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This thesis examines the following hypothesis:  Through the combined use of 
common training and collaborative planning, a decision maker may sufficiently alleviate 
the harmful effects of an environment of information so that he/she can continue to make 
effective decisions. An environment of extreme information ambiguity, a dependent 
variable, is one of the most difficult components of a battle where the decision maker 
may reach a confusing and debilitating point where surviving seems less and less likely. 
Common training, an independent variable, purports that everyone who is relevant to the 
situation in the battlespace has similar skills, education, doctrine, and standards of 
performance coupled with comparable experiences. Collaborative planning, an 
independent variable, connotes a sharing of ideas; synchronization of assets, use of 
information technology, global real-time mission planning, face-to-face meetings, and 
other information sharing techniques for situations of collective concern.  
This thesis is a unique and in depth exploration of the relation of these three 
variables. Until now, no other research has looked at the relation of common training and 
collaborative planning with respect to decision making in environments of extreme 
information ambiguity. In order to explore the model the researcher analyzed two 
historical military battles: the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of Midway. Detailed 
research using a case study method was conducted to determine if the battles 
substantiated the thesis model. Research results indicate that for the maritime battles 
studied, the model appears to be a useful tool for interpretation and description of events 
and their outcomes. However, future studies should also increase the number and type of 
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War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life or death, 
the road either to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be 
studied thoroughly.1 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An environment of extreme information ambiguity is one of the most difficult 
components of a battle. In such an environment, the decision maker may reach a 
confusing and debilitating point where surviving seems less and less likely. Furthermore, 
the decision maker’s senses and capacity to continue functioning are so overwhelmed, 
there is sometimes a tendency towards paralysis and an inability to function. In addition 
to an environment of extreme information ambiguity, the dependent variable in this 
thesis, this study will also focus on two independent variables, common training and 
collaborative planning.  
Briefly, common training purports that everyone who is relevant to the situation 
in a battlespace has similar skills and standards of performance coupled with comparable 
experiences. Collaborative planning connotes a sharing of ideas; synchronization of 
assets; use of information technology; global real-time mission planning among units, of 
all types, in all the services; face-to-face meetings; and other information sharing 
techniques. In-depth explanations of each variable are presented in the definitions section 
of this chapter. 
The fundamental goal of this thesis is to illustrate the relationship between these 
three variables and to demonstrate that, through the combined use of common training 
and collaborative planning, a decision maker may sufficiently alleviate the harmful 
effects of an environment of extreme information ambiguity so that he/she can continue 
to make effective decisions.2 These variables are important and related to military 
decision making and the success or defeat of a commander on the battlefield. Through the 
use of common training and collaborative planning, the decision maker must ensure: 
                                                 
1 Sun-Tzu. 
2 Military decision making is often conceived of as involving the process of forming probability 
estimates of events and using them to choose between different courses of action in battle. 
1 
1. Subordinates know what needs to be done. 
2. Subordinates can carry out his orders.  
3. Subordinates actually carry out his orders.  
4. How well subordinates carried out his orders.  
As shall be discussed and argued, common training and collaborative planning 
relate directly and unavoidably to effective military decision making. Making the correct 
decisions in today’s modern combat is imperative. Another reason this topic is of great 
importance is because, until now, no other research has looked at the relationship 
between common training and collaborative planning with respect to decision making in 
environments of extreme information ambiguity. This thesis is a unique and in-depth 
intial exploration of the relation of these three variables. 
B. DEFINITIONS: 
1. Environments of Extreme Information Ambiguity 
In the process of researching, developing, and finalizing a description of an 
environment of extreme information ambiguity, the researcher must concede that, more 
or less, such an environment is oftentimes characterized as the fog of war. Having 
conceded that, there is significance in using a unique term for this research. With the 
creation of this term, the researcher has sought to distinguish or emphasize a very 
particular element of the fog of war -- the information domain. To that end, great effort 
has been made to demonstrate how intensely ambiguous the information domain 
inevitably becomes in battle. Furthermore, this definition serves to help the reader 
encapsulate what a decision maker feels when caught up in such an environment. Lastly, 
for those that already understand the term, fog of war, this definition of an environment 
of extreme information ambiguity should serve as a refresher for the key aspects of the 
fog of war as they pertain to decision making, the information domain, and the thesis 
model. 
To further illustrate the complexity and significance of this new term, Appendix B 
offers a visual conceptualization of Colonel John Boyd’s OODA “Loop.” This 
comprehensive and multipart diagram reinforces the complexity of the decision making 
process/cycle. Additionally, the diagram underlines that fact that the decision loop does 
not move from one step to the next and only in one direction at a time. Rather, all 
2 
elements (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) proceed concurrently and in both directions 
(note the directions of the arrows). Further detail on the OODA loop is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
Table 1 displays the characteristics of, and reactions to, an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity.  The first part of the table details five general 
characteristics of an environment of extreme information ambiguity. These five 
characteristics are friction, ambiguity, time pressure, delayed action-feedback loops, and 
high stakes. The subsequent three parts of Table 1 detail reactions to these characteristics 
and are organized in to three categories -- senses, cognition, and affect. 
An environment of extreme information ambiguity is by definition a complex 
system. A complex system is a system whose characteristics are not fully understood by a 
comprehension of its individual parts. Complex systems contain a great number of 
mutually interacting and interwoven parts, entities or agents. Furthermore, complex 
systems are open systems. Energy and information are incessantly imported and exported 
across system borders. Because of all this activity, complex systems are often far from 
equilibrium -- even though there is continuous change there is also the look of stability. 
Complex systems are also nested systems. Yet another key aspect of complex adaptive 
systems is that the components of the system, usually referred to as agents, are 
themselves complex adaptive systems. For instance, “an economy is made up of 
organizations, which are made up of people, who are systems of organs controlled by 
their nervous systems and endocrine systems, which are made up of cells - all of which, 
at each level in the hierarchy, are complex adaptive systems.” 3 
From this, it is not a far stretch to see that an environment of extreme information 
ambiguity is, in itself, complexity. Taking this concept one step further, one can see how 
a navy (e.g., the United States Navy) should always try to create complexity for an 
adversary. In developing and using forces, including the future United States Naval Fleet, 
the ability to complicate warfare for an enemy is an important consideration (i.e., the 
ability to effect his environment of information ambiguity.) In maritime operations, 
elements that may complicate the operational problems facing an adversary include: 
                                                 
3 < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complex_system >Last accessed September 16th, 2005. 
3 
forcing the enemy to deal with large numbers of combat entities; a variety of platforms 
with which to the enemy must contend; speed and maneuverability; different 
combinations of forces; distribution of forces across large areas; and ambiguity as to the 
mission and abilities of a given platform.4 
                                                 
4 Stuart E. Johnson and Arthur K. Cebrowski, Alternative Fleet Architecture Design, Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University, August 2005, iii. 
4 
Table 1. External Characteristics of and Reactions to Environments of Extreme 
Information Ambiguity - Senses, Affect, Cognitive 
 
# Factor Description 
Characteristics of Environments of Extreme Information Ambiguity 
1. External events: Imposed by enemy actions, the terrain, weather, or chance.   
2. Self-induced: Caused by such factors as lack of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, 
unclear or complicated plans, complex task organizations or command relationships, or 
complicated technologies. 1 Friction 
3. Whatever form it takes, because war is a human enterprise, friction will always have a 
psychological as well as a physical impact. 
A. Ambiguous data: Imperfect sensors provide less than 100% accurate data due to elements 
such as weather, atmospherics, and system design limitations.  
B. Correlation of data: May lead to several different possible threat assessment solutions. 
C. Rules of engagement: ROE may not cover all situations or may be confusing. There are 
often different levels of ROE for dealing with different targets and countries which 
complicates responses.  
2 Ambiguity 
D. Vague Commander's Intent: Written/stated so mission priorities are not clear to 
subordinates. 
3 Time Pressure Forces the decision maker to make decisions and take action when he/she does not have all the necessary information.  
4 Delayed Action-Feedback Loops  
Warfighter may not receive feedback or battle damage assessment for many hours. May not 
know whether actions have been successful or not. 
5 High Stakes Making high stakes, life and death decisions, that may impact subordinates or even the future of the nation. 
 
Reactions  to Environments of Extreme Information Ambiguity 
SENSES 
6 Touch/Taste deadened Mouth may be dry / loss of taste 
7 Sight affected Sight becomes poor or non-existent. Sight of blood, dust, smoke, fire, body parts, splintering wood, or shrapnel, or the death of comrades may trigger these sensual reactions.  
8 Smell affected Experiences smell of burning vegetation, flesh, decaying bodies, burning wood, gunpowder, or the aftermath of an exploding bomb. 
9 Hearing reduced or made impossible. 
Ceaseless, deafening sounds such as machine gun fire, artillery & bombs exploding, and the 





10 Decision Maker Ability to Think 
Confusing and debilitating point at which surviving seems less and less likely. Senses 
overwhelmed, debilitated, and tending towards paralysis. Decision maker is increasingly less 
able to function. 
11 Cognitive Tunnel Vision 
The decision maker experiences a narrowing of attention. Situation where, due to cognitive 
overload, the decision maker cannot process all the information, which in turn may bias the 
decision-making process. 
12 Information Overload 
Often times difficult to discern the situation from inaccurate, missing, or ambiguous data in 
this inherently ambiguous environment.5 
 
AFFECT 
1. Fear of dying: Decision maker may be affected by a fear of death. 
2. Fear of making bad decisions: Decision maker may fear the consequences of bad 
decisions. 
3. Fear of not understanding a situation: Decision maker may feel incapable of completely 
understanding a situation or of misinterpreting a situation. 
13 Fear 
4. Fear of friendly fire: Decision maker may fear the possibility, or reality of, fire that injures 
or kills a fellow serviceman or an ally. 
 
Characteristics of Environments of Extreme Information Ambiguity 
a. Friction 
For the description of friction, this research simply relies on the original 
source of the term friction as it pertains to war. Clausewitz said, “Friction is that force 
which separates real war from war on paper. The difficulties accumulate and end by 
producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war."6 The 
United States Marine Corps takes it one step farther with their Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication 1 (MCDP 1),  
Friction may be external, imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, 
or mere chance. Friction may be self-induced, caused by such factors as 





                                                 
5 Moore, 2. 
6 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Edited and Translated 
by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 
6 
plans, complex task organizations or command relationships, or 
complicated technologies. Whatever form it takes, because war is a human 
enterprise, friction will always have a psychological as well as a physical 
impact.7 
b. Ambiguity 
Ambiguity can take many forms. First, imperfect sensors provide less than 
100% accurate data due to elements such as weather, atmospherics, and system design 
limitations. For example, if a decision maker is dealing with an enemy like an insurgency 
group who is trying to be stealthy, deliberately deceptive, or misleading, it may be 
difficult to obtain accurate information. Second, correlation of data may lead to several 
different possible threat assessment solutions. For instance, a commander may be 
receiving information from many sources or subordinates at the same time, and those 
inputs may be suggesting different courses of action. Third, rules of engagement may not 
cover all situations or may be confusing. There are often different levels of ROE for 
dealing with different targets and countries which complicates responses. Lastly, vague 
commander's intent may be written/stated so mission priorities are not clear to 
subordinates. 
c. Time Pressure 
Time pressure forces the decision maker to make decisions and take action 
when he/she does not have all the necessary information. For example, during World War 
II at the Battle of Midway, both the Japanese Royal Navy and the United States Navy 
commanders experienced time pressure on June 4th, 1942, as they pondered their decision 
on when to launch their respective attacks on one another, all the while feeling they had 
little time to spare.8 
d. Delayed Action-Feedback Loops 
Action-feedback loops may become delayed. Warfighters may not receive 
feedback or battle damage assessment for many hours. What is more, they may not know 
whether actions have been successful or not. This lack of accurate information adds 
further ambiguity to an already inherently ambiguous environment. 
                                                 
7 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, 5-6. 
8 Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press), 1987, 145. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with 
Japan, (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 171. 
7 
e. High Stakes 
Commanders often times must make high stakes, life and death decisions 
that may impact subordinates or even the future of the nation. Returning to the example 
of the Battle of Midway, Admiral Nagumo, commander of the Japanese carrier strike 
force, in making the decision to delay the launch of his carrier planes in favor of waiting 
and preparing for a “full scale” attack, doomed thousands of his men to death, lost four 
carriers, lost the Battle of Midway, and arguably changed the entire course of the war.9 
Nagumo was the epitomy of a commander forced to make a high stakes decisions. 
All of the characteristics of environments of extreme information 
ambiguity tend to create nerve-racking environments and strain for the decision maker 
which in turn causes particular personal reactions which frequently impact his/her 
thought process and decision strategies. Accordingly, environments of extreme 
information ambiguity can be further understood by describing how the five senses, 
cognition, and affect factor into a decision maker’s ability or inability to make effective 
decisions in this overwhelming environment. In short, the next few sections answer the 
question of what are the decision maker’s reactions to environments of extreme 
information ambiguity.  
Reactions to Environments of Extreme Information Ambiguity 
f. Senses – Touch, Taste, Sight, Smell, Hearing  
At the height of an ambiguous situation, touch and taste may become 
deadened or perhaps the decision maker will experience dry mouth. Similarly a sense 
such as sight can be poor, unpleasant, or non-existent. The sight of blood, dust, smoke, 
fire, body parts, or the horrific death of comrades may trigger these sensual reactions.  
Regarding the sense of smell, imagine the smell of burning vegetation or flesh; rotting 
bodies; the harsh smell of burning gasoline; or the aftermath of exploding bombs. There 
may be ceaseless, deafening sounds coming from every direction. For instance, imagine 




                                                 
9 Spector, 172.  
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bombs exploding, or the screams of buddies being wounded or killed. Inevitably, the 
ability to hear is significantly reduced or made extremely difficult due to the noise of the 
battlefield, so much so, that even communicating with someone nearby is often times 
nearly impossible. 
g. Cognition 
An understanding of the cognitive component of an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity and how it impacts the warfighter’s decision making and 
thought processes is critically important. The following elements of cognitive decision 
making are discussed: decision maker’s ability to think, cognitive tunnel vision, and 
information overload.  
h. Decision Maker Ability to Think 
An organization is composed of people, each of whom, under the right 
conditions, can become a decision maker. A military decision maker is often confronted 
with environments of extreme information ambiguity. At the most confusing point of a 
battle, while operating in such an uncertain environment, the decision maker reaches a 
point at which surviving seems less and less likely. Tending towards paralysis, one’s 
senses and capacity to continue functioning become increasingly overwhelmed and 
degraded. Despite this confusion, a decision maker who is equipped to deal with such an 
environment endeavors to diminish the environment’s dangerous effects and WILL 
continue to function and orchestrate the operation or campaign.  
Of note, it is essential to continually reinforce the idea that the effects of 
an environment of extreme information ambiguity can only be mitigated and not 
eliminated completely. Furthermore, a decision maker that tries to eliminate the injurious 
effects of this type of environment will expend a disproportionate amount of energy, 
resources, and time for little to no gain. For clarification, the reader should distinguish 
between an environment and the “effects” an environment has on a person or thing. One 
cannot eliminate an environment per se, but one can lessen or tone down the “effects” of 
an environment. 
i. Cognitive Tunnel vision 
Another such reaction is cognitive tunnel vision. Cognitive tunnel vision 
refers to a situation where the decision maker cannot process all the information and 
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biases which impact the decision-making process.10 The decision maker experiences a 
narrowing of attention and a situation where, due to cognitive overload, he/she cannot 
process all the information, which in turn may bias the decision-making process. 
j. Information Overload 
Information overload occurs when it becomes difficult for the decision 
maker to discern the situation because of inaccurate, missing, or ambiguous data.11 
Information overload also speaks to the condition of having too much information to 
make a decision or remain informed about the ongoing situation/battle. For example, 
large amounts of currently available information, a high rate of new information being 
added, contradictions in available information, and inefficient methods for comparing and 
processing different kinds of information can all contribute to this effect. Essentially, 
information overload comes from having more information on hand than the individual or 
organization can readily assimilate.12 
k. Affect 
Affect is an emotion (an emotional response to a situation) or a 
subjectively experienced feeling. Emotion is an aspect of a person's mental state of being, 
normally based in or tied to the person's internal (physical) and external (social) sensory 
feeling.13 Fear is one example of affect that has particular relevance to this discussion on 
decision making in environments of extreme information ambiguity. “Fear is an 
unpleasant feeling of perceived risk or danger, real or not.”14 For example, a decision 
maker may be affected by a fear of death or a fear of making bad decisions (e.g., 
Decision maker may fear the consequences of bad decisions.). Additionally, there may be 
a fear of not understanding a situation. For instance, he/she may feel incapable of 
completely understanding a situation or of misinterpreting a set of circumstances. Lastly, 
                                                 
10 Susan G. Hutchins, William G. Kemple, Ron Adamo, and Dan Boger, Knowledge Management and 
Collaboration in an Effects-Based Operations, Graduate School of Operations and Information Sciences 
Naval Postgraduate School, May 1, 2002, 1-2. 
11 Ronald A. Moore, Intelligent Aided Communication (ia C) in a Command and Control 
Environment, Pacific Science & Engineering Group, Inc., 2. 
12 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_overload> Last accessed September 8, 2005. 
13 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotion> Last accessed September 9, 2005.  
14 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fear>  Last accessed September 9, 2005. 
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one may experience a fear of friendly fire to the extent that the decision maker may fear 
the possibility, or reality of, fire that injures or kills a fellow serviceman or an ally. 
2. Common Training 
This section on common training, akin to the previous section, is reinforced by a 
table divided into two parts, i.e., characteristics of common training and products of 
receiving common training (see Table 2 next page). 
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Table 2. Characteristics and Products of Receiving Common Training 
 
Characteristics of Common Training 
# Factor Description 
1 Similar Training, Education, Doctrine 
Friendly commanders, at similar levels of command and rank, have similar training, 
education, and doctrine and have all rehearsed before an actual battle takes place. 
(e.g., Officer Training: Naval Academy, Officer Candidate School, Reserve Officer 
Training Corps. Enlisted Training: Basic Training. 
2 Vigorous Training and Rehearsal 
Vigorous training is necessary before actual battle. The result is a force that is freer 
to execute its mission without being bogged down by the requirement for explicit 
communication from the chain of command.       
3 Mission-Oriented Command    (Auftragstaktik) 
German military leadership principle. It is a decentralized leadership and command 
philosophy that pushes decisions and actions down to the lowest level where there 
exists an intimate knowledge of the most intimate details of the circumstances and of 
the commander’s objectives. The mission order is a technique utilized to implement 
and execute mission-oriented commands.  
4 Moltke System 
"This Prussian system institutionalized combat efficiency  by ensuring that in a given 
situation different staff officers, educated to a common fighting doctrine, would 
arrive at approximately the same solution to employ the available forces most 
effectively. In addition to personnel, this system depended on conformity to a 
common fighting doctrine and common operational procedures."15 
Products of Receiving Common Training 
5 Similar Skills Everyone who is relevant to the situation in the battlespace has similar skills and standards of performance coupled with similar experiences. 
6 Similar Perception and Reaction 
May share similar perception and reaction to any given event. Friendly commanders, 
at similar levels of command and rank, have similar training and doctrine and have 
all rehearsed before an actual battle takes place.  
7 Alignment amongst Commanders 
Alignment of friendly battlespace commanders in the battlespace which minimizes 
the need for complete dependence on command, control, and communications. 
8 Harmony, or focus and direction, in operations  
There exists a “a harmony, or focus and direction, in operations (which) is created by 
the bonds of communication and trust that evolve as a consequence of the similar 
mental images or impressions each individual creates and commits to memory by 
repeatedly sharing the same variety of experiences in the same ways.”16 
9 Implicit connections and bonds The soldiers and commanders have implicit connections and bonds; an understanding which is unstated or is not communicated to one another.  
 
                                                 
15 Gunther Rothenburg, “Moltke and Schlieffen” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
16 Boyd, 18. 
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Characteristics of Common Training 
a. Similar Training, Education, and Doctrine 
The primary characteristic of common training is similar training, 
education, and doctrine. More precisely, all friendly commanders, at similar levels of 
command and rank, have similar training, doctrine, and all have rehearsed before an 
actual battle takes place. A friendly commander on one side of the battle field has training 
comparable to a friendly commander on the other side of the battlefield (in training, 
doctrine, and basic military training, i.e., Naval Academy, Officer Candidate School, and 
Reserve Officers Training Corps).  
b. Vigorous Training and Rehearsal 
Common training necessitates a lot of vigorous training and rehearsal 
before actual battle, but the result is a force that is freer to execute its mission without 
being bogged down by the requirement for explicit communication from the chain of 
command.17 
c. Mission-Oriented Command (Auftragstaktik) 
One cannot fully appreciate the many merits of common training without a 
basic understanding of the concept of mission-oriented command, or Auftragstaktik, a 
leadership principle the German military has been employing for two hundred years.18 
Evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth century, Auftragstaktik is a command and 
control principle developed primarily by former Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke, Chief 
of the General Staff of the Prussian Army from 1857 to 1888. It is a decentralized 
leadership and command philosophy that pushes decisions and actions down to the lowest 
level where there exists first-hand knowledge of the most intimate details of the 
circumstances and of the commander’s objectives. The mission order is a technique 
utilized to implement and execute mission oriented commands.  
                                                 
17Lieutenant Colonel John L. Silva, Infantry - Auftragstaktik – Its Origin and Development, 
September-October 1989, 6-9. 
18 Robert M. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare, (2004), 18-25.  
Auftragstaktik, although an important element of German tactics, was by no means the only tactic they 
used. The Germans trained as an army to be well-rounded and balanced. They looked very unfavorably on 
and tried hard to avoid Einseitigkeit (one-sidedness) in their discourse. In reality, Auftragstaktik is really an 
Americanization of certain mission-oriented tactics used by the Germans, and is word the Germans seldom 
used.  
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Mission-oriented command is based on the principle that initiative and 
creativity in execution and completion of the mission is done without fear of retribution 
by higher command in the case of a possible mistake by a junior. Simply stated, the 
subordinate is trained and expected to act. There are several components of mission-
oriented command: mutual trust among leaders based on each person’s thorough 
knowledge of the other person’s capabilities; training and organization in everything the 
army does to reinforce the importance of the man at the scene (decentralization); and 
lastly; simple, commonly accepted and understood operations concepts. The success of 
battle with Auftragstaktik depends on the initiative of junior leaders and their willingness 
to act in support of their commander’s intent. This is key.  
The mission-oriented control practiced by the German Army from 1800 to 
1945 accepted a centralized lack of control over all events on the battlefield. More 
important than being in total control of each junior’s actions, the Germans felt it was 
more essential for their people to act, especially in the absence of orders. The Germans 
wanted to know their fighting forces would contribute to completing the mission instead 
of waiting around for orders so they could do the “right” thing. Auftragstaktik provides a 
way for a soldier at the front to act in the spirit of a particular mission.  
Lastly, inaction, not wrong action, is the cardinal sin of Auftragstaktik. 
Mission-oriented command is based on the concept of trust between a superior and his 
personnel. Further, mission-oriented command condemns undue criticism of the person 
on the scene because it is them, and them alone (in the confused and dangerous situation) 
who has the best command of which actions to take to complete the mission.  
Auftragstaktik is a command and control system where explicit communications are not 
the only way to get things done. Commanders are able to exploit lower level initiative 
because their troops know what to do -- things happen, and decisions are made. 
d. Moltke System 
The following quote from Gunther Rothenburg’s book, “Moltke and 
Schleiffen,” compliments the discussion on mission-oriented command and is a 
characteristic which epitomizes the concept of common training. 
This Prussian system institutionalized combat efficiency by ensuring that 
in a given situation different staff officers, educated to a common fighting 
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doctrine, would arrive at approximately the same solution to employ the 
available forces most effectively. In addition to personnel, this system 
depended on conformity to a common fighting doctrine and common 
operational procedures.19 
Products of Receiving Common Training 
e. Similar Skills 
The discussion proceeds with a description of the products of receiving 
common training. Ideally, common training means everyone who is relevant to the 
situation in the battlespace has similar skills and standards of performance coupled with 
similar experience. 
f. Similar Perceptions and Reactions 
Commanders may share similar perception and reaction to any given 
event. For instance, when a Captain at sea sees a column of enemy destroyers come over 
the horizon, he reacts in a way analogous to the Captain of a friendly ship twenty miles 
away without calling on the radio. It just happens. In an ideal world, every action is 
common: thinking, training, education, actions.  
g. Alignment amongst Commanders 
Once in battle, once friction begins to increase, common training enables 
one friendly battlefield commander to be in all but complete alignment with another 
friendly battlefield commander to successfully navigate on to victory.  Alignment enables 
a friendly battlespace commander to be familiar with other friendly commanders in the 
battlespace, and it minimizes the need for complete dependence on command, control, 
and communications.  
h. Harmony, or Focus and Direction, in Operations 
The types of conditions produced by an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity require commanders to observe and orient themselves 
simultaneously to the situation at hand so that effective decisions can be made in support 
of the objective. Colonel John Boyd, inventor of the OODA loop, says that in 
environments such as these, “a harmony, or focus and direction, in operations is created 
by the bonds of communication and trust that evolve as a consequence of the similar 
                                                 
19 Gunther Rothenburg, “Moltke and Schlieffen” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 53. 
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mental images or impressions each individual creates and commits to memory by 
repeatedly sharing the same variety of experiences in the same ways.”20 This is the 
essence of common training. 
i. Implicit Connections and Bonds 
Referring back to the discussion of mission-oriented command, military 
forces (i.e., commanders/decision makers and the men and women they command) have 
implicit connections and bonds; an understanding which is unstated or not communicated 
to one another. As a result, the commander’s intent is fulfilled and he has more time to do 
other things.21  
3. Collaborative Planning 
Collaboration offers great potential to better enable warfighters to plan, 
monitor, execute, and assess activities across the spectrum of joint 
functional areas.22 
The term collaborative planning describes the challenging process of how to deal 
with situations of collective concern. These situations arise from the problems and 
opportunities of relational groups in shared spaces, most often sharing very different 
priorities and ways of looking at things. Through shared comprehension of the issues, 
open communication, reciprocal trust, and acceptance of differing points of view, 
collaborative planning facilitates a capability for joint planning, shared resources, and 
joint resource management en route to developing solutions and solving differences.23 
Put another way, “it involves people working together for solutions that maximize 
the gains for all parties”24 in and around the battlespace. Resolving conflict from the 
perspective of collaboration depends on a fundamental principal identified by Chrislip 
and Larson (1994), “implicit trust that diverse people engaged in constructive ways and 
provided with the necessary information to make good decisions can be relied upon to 
                                                 
20 Colonel John R. Boyd, Discourse on Winning and Losing, s.n. 1987, 18. 
21 Boyd, 18. 
22 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 1-2. 
23 <http://www.nccev.org/resources/terms.html> Last accessed on September 9, 2005. 
24 Myra Warren Isenhart/Michael Spangle, Collaborative Approaches to Resolving Conflict, Sage 
Publications      Inc., 2000, Chapter 2, pg. 23. 
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create appropriate answers to the most pressing problems.”25 The characteristics and 
products of participating in collaborative planning are listed in Table 3.  
                                                 
25 Chrislip, D. & Larson, C., Collaborative Leadership, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994, pg. 14.  
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Table 3. Characteristics and By-Products of Receiving Collaborative Planning 
 
Characteristics of Collaborative Planning 
# Factor Description 
1 Sharing Ideas 
Sharing ideas and actions among people, machines, and joint coalition 
forces.26 
2 Synchronization of Assets 
Synchronization of assets so everyone has access to the same assets and 
information as near to instantly as possible.27 
3 Physical Collaborative Tools 
Planning may use physical, paper-based inputs, processes and outputs for 
the performance of tactical mission planning of mission orders, intelligence 
reports and operational area graphics. 




mission planning  
A fully integrated IT system to enable global real-time collaborative 
tactical mission planning among units, of all types, in all the services.28 
6 Face-to-Face Meetings Face-to-face meetings with fellow planners. 
7 Multiple Information Sharing Techniques 
Techniques such as the ability to share applications, have a virtual 
workspace, use voice/audio, whiteboard, video, and chat functions. 29  
By-Products of Utilizing Collaborative Planning 
8 Shared Situational Awareness 
Through the use of collaborative tools, individuals develop shared 
situational awareness among heterogeneous, distributed team members.30 
9 
Information Flows, Issues 
are Raised, Brainstorming 
occurs 
Collaboration enables information to flow quickly, outstanding issues can 
be raised, and a certain amount of brainstorming can occur to arrive at a 
decision.31 
10 
Reach a fuller 
understanding of the 
issues 
All relevant users or providers of information are able to reach a fuller 
understanding of the issues because they have seen other viewpoints and 
received a freer flow of information.32 
11 
Share information across 
geographic and temporal 
boundaries 
Collaborative tools offer the capability to share information and resources 
and coordinate among individuals across geographic and temporal 
boundaries. 
12 
Near Real Time: maintain 
clearer picture/access to 
all relevant information 
With sufficient bandwidth warfighters maintain a clearer picture of the 
situation because everyone involved in planning has access to all relevant 
information, all the time, and can communicate ideas to all participants in 
near-real time33 (with a goal of the same process becoming instant). 
                                                 
26 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 1-2.  
27 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 1-2. 
28 Brzostowski and Smith II, 7. 
29 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 2. 
30 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 1. 
31 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 2. 
32 Truver, 46-48. 
33 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 1-2. 
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Characteristics of Collaborative Planning 
a. Sharing Ideas 
 The goal of collaborative planning is to achieve a sharing of ideas and 
actions among people, machines, and joint coalition forces.  
b. Synchronization of Assets 
Collaborative planning and, more specifically, sharing ideas, requires 
synchronization of all assets so everyone has access to the same assets and information as 
near to instantly as possible. 
c. Physical Collaboration Tools  
The collaborative planning techniques, or style, used today have evolved 
from where they were during the time of the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, and from where 
they were during the Battle of Midway in 1942. Even then, collaborative planning was 
still people working as a group to strive towards a common goal. However, the exact 
means and methods by which they achieved their planning and coordination of goals was 
slightly different, mostly due to the technology available to planners at that time.   
Until the late 1970’s, tactical mission planning was performed using 
almost exclusively physical, paper-based inputs, processes and outputs. 
Mission orders, intelligence reports, and operational area graphics were all 
received on paper. Mission planning cells processed these inputs and 
produced maps, overlays, diagrams, checklists and mission briefs by hand. 
The mission briefings were then conducted referring to paper maps with 
acetate overlays…34 
d. Information Technology 
Fast forward to the year 2005, and notice the increase in the availability 
and capability of collaboration efforts that utilize Information Technology (IT) tools. 
Participants utilize Information Technology (IT) tools which increase the availability and 
capability of collaboration efforts.35 
 
 
                                                 34 Stephen C. Brzostowski and Larry E. Smith II, Transition of naval Expeditionary Force’s Tactical 
Mission Planning Systems to a global collaborative capability (thesis title), (Naval Postgraduate School 
September 2003), 7. 
35 Brzostowski and Smith II, 7. 
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e. Global Real-Time Collaborative Tactical Mission Planning 
 By the year 2000, the Department of Defense (DoD) began a joint 
program to develop a fully integrated IT system to enable global real-time collaborative 
tactical mission planning among units, of all types, in all the services.36 
f. Face-to-Face Meetings 
Face-to-face meetings allow collaborators to come together with a mutual 
goal and accomplish their objective through discussion with one another. Some studies 
have shown people are more likely to buy into a concept if they can see the person who is 
presenting it. Furthermore, because visual information can be shared in real-time, face-to-
face meetings generally condense the time it takes to complete most tasks. “Despite their 
many conveniences, phones, fax machines and e-mail don't come close to delivering the 
collaborative energy of a face-to-face meeting because so many of the sociological 
communication cues are missing.”37  
g. Multiple Information Sharing Techniques 
Decision makers who plan collaboratively may benefit from the ability to 
share applications, have a virtual workspace, use voice/audio, whiteboard, video 
conferencing, and chat functions.38 Regarding chat functions, “during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom collaborative technology enabled war planners to target elusive targets more 
quickly. Previously, war planners were placing phone calls and sending emails and faxes 
to relay data on potential threats.”39 
                                                 36 Brzostowski and Smith II, 8. 
37 <http://www.3m.com/meetingnetwork/readingroom/meetingguide_video.html> Last accessed 
September 9, 2005. 
38 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 1-2. 
39 Alex Bordetsky, Susan G. Hutchins, William G. Kemple, and Eugene Bourakov, Providing Network 
Awareness For Peer-to-Peer Tactical Collaborative Environment, (Naval Postgraduate School, 
Information Sciences Department), 3. Butler, 2003. 
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Products of Utilizing Collaborative Planning 
h. Shared Situational Awareness 
Through the use of collaborative tools, individuals develop shared 
situational awareness among heterogeneous, distributed team members.40 The following 
definition offers one way to conceptualize the fundamental meaning of shared situational 
awareness. 
Shared situational awareness…translates to a clear and accurate, common, 
relevant picture of the battlespace for leaders at all levels and a reduction 
in the potential for fratricide. Situational awareness answers three 
fundamental battlefield questions: Where am I? Where are my friends? 
Where is the enemy? The sharing of timely information enabled by 
digitalization improves significantly the ability of commanders and leaders 
to quickly make decisions, synchronize forces and fires, and increase the 
operational tempo.41   
Of note, there are several other elements of information  that contribute to 
better shared situational awareness such as policy, strategy, operations, technology, 
logistics, tactics, plans, command structure, personalities, posture, environment, and the 
list goes on.42 
i. Information Flows, Issues are Raised, Brainstorming Occurs 
Benefits like information flowing more quickly, outstanding issues being 
raised, and a certain amount of brainstorming amongst planners occurring to arrive at a 
decision are just some of the benefits that can be gained via the use of collaborative 
planning tools.  
                                                 
40 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 1-2. 
41 Lt. Gen. Paul J. Kern and Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams. http://armed-services.senate.gov/ Lt. Gen. Paul 
J. Kern, Military Deputy, and Acquisition, and Lt. Gen. John N. Abrams, Deputy Commanding General, 
TRADOC, provided this definition of shared situational awareness as part of their testimony before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee in 1998. 
42 Albert A. Nofi, Defining and Measuring Shared Situational Awareness, (Center for Naval Analyses, 
Alexandria, Virginia, November 2000), 6. 
<http://www.thoughtlink.com/publications/DefiningSSA00Abstract.htm> Last accessed on September 9, 
2005. 
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j. Reach a Fuller Understanding of the Issues 
Additionally, “all relevant users or providers of information reach a fuller 
understanding of the issues because they have seen other viewpoints and received a freer 
flow of information”43  
k. Share Information Across Geographic and Temporal Boundaries 
Collaborative tools offer the added capabilities of providing the ability to 
share information and resources and coordinate among individuals across geographic and 
temporal boundaries.44 
l. Near Real-Time: Maintain Clearer Picture/Access to All 
Relevant Information 
With sufficient bandwidth, collaborative planning enables warfighters to 
maintain a clearer picture of the situation because everyone involved in the planning has 
access to all relevant information, all the time, and can communicate ideas to all 
participants in near-real time (with a goal of the same process eventually becoming 
instant). 
It is clear to see just how dispersed units, commanders, and coalition 
forces can and do benefit from the practice of collaborative planning. It is not a far stretch 
to see how a technique such as collaboration benefits the decision maker/leader in almost 
every situation, especially in times of crisis. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis, through exploration and research, shall examine the following model:  
Through the combined use of common training and collaborative planning, a decision 
maker may sufficiently alleviate the harmful effects of an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity so that he/she can continue to make effective decisions. In order 
for a decision maker/commander to make the right decisions and emerge successful from 
environments of extreme information ambiguity, that decision maker must make use of 
common training and collaborative planning to lesson the harmful effects of  ambiguous 
information environments. Furthermore, one must be able to utilize both concepts 
effectively so as to emerge successful and victorious in battle.  
                                                 43 Scott C. Truver, Spearheading Joint Transformation – And Supporting Homeland Defense, Sea 
Power, December 2001, 46-48. 
44 Hutchins, Kemple, Adamo, and Boger, 1-2. 
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D. METHOD OF EXPLORATION 
To explore the hypothesis the researcher analyzed two historical military battles: 
the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of Midway. These battles were chosen from an 
initial pool of more than twenty five different historical military battles or military events 
that were initially nominated for consideration.  The initial pool was created using an 
exploratory research method which provided an objective method for choosing which 
battles would receive further study. The goal was to create a large collection of potential 
military battles where environments of extreme information ambiguity were prominent. 
Interviews were conducted with several professors who were nominated by others who 
knew their areas of concentration. 
Two battles were chosen for in-depth research. Based on the ten interviews 
conducted, there were only two cases where a particular battle received at least two votes. 
At that point, detailed research began into each case in order to determine whether the 
case studies substantiated or did not substantiate (and how much) the thesis statement. 
The findings of the analysis for each battle are written up in Chapter IV. While 
researching each battle, particular attention was paid to three different things: (1) 
Instances that demonstrated a decision maker operating in an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity, (2) Instances of a decision maker using common training or 
collaborative planning or both to diminish the effects of the ambiguous information 
environment, and (3) Instances of a decision maker using anything else to lessen the 
effects of the uncertain information environment. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into the following chapters: 1. Introduction, 2. Research 













































II. RESEARCH METHODS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of the thesis model is to show how military decision makers maintain 
the ability to make successful decisions by mitigating the debilitating effects of 
environments of extreme information ambiguity through the combined use of common 
training and collaborative planning. In order to determine the validity of the model, the 
researcher analyzed two historical military battles: the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle 
of Midway. These battles were chosen from an initial pool of more than twenty five 
different historical military battles or military events that were initially nominated for 
consideration including battles such as the Battle of Jutland and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
An initial pool of battles was created using an exploratory research method which 
provided an objective method for choosing which battles would receive further study. 
Specific details of the exploratory research method used for this thesis are described at 
length in section II of this chapter. In short, it is a method that uses a style of interview 
and questions that help to generate a particular type of data. In this case, the goal was to 
create a large collection of military battles where environments of extreme information 
ambiguity were prominent. Interviews were conducted with ten professors from the 
Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College in Monterey, California. These 
professors were nominated by others who knew their areas of concentration. The battles 
chosen for further case study analysis were chosen based on a specially scripted question 
and presented in the same way under the same conditions to every subject interviewed. 
Once interviews were conducted with all of the these professors who were 
considered highly knowledgeable about military history by their peers, their responses 
were catalogued in Table 4 in order to determine if there was any convergence of opinion 
in the interview results (i.e., Was any battle cited by more than one of the respondents?). 
Based on the data obtained from the ten interview, there were only two cases where a 
particular battle received at least two votes. Based on analysis of the data in Table 4, the 
respondents most often nominated the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle 
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 Table 4. Results of Academic Source Survey45 
 
Respondent Battle/Event War Year Commander 
A Battle of Trafalgar   Nelson 
 Battle of the Bulge World War II   
 Tet Offensive Vietnam War 1968  
 Leyte Gulf World War II  Halsey 
 Saipan World War II  Spruance 
B Battle of Midway World War II   
 Battle of Guadal Canal World War II   
  Iraqi Freedom 
C No response given    
D Battle at Tarawa World War II   
  Iraqi Freedom 
     
E Chinese vs. Americans Korean War 1950 Macarthur 
 Battle of Missionary Ridge Civil War   
F Battle of Trafalgar   Nelson 
    Napoleon 
G Battle of the Atlantic World War II   
 Invasion of Iraq Iraqi Freedom   
  Korean War 
 Afghanistan 
Operation Enduring 
Freedom   
 North Korea Korean War   
 Palestine    
H German High Command World War II   
 Soviet Union Commanders World War II   
 Japanese C2 World War II   
  Civil War  George B. McClellan 
I    Napoleon 
  Iraqi Freedom  General Abizaid 
 German Generals World War II  Rommel and Gudarian 
J Battle of Jutland World War I   
 Battle of Midway World War II   
 
German Defense of 
Atlantic Coast World War II   
 
Battle of Komandorsky 






                                                 
45 This table represents only that which was actually said or commented on by the respondents during 
the interview.  
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of Midway (both of these battles received two votes). It was concluded that these two 
battles provided the strongest examples of decision making in environments of extreme 
information ambiguity thus, these battles were chosen for further study.  
Next, detailed research was conducted on each case in order to determine whether 
the case studies substantiated (and how much) or did not substantiate the thesis model. 
Research consisted primarily of comparing several different accounts of each battle 
through the use of multiple sources. For instance, for the Battle of Midway, works by 
seven authors were used (Evans and Peattie, Lundstrom, Morison, Buell, Fuchida, 
Spector, Potter). Next, through the use of three different colored sticky notes, all 
instances of environments of extreme information ambiguity, common training, and 
collaborative planning were marked for later analysis. Upon completion of all reading for 
each battle, a synopsis of each battle was written up in chapter III using a case study 
analysis method. Each battle was broken down into the same five parts for the write up. 
For example, the question format for the Battle of Trafalgar was: 
1. What effect did the environment of extreme information ambiguity have 
on the Royal Navy and the Franco-Spanish Navy? 
2. What was the effect of common training for each side? 
3. What was the effect of collaborative planning for each side? 
Each case study discussion concludes with the following two questions: 
4. With respect to questions 1-3, what was expected to happen in the battle? 
5. With respect to questions 1-3, what actually did happen in the battle?  
At the completion of the analysis it became clear, for each battle, whether or not 
the military decision makers were able to alleviate their environments of extreme 
information ambiguity through the use of common training and collaborative planning. 
Results of the analysis for each battle are written up in Chapter IV. The analysis 
presented in Chapter IV describes the degree to which each battle case study substantiates 
or does not substantiate the thesis statement. In each battle, there were decision makers 
who faced environments of extreme information ambiguity, and clearly, there was a clear 




enough examples of common training and collaborative planning so that, by the end, it 
was clear how necessary and apparently sufficient common training and collaborative 
planning were. 
While researching each battle, particular attention was paid to three different 
things: (1) Instances that demonstrated a decision maker operating in an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity, (2) Instances of a decision maker using common training 
or collaborative planning or both to diminish the effects of the ambiguous information 
environment, and (3) Instances of a decision maker using anything else to lessen the 
effects of the uncertain information environment. 
B. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH – CASE STUDIES AND EXPLORATORY 
METHODS 
1. What is the Case Study Method?  
Case study research serves to bring about a better understanding of a potentially 
complex subject and can provide the researcher or reader (of the case study) more 
knowledge, or strengthen what is already known, about the subject. Case studies focus on 
detailed context based on analysis of a finite number of events or situations and their 
relationships. Case studies have been in use by researchers for a long time, especially by 
social scientists who use qualitative methods to explore real-life occurrences. They also 
provide a basis for the use of ideas and the extension of methods.46 Yin defines the case 
study research method as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its 
real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.”47 
Some researchers are critical of the case study method. They say that if the 
number of case studies is too small, then it offers no footing for establishing reliability or 
basis of findings. Others believe that the case study method is overused and thus provides 
biased results. Still others believe case study research should only be used as an 
                                                 46 Susan K. Soy, The Case Study as a Research Method, Paper prepared for Uses and Users of 
Information, (University of Texas at Austin, School of Information, 1997). Available: 
<http://fiat.gslis.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l39> Last Accessed on August 8, 2005. 
47 Robert K. Yin, Case  Study Research: Design and Methods, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1984), 23. 
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exploratory tool. Nevertheless, researchers continue to use case studies with success for 
analysis of real-world situations.48  
One of the primary goals of this chapter is to inform the reader about the practice 
and procedures for utilizing the case study research method. The other goal of this 
chapter is to explain the exploratory method used for conducting this research; the later 
method was used to determine which battles would be chosen for case study analysis. 
Several well-known and well-respected case study researchers such as Robert E. 
Stake, Robert K. Yin and others49 have written extensively on case study research and 
have developed steps for organizing and conducting this style of research with success. 
Six steps to follow when conducting case study research are: 
1. Determine and define all research questions. 
2. Select the case studies and decide on data gathering and analysis methods. 
3. Prepare for the collection of data. 
4. Collect data. 
5. Evaluate, analyze, and synthesize all data. 
6. Prepare the report. 
Step 1: Determine and define all research questions. 
A well-defined research focus is the first step in case study research and gives the 
researcher something to look back on over the course of investigating a particular 
complicated subject. In the case of this thesis, the focus is on how military decision 
makers sustain the ability to make successful decisions and succeed in environments of 
extreme information ambiguity through the combined employment of common training 
and collaborative planning. By developing questions and assigning variables, the 
researcher was able to establish and maintain a focus throughout the investigation and 
writing process. For instance, as discussed in Chapter I, the only dependent variable in 




                                                 48 Soy, <http://fiat.gslis.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l39> Last accessed on August 10, 2005.  
49 Robert E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research, (Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage, 1995), Chapter 1.  
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connected to the two independent variables: common training and collaborative planning. 
Furthermore, as a researcher seeks to answer any thesis questions, a variety of data 
gathering techniques may be used to produce data to substantiate the claims of the thesis 
statement. 
Step 2: Select the case studies and decide on data gathering and analysis 
methods. 
In order to select which case studies to explore, the researcher must determine the 
methods to be used in determining which examples and how many to pursue. For this 
thesis, an exploratory method and “snowball sampling”50 were used to determine which 
battles would be used to examine the validity of the thesis question.51 Ten professors, 
including six from the Naval Postgraduate School and four from the Naval War College 
in Monterey, California, were selected to participate in the interview process. The 
professors were representative of various disciplines and three different departments: 
Information Sciences, Operations Research, and Strategy and Policy. Interview 
Participants: 
1. Dr. Alan Ross, Information Sciences, Associate Professor 
2. Dr. Bill Kemple, Information Sciences Department, Associate Professor 
3. Dr. Dan Boger, Chairman Information Sciences Department 
4. Dr. Donald Stoker, Naval War College, Strategy and Policy Professor 
5. Dr. Dorothy Denning, Information Sciences Department, Professor 
6. Dr. Harold Blanton, Naval War College, Strategy and Policy Professor 
7. Dr. John Arquilla, Information Sciences Department, Professor 
8. Dr. Kenneth Hagan, Naval War College, Strategy and Policy Professor 
9. Dr. Mike Jones, Naval War College, Strategy and Policy Professor 
                                                 
50 David C. Leege and Wayne L. Francis, Political Research – Design, Measurement and Analysis, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1974), 120. A particular phenomenon called snowball sampling was used while 
conducting the interviews with the ten university professors.  Part of the Academic Source Survey asked for 
the respondent to supply three other names of people they thought would be good candidates for the survey. 
In cases where additional information is provided by the respondent, the researcher may use the 
information to further the research. For this research, the extra names selected by the original ten 
respondents were recorded. In this case, when the pool of potential experts grows in such a way it is 
sometimes called snowball sampling. Many of the names provided by the experts interviewed were names 
of the original ten selected to participate in the Academic Source Survey (duplicates). In the cases were 
new names were discovered, those names were held aside in the case that sufficient convergence was not 
achieved after the first ten interviews. 
51 A discussion of the exploratory method follows this discussion on case studies. 
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10. Dr. Wayne Hughes, Dean of Operations Research 
All professors were asked one specific, scripted question called the Academic 
Source Survey.52 The objective of the script was to ensure that all professors surveyed 
would be asked the same question in the same way. At the time of the survey, each 
professor was given a copy of the Academic Source Survey to refer to as the interview 
was conducted.  
After each professor was interviewed, their responses were catalogued in Table 4 
in order to determine if any convergence of opinion existed, and, ultimately, to determine 
which battles would be utilized for case study analysis. Two battles were chosen for 
further research: the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) and the Battle of Midway (1942). 
Step 3: Prepare for the collection of data. 
Detailed research was conducted for each case study. The case study research for 
this thesis produced a vast amount of data from many different books, journals, videos, 
periodicals, as well as the initial interviews. Accordingly, proper organization of all 
collected data was important. Without organization, the researcher will tend to proceed in 
an inefficient way, become overwhelmed, and possibly lose focus of the overall goal (see 
Step 1 above). All data and sources were catalogued via the use of folders, computer 
spreadsheets and tables, notes, and tape recordings.  This organization served to keep all 
data properly categorized and stored for easy retrieval throughout the process.  
Step 4: Collect Data. 
The collect data step is mostly concerned with procedures used during the process 
of data collection. While conducting research, it was necessary to utilize an efficient 
means for coding the information contained in the readings for future reference and 
writing. For instance, it was essential to formulate a way to mark and notate the 
occurrence of the dependent and independent variables in the readings. Colored sticky 
notes were used, one color for each variable, to mark the readings. Additionally, 
abbreviations of the variables (e.g., ct, cp, eeia.) and specific criteria were used on the 
sticky notes in an effort to facilitate quick identification of key citations during the 
writing phase. 
                                                 
52 See Appendix A 
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Mini cassette recordings were used to annotate feelings and intuitive hunches, 
formulate questions, and brainstorm ideas for future chapters and work. Recordings were 
also used as a way of posting reminders for upcoming tasks and to warn against potential 
potholes that might present themselves. The ultimate purpose for these systematic data 
recording procedures was to make sure all data was categorized and filed so it could be 
efficiently and accurately recalled for use over the duration of the study.  
Step 5: Evaluate, analyze, and synthesize all data. 
Once all the data has been collected, the researcher examines all the material and 
draws conclusions about the findings with respect to the original thesis statement. It is 
important at this point to be open to new ideas; the researcher should not fall into the trap 
of interpreting the data the way he or she thinks it should be. It is essential to remain open 
to new ideas and revelations and be willing to change course if necessary. For instance, in 
this work on decision making in environments of extreme information ambiguity, the 
conclusions and answers to the thesis question turned out differently than originally 
expected.53 Flexibility and open mindedness are crucial when this occurs.  
Many times the methods used to analyze the data force researchers to move in 
different directions than their initial impressions were taking them. All of this is done to 
ensure the best possible chance of accurate, reliable, and usable results.54 This was 
especially critical during the research of this thesis because its results carry real life 
implications for decision making on tomorrow’s battlefields.   
Step 6: Prepare the Report. 
The goal of this research was to investigate the hypothesis of the thesis statement. 
Once the research and analysis steps were complete, the next step was to prepare a report 
that took the comlex problem and translated it into one that could be easily understood by 
the reader. A final report should allow the reader to ask questions and find answers 
without assistance from the researcher. A report should be written in a way that 
captivates the reader through the use of coherent prose and by displaying enough 
evidence to gain the reader’s confidence in the conclusions drawn and in the prospect that 
                                                 
53 See Chapter IV Analysis. 
54 Soy, http://fiat.gslis.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l39 Last accessed on August 8, 2005. 
32 
every possible avenue has been explored. Furthermore, the report should address any 
conflicting issues that may have arisen over the course of the research and analysis. 
Lastly, in the case of this thesis, a section on the future or “The Road Ahead” is provided 
to give the reader some ideas on where this topic may be headed in the future. 
In conclusion, case studies can be extremely complex because they comprise 
many sources of data and subsequently produce a lot of material which must be 
thoroughly analyzed. However, one thing that makes the process of analysis easier, as in 
the case of this thesis, is when the case studies offer the advantage of “applicability to 
real life human situation.”55  
2. What is an Exploratory Method? 
Generation of Data: Methods and Techniques 
The goal of section 3 is to explain how the battles were chosen and to show that a 
systematic process was employed. For this thesis, the objective selection of two battles 
was made possible through the use of an exploratory research method. The book Political 
Research – Design, Measurement, and Analysis was consulted for a detailed explanation 
of how this data generation method works.56 The quality of data developed for a thesis, or 
for any other research project, is intrinsically tied to the quality and reliability of the 
methods used to generate it. No amount of technology or verbiage can overcome the 
defects inherent in data cultivated from an underdeveloped or non-rigorous research 
method. There are many sources available for data, and scientists have often relied on 
published documents and large-scale surveys. For this thesis, a scripted survey was used 
to determine which two battles would receive further study.  
Extent of Information 
The second aspect to consider regarding survey administration is the extent of 
information required about or from each person surveyed. For instance, in this study, the 
Academic Source Survey has just one question with the exception of some probing 
questions that only came into play in the event the respondent gave too vague of a 
response or if the respondent did not fully understand the primary question. “The decision 
                                                 55Soy, http://fiat.gslis.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l39 Last accessed on August 8, 2005. 
56 Leege and Francis, Chapter 7. 
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regarding the extent of information required is based on several criteria: (1) state of 
theory development about the phenomenon, (2) need for serendipity, (3) degree of 
efficiency required, and (4) importance of reliability and validity of information.”57 
Therefore, in the event not much information is known about the topic in question, as was 
the case with this research (i.e., the combined used of common training and collaborative 
planning as they pertain to alleviating the destructive effects of environments of extreme 
information ambiguity on military decision makers.), it is helpful to conduct exploratory 
research. 
Forms of Data Collection – Error Management 
When a researcher selects a data-generating instrument (e.g., exploratory 
research), the researcher needs to be aware of several types of potential errors. Table 5 
highlights the most common types of errors using this method. During the interviews 
conducted for this thesis, the researcher was not aware of the occurrence of any of the 
errors in Section 1 of Table 5. From Section 2 of Table 5, it is reasonable to presume 
errors 2A and 2B could have been committed, but it seems unlikely. Errors 2C from 
Section 2 and 3A-3D from Section 3 were not committed.  
There was a time in history when social scientists sometimes opted to discard a 
data collection instrument if it was determined to contain any error at all. It was soon 
discovered that every research technique is plagued with some type of error at one time 
or the other. Since errors cannot not be explicitly avoided some guidelines for researchers 
to observe are:58 
11. Pinpoint the most common errors resulting from each method or technique. 
12. Control the errors where possible. 
13. Generate data by at least two methods or techniques and ensure they are different in 
the extent to which they may suffer from the same potential (errors). 
                                                 
57 Leege and Francis, 191. 
58 Leege and Francis, 193. 
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Table 5. Possible Errors Committed During Data Collection59 
Section 1. Error stemming from persons 
A. Evaluation apprehension Anxiety a person feels when aware of being tested. 
B. Subject role Subject's desire to behave as he or she thinks the investigator wants, so that the test hypothesis will be substantiated.  
Acquiescence or opposition ("yea-saying" or "nay-saying"). 
Choosing of socially desirable answers.  C. Response sets 
Systematic selection of alternatives occupying a certain location on 
the instrument.  
  
2. Error stemming from observers, interviewers, or related sources 
In some unknown manner - tone of voice, manifestation of 
nervousness, etc. 
A. Expectancy effects 
The investigator tipping off the subject to behave, verbally or 
physically, consistent with the hypothesis. 
B. Changes in instrument calibration 
Through time the investigator unknowingly altering the 
administration of the instrument through familiarity with it, fatigue, 
boredom, etc.  
C. Changes in the data matrix  
While the format in which data are embedded appears similar 
through time, undocumented changes in classification principles or 
recording prcitces, or unknown erosion effects on the aritfacts 
confounding apparent substantive change with a method effect.  
  
3. Error stemming from physical settings and situations 
A. Process of measurement itself… …serving as a change agent with lasting affects.  
B. Inaccessibility …of some populations 
C. Instability  …of other samples through time. 
…generating positive or negative effects on either subject or 
investigator. 
Such as persons other than the subject present in the situation 
Such as visual and aural attractiveness of the setting 
C. Idiosyncratic situational factors 
Such as interaction of subject's and investigator's physical and 
emotional attributes. 
 
                                                 
59 After: David C. Leege and Wayne L. Francis, Political Research – Design, Measurement and 
Analysis, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 192. 
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 Self Report 
In 1974, Leege felt the dominant type of methods and techniques used for data 
gathering in social science at that time involved respondents’ self-reports of knowledge.60 
This researcher used scripted self-report interviews (i.e., Academic Source Survey) to 
select the battles which would receive further case study analysis.  
What follows is a brief discussion of the self-report interview. Whereas a 
questionnaire is administered to and responded to by the respondent (e.g., surveys 
administered as part of an experiment), a scripted interview is administered and recorded 
by the researcher. A scripted interview is simply a survey or question, in template form, 
typed up, and presented in the same manner to every respondent. For the purpose of 
developing a pool of potential military battles to be used for further case study analysis, 
the subjects of this thesis research were presented a question about which military battles 
(historical or present day) provided the best examples of decision making in 
environments of extreme information ambiguity. The question was designed to illicit a 
verbal response about the dependent variable. The responses were recorded on the 
Academic Source Survey and via audio cassette recorder.  
Surveys have a number of advantages because of the information they provide. 
Interview data tends to be more reliable than questionnaire data because any confusion 
can be clarified during the interview. Also, a skilled interviewer will record sufficient 
notes during the interview including areas the respondent may struggle with. During the 
interviews conducted for this thesis the professors questioned often had useful 
elaboration of their choices of battles above and beyond what the main and probing 
questions would have provided. This yielded serendipitous discovery of a variety of 
information among those interviewed and provided potential avenues for further 
exploration of the thesis statement. For example, Respondent A answered the survey 
question with the Battle of Trafalgar. Instead of stopping there, he proceeded to explain 
in great detail what he knew about the battle with respect to the survey question. From 
that point, the researcher discovered the respondent was the Naval War College, 
Monterey, California, authority on the Battle of Trafalgar. 
                                                 60 Leege and Francis, 193. 
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Moving on to the question styles used in the self-report method, there are several 
different ways to design surveys/questionnaires, namely through the use of open-ended, 
forced-choice, or fixed-alternative questions.61 For the scripted interview used in this 
research, open-ended questions were used followed by the use of probing questions 
which served to help the interviewee narrow down their responses if the response they 
gave were too broad. For instance, one respondent gave the response, “North Korea” as 
an example of an environment of extreme information ambiguity. In this case, a probing 
question might be, “Can you think of a particular campaign or battle during the war with 
North Korea where an environment of extreme information ambiguity existed?” The use 
of probing questions always proved sufficient to get the respondent back on track. Lastly, 
the use of open-ended questions is most appropriate when not much is known about a 
particular problem or subject.62 
C. CONCLUSION 
Chapter II described the researcher’s procedure followed for exploring the thesis 
question. First, an exploratory research method was used to interview ten professors 
representing multiple disciplines. Once the results of the interviews were analyzed it was 
determined that a convergence of opinion existed on two battles in particular. Case study 
analysis was conducted on the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of Midway. At that 
point, detailed research was conducted on both battles in order to determine whether or 
not they substantiated the overall thesis question: Can military decision makers maintain 
the ability to make successful decisions by mitigating the debilitating effects of 
environments of extreme information ambiguity through the combined use of common 
training and collaborative planning. Chapter III presents a synopsis of the data collected 
on these two battles starting with the Battle of Trafalgar.
                                                 61 Leege and Francis, 199. 
62 With respect to decision making in ambiguous environments, it is clear that much has been written 
in the past on this topic. Clearly, for centuries people have been describing wars (or any other confusing 
environment) as ambiguous. However, this study brings to light for the first time the idea of mitigating the 
effects of an environment of extreme information ambiguity on decision making through the combined 
application of common training and collaborative planning. The key unique phrase here is “extreme 
information ambiguity” and the key (novel) concept is that such an environment can be mitigated with 
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III. DISCUSSION OF THE CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapters I and II, case study analysis on two historical military 
battles (Chapter IV) was used to show how military decision makers maintain the ability 
to make successful decisions by alleviating the debilitating effects of environments of 
extreme information ambiguity through the combined use of common training and 
collaborative planning. Chapter III serves to enlighten the reader of the fine points of 
each case study conducted in preparation for the analysis to be conducted in the chapter 
that follows.63 The case studies will be discussed here in the following order: The Battle 
of Trafalgar (1805) and the Battle of Midway (1942). For the sake of clarity, 
thoroughness, scientific rigor, and for efficiency of analysis, both cases will be broken 
down and discussed based on the same outline.  
Each case study will be discussed from the perspective of the one dependent 
variable and the two independent variables defined in Chapter I.64  For each case study, a 
brief account of the battle will be given based on the following five questions:  
1. What effect did the environment of extreme information ambiguity have on the Royal 
Navy and the Franco-Spanish Navy? 
2. What was the effect of common training for each side? 
3. What was the effect of collaborative planning for each side? 
 Each case study discussion concludes with the following two questions: 
4. With respect to questions 1-3, what was expected to happen in the battle? 
5. With respect to questions 1-3, what actually did happen in the battle? 
 
Following the discussion of both case studies, Chapter IV will serve to assess, analyze, 
and determine whether or not the thesis statement is substantiated. The first case study is 
The Battle of Trafalgar which occurred over the span of about one day on October 21, 
1805. 
                                                 
63 Refer to Chapter II for an explanation on how and why these particular battles were chosen. 
64 Reference Tables 1, 2, and 3. Recall the dependent variable is the environment of extreme 
information ambiguity. The two independent variables are common training and collaborative planning.  
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B. THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR 
1. What Effect Did the Environment of Extreme Information Ambiguity 
Have on the Royal Navy and the Franco-Spanish Navy? 
a. Environment of Extreme Information Ambiguity and the Royal 
Navy 
Based on the criteria described in Chapter I and listed in Table 1, the 
admirals for both fleets, Nelson for the British, and Villenueve for the French, both 
experienced an essentially continuous environment of extreme information ambiguity. 
Most, if not all, of the ambiguity stemmed from the uncertainty pertaining to each other’s 
force strength, disposition, and intentions. Nelson wondered when the Combined Fleet 
would come out of port so that he could bring them to battle and annihilate them.65 He 
also wondered if, at the time of Villenueve’s departure from Cadiz harbor, the British 
Fleet would be in the right position to bring about a decisive victory over the Franco-
Spanish Fleet. In addition to ambiguity, Nelson was forced to deal with other factors such 
as friction (Table 1, factor 1); i.e., weather in the form of heavy seas and insufficient 
winds (to move his fleet about). 
When Villenueve finally decided to come out of port, Nelson remained 
puzzled because here was the enemy fleet sailing towards him in a disorganized gaggle, 
lacking any semblance of formation he could recognize or would expect. Furthermore, 
the Combined Fleet was not flying any signal flags. During the age of sail, signal flags 
were used to communicate many types of information. In particular, there were special 
flags reserved for the commanders-in-chief for each fleet. Because the French and 
Spanish Fleets were not flying flags, Nelson had no way to discern which ship was the 
flagship of Villenueve. Nelson needed this piece of information so he would know 
exactly where in the Franco Spanish battle line to concentrate his attack.  “Nelson had not 
counted on any of this.”66 The British admiral’s whole plan revolved around this small 
piece of information for it was his intention to split the Franco-Spanish battle line at a 
                                                 
65 Alan Schom, Trafalgar Countdown to Battle 1803-1805, 1990, pg. 315. The Franco-Spanish fleet 
was also referred to as the Combined fleet. 
66 Schom, 307. 
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point just forward of the French flagship (thus cutting off the vanguard) and at a another 
point, perhaps twelve ships up from the very end of the enemy battle line.67 
Because the French and Spanish ships were in bunches instead of one long 
battle line, it would be impossible for Nelson to completely pierce the Franco Spanish 
line as he had described in his Memorandum.68 One might think that Villenueve had 
planned this formation when, if fact, the Combined Fleet was in this formation because of 
the poor skills of its crews and because of the very light wind blowing at the time they 
were getting underway from Cadiz.  Ironically, Villenueve had “established the one 
formation that did not fit the British plan.” Nevertheless, Nelson pushed on towards the 
Combined Fleet despite the ambiguity and uniqueness of the situation. This was not one 
of the routine situations he had trained for; rather, it was a novel circumstance that he 
needed to overcome. In Section 3.a., one sees how collaborative planning combined with 
common training ensures a commander the best possible chance of being able to adapt to 
novel situations once a battle begins.69  
Although the ships did not move at high rates of speed, the preparation 
leading up to the beginning of the Battle of Trafalgar at 1150, October 21st, 1805, partly 
because of the lack of French and Spanish signal flags, was intense. At 1140 Nelson had 
changed his mind while still trying to determine the intentions of the Combined Fleet. He 
decided to push through for the head of the Combined Fleet rather than the center as 
originally planned. At 1145, the Combined Fleet hoisted their colors, and shortly after 
that, at the last moment before Nelson made his final maneuver in preparation for battle, 
                                                 
67 Van is short for vanguard and is defined as the foremost position in an army or fleet advancing into 
battle. In the case of the Battle of Trafalgar, the van of the Combined fleet consisted of about twelve ships 
of the line. 
68 Schom, 290-291. Nelson referred to his new plan for attacking the Franco-Spanish Fleet the ‘Nelson 
Touch’. Only one other commander in history (Rodney, 1782) had devised, and attempted to form, two 
battle lines in an effort to break the battle line of the opposing fleet by approaching them at a perpendicular 
angle. “Until this time, there were only a couple of traditional methods of attack where two large fleets 
were concerned. They would approach each other in two long, enormous battle lines, maneuvering to gain 
the advantage of the wind…both fleets would sail past each other in two close parallel lines, lambasting 
each other with their broadsides preparatory to boarding.” 
69 Refer to Chapter I for the discussion on common training and collaborative planning. Recall that 
decision makers rely on common training for encounters they have faced before. In contrast, in a novel 
situation, or one for which the decision maker has not sufficiently trained, there is more of a reliance on the 
collaborative planning utilized before the battle begins. In the end, during the heat of battle, a commander 
may only rely on the planning and training conducted before the battle begins. 
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Villenueve’s flag was slowly hoisted on his flagship Bucentaure. In a flash, Nelson 
abandoned his plans to attack the head of the fleet and reverted back to his very first plan 
of attacking the center.70 At 1150 the first shots were fired by the French at the HMS 
Victory, and the battle had begun.  
This example demonstrates how the Royal Navy and Admiral Nelson, 
through the combined use of common training and collaborative planning, were able to 
alleviate the negative effects of an environment of extreme information ambiguity. Their 
prior training and ongoing planning enabled them to carry out last minute changes to deal 
with ambiguous information. At the point that Villenueve finally hoisted his command 
pennant, through the use of collaborative planning Nelson was able to communicate his 
change of plan to his Captains. He did this by means of flag signals and face-to-face 
meetings. For instance, at the time the battle began, he had one of his captains aboard; 
therefore, he was able to use a face-to-face meeting to discuss options and orders with 
that captain (Table 3, factor 6).  At the moment the battle began, Captain Blackwood was 
departing Nelson’s flagship Victory and returning to his own ship with new 
instructions.71 Although Nelson’s overall objective of annihilating the Combined Fleet 
never changed, his strategy changed by the minute. Moreover, despite all of the changes 
and the increasingly ambiguous information environment, Nelson’s fleet successfully 
adapted to its environment. This adaptation was enabled by the combined use of common 
training characteristics such as similar training and vigorous training in areas like ship 
maneuvering, flag hoisting, and battle procedures (Table 2, factors 1, 2). Moreover, there 
was also evidence of   collaborative planning in the form of synchronization of all assets, 
face-to-face meetings, and developing shared situational awareness. Skillful use of these 
factors contributed to Nelson’s ability to successfully manage his ambiguous 
environment despite the onset of battle (Table 3, factors 2, 6, 8).72 
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b. Environments of Extreme Information Ambiguity and the 
Franco-Spanish Fleet 
The Franco-Spanish Fleet also suffered from the effects of an environment 
of extreme information ambiguity. Specifically, they had to contend with friction, 
ambiguity, time pressure, and high stakes (Table 1, factors 1, 2, 3, 5). First, Villenueve 
experienced a high degree of uncertainty trying to determine the status of the Royal Navy 
outside the harbor, and he felt time pressure because he was under orders from Napoleon 
to report to the Mediterranean. He needed information about the British Fleet in order to 
coordinate his escape through the Straits of Gibraltar. Second, Villenueve experienced 
the effects of friction with respect to the weather. There was insufficient wind to carry his 
fleet efficiently out to sea. Additionally, the lack of experienced sailors (common 
training) compromised his ability to deal with adverse weather conditions. Third, 
Villenueve was operating under the pressure that is produced by high stakes. France 
could not afford to have their navy annihilated, yet Villenueve knew the Combined Fleet 
was no match for the Royal Navy. Once out to sea, and engaged in battle, Villenueve 
found that his inexperienced fleet, especially the twelve ships of the vanguard, was 
unable to deal with the apparently disorganized way in which the British Navy was 
attacking.  
When it came to figuring out the strength, disposition, and location of the 
British Fleet, Villenueve had considerably more ambiguity (Table 1, factor 2) to deal 
with than did Nelson. It was not until 1100 on the morning of the battle, October 21st, 
1805, that Villenueve saw Nelson’s entire fleet for the first time.73 For weeks the French 
and Spanish Fleets had been bottled up in Cádiz harbor with little to no idea of the Royal 
Navy’s disposition or intentions.74 During the several days leading up to the battle, 
Villenueve’s intelligence on the strength, disposition, and location of the British Fleet 
was practically non-existent. In contrast, Nelson had placed Captain Blackwood and a 
small group of four frigates and two schooners just outside Cádiz Harbor for the sole 
purpose of monitoring the movements of Villenueve’s forces. Meanwhile, in preparation 
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for battle, Nelson was several miles out to sea and had dispersed his fleet for the purpose 
of making it difficult for Villenueve to determine his force strength.  
Villenueve knew his fleet was most likely no match for that of the British. 
He had always told his superiors the French Navy could never defeat the British Navy in 
an equal fight, or even if the Royal Navy were one-third weaker.75 He struggled to 
determine the strength, disposition, and location of the British Fleet so that he could come 
out at a time when they were at their weakest and most dispersed. It was then he would 
have his best chance to escape south through the Strait of Gibraltar.76  
Like Nelson, Villenueve was concerned about the weather, especially with 
respect to the winds. He needed to get his fleet out to sea, and he knew the current status 
of light winds would not work to his benefit considering his sailors’ obvious deficiencies 
of seamanship and sea experience. This was a great source of consternation for 
Villenueve as it took the Combined Fleet well over a day to exit Cádiz.77 
Once out to sea, and once the battle had begun, the reports of the Spanish 
and the French were of “bewildered astonishment” that an attack such as the one Nelson 
carried out could even work. Accounts such as these from the summary of the Spanish 
staff confirm that, during this battle, the commanders of the Combined Fleet experienced 
many confusing times where their senses became overwhelmed.78 For instance, 
immediately as the battle began, Nelson successfully separated the vanguard from the rest 
of the Combined Fleet’s battle line. By the time they came about and maneuvered into 
position, it was too late. One must infer that the commander of the vanguard, Rear 
Admiral Dumanoir, in the French ship Formidable,79 suffered from the effects of an 
environment of extreme information ambiguity. Returning again to Table 1, factor 1 
refers to the United States Marine Corps definition of friction. One can easily identify all 
of the elements the rear admiral must have been facing: Sea state, weather, lack of 
coordination, and lack of a clearly defined goal are certainly at the top of the list.  
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Finally, the conclusion of the battle was a time for the leaders and men of 
the Combined Fleet to see and reflect on the great loss they now faced.80Indeed, the 
Franco-Spanish Fleet casualty list topped 6,953 men, either dead or wounded. Nineteen 
of the French and Spanish ships had been taken as prizes by Vice Admiral Collingwood, 
while the Royal Navy had lost none.81 Clearly, a sense of demoralization quickly affected 
the leadership and sailors of the losing fleet. Fears of whether the wrong decisions had 
been made, fears of not having completely understood the situation, and fear for their 
lives were no doubt weighing heavily in their hearts and minds.  
In contrast, Nelson handled the uncertainty of his information environment 
as any well-trained and capable admiral would. He dispersed his fleet in such a way as to 
conceal its full composition, while at the same time maintaining a line of communication 
and intelligence flow that allowed him to know when the Combined Fleet was leaving 
Cadiz. In 1805, the British had the most formidable and well-trained fleet in the world. 
Their seamanship and sea experience were matched by no other nation’s fleet. Their 
skills and experience, combined with the leadership of admirals such as Nelson, 
represented a force that Villenueve simply did not want to confront. On the other hand, 
Nelson, because of how well he had trained his personnel and communicated with his 
subordinate commanders, could not wait to engage the Combined Fleet. 
2. What Did Common Training Mean to the Royal Navy and the 
Franco-Spanish Navy? 
a. Common Training and the Royal Navy 
The common training of the Royal Navy and Admiral Nelson was superior 
to that of the Franco-Spanish Fleet and Admiral Villenueve for three primary reasons. 
First, by 1804, the Royal Navy had spent nearly one hundred years refining their 
strategy.82 Second, the officers and sailors under Nelson’s command (subject to his style 
of discipline and training) spent long months at sea. Training conducted at sea enabled  
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crews to learn skills that could not be mastered sitting inport, anchored or tied to a pier.83 
Third, Nelson, with the advent of his famous memorandum, introduced new battle 
procedures and doctrine for the Royal Navy’s operations at sea.84 
First, by 1804, the Royal Navy had earned control of the seas around 
Europe because they had a navy that had been operating together and honing its skills and 
capabilities for almost a century. In contrast, his adversary’s (Napoleon and Villenueve) 
ships had remained mostly in harbor during that same time. Meanwhile, for more than ten 
years, the British Navy had been ready for battle with constant training and weapons 
practice. The officers and sailors of the Royal Navy were experienced veterans who had 
proven themselves in combat. For instance, out of seventeen officers on Nelson’s 
flagship, Victory, ten had seen battle at sea at least once, and on one other ship, every 
officer was a battle veteran.85 
Nelson adapted much of his common training and discipline style from a 
man named Sir John Jervis, whom he met on January 19, 1796. “Jervis was a leading 
apostle of the navy’s hard and bold spirit which appealed so much to Nelson…”86 Jervis 
was adamant about cleanliness and was a stern authoritarian and very particular about 
protocol and the rehearsal of skills. For instance, he required all his ships to practice with 
at least five of their guns each day. Although Jervis would not hesitate to flog a man or 
hang him for mutiny, he always cared for the health and welfare of his men.87 It was the 
combination of cleanliness, discipline, protocol, and rehearsal that constituted the training 
style of Jervis’ and that style which Nelson adopted as his own.  
                                                 
83 Schom, 223. 
84 Schom, Alan, Trafalgar Countdown to Battle 1803-1805, 1990, pgs. 290-291. Nelson referred to his 
new plan for attacking the Franco-Spanish Fleet the ‘Nelson Touch’. Only one other commander in history 
(Rodney, 1782) had devised and attempted to form two battle lines in an effort to break the battle line of the 
opposing fleet by approaching them at a perpendicular angle. “Until this time there were only a couple of 
traditional methods of attack where two large fleets were concerned. They would approach each other in 
two long, enormous battle lines, maneuvering to gain the advantage of the wind…both fleets would sail 
past each other in two close parallel lines, lambasting each other with their broadsides preparatory to 
boarding.” 
85 Herman, 377. 
86 Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004), 345. Ernle 
Bradford, Nelson The Essential Hero, (London: Macmillan London Limited, 1977), 123. 
87 Herman, 345. Bradford, 138-139. 
46 
Second, with respect to a sailor honing the everyday skills of seamanship, 
maneuvering, and stationing, there was no better way to accomplish such a task than 
actual time spent at sea. The officers and sailors of the British Fleet under Nelson’s 
command received the common training they needed because of the demanding months 
spent at sea operating the fleet. A sailor’s sole purpose at sea is to work, and because a 
Sailor most aptly learns his job by doing it, in the end, the product of their hard work is 
unmatched skill and proficiency of their jobs.88 
Third, as previously demonstrated, the British Fleet was well trained. It 
was this training that allowed them to carry out Nelson’s Memorandum for the Battle of 
Trafalgar, and subsequently defeat the Combined Fleet. The memorandum was composed 
on October 9th, 1805, and it highlighted a shortfall in his fleet’s battle procedures, 
training, and doctrine. Nelson’s insight was aimed at making his commanders more self-
reliant, his communications more efficient, and at reducing the amount of time required 
for the fleet to form up and engage the enemy. Before this change in doctrine, individual 
captains were sometimes too reliant on their commander’s signals which oftentimes, due 
to weather or battle smoke, could not be seen. Furthermore, the old method of forming 
one long battle line consumed too much time in Nelson’s view. He believed in getting to 
the business of fighting as soon as possible. His ‘Nelson Touch’ technique allowed him 
to do just that. Lastly, in the last line of his famous memorandum, he shows how much 
faith he has in the common training of his captains: “Captains,” he closed, “…in case 
signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he 
places his ship alongside that of an enemy.”89 
It is not difficult to see just what common training meant to the British 
Navy. Clearly, it was the superior training of their fleet, in the areas of seamanship, 
stationing, and maneuvering that enabled them to experience much of the success they 
enjoyed against the Franco-Spanish Fleet. Furthermore, the manner in which they 
achieved their similar skills and alignment amongst commanders came from long months 
at sea doing their job, day after day (vigorous training, doctrine, and rehearsal).  
                                                 
88 Herman, 381. Schom, 223. 
89 Ibid., pgs. 291-292. These two pages also contain Schom’s description of what was in Nelson’s 
famous memo and how it was briefed to his Captains. 
47 
b. Common Training and the Franco-Spanish Navy 
The previous section gave the reader a slight preview of some of the 
primary reasons the Franco-Spanish Fleet was so poorly trained with respect to their 
British adversary. First, Villenueve was a “trained and dedicated officer,”90 but he was a 
young admiral which was a sign of how the French had a limited supply of seasoned sea 
officers.91 Second, the Combined Fleet lacked the ability to execute efficiently the most 
fundamental tasks involving basic seamanship, stationing, and maneuvering. The French 
and Spanish, for some reason, never spent the time, or had the time, to train properly their 
navies.92 Third, the Franco-Spanish Fleet lacked alignment among the captains of their 
ships. This was caused, in large part, by a resentment most officers and sailors of the 
Combined Fleet shared for Villenueve. This hostility undermined what little skills the 
crews did have.  
Although Villenueve was a well-trained officer and experienced veteran, 
he lacked certain indispensable qualities of leadership such as a sense of independent 
judgment and the motivation to follow his intuition (i.e., he was afraid of Napoleon and 
would not ever challenge Napoleon’s orders). Villenueve was an expert naval officer who 
knew what kind of common training his fleet needed.93 However, Villenueve’s failings 
affected his ability to ensure his fleet was properly trained. Moreover, the Spanish Fleet 
was even less well trained than the French Fleet. To make matters worse, Villenueve 
knew the Royal Navy was of a much higher caliber than the French and Spanish Navies 
combined.94 Villenueve allowed the limitations of his fleet to become an excuse for his 
continued poor performance, and it was this poor performance that ultimately resulted in 
Villenueve’s inability to properly train his own fleet.95 
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The Combined Fleet lacked the ability to efficiently execute the most 
fundamental tasks involving basic seamanship, stationing, and maneuvering. For 
example, on January 22nd, 1805, after a failed attempt to get underway from Toulon, 
Villenueve informed his superior, Admiral Denis Decrès, that his sailors had no sea 
experience in stormy weather. When they did finally sail for the first time they panicked 
and much unnecessary damage was done to several ships.96 In another similar incident on 
March 30th, 1805, Villenueve was making his second attempt to get underway from 
Toulon. Schom writes, “The crews of many of these ships, so sparse and so poorly 
trained, were beefed up at the last minute with several hundred troops, all of whom were 
given a crash-course in basic seamanship.”97 In contrast, Nelson and his fleet spent more 
than two years at sea without docking for supplies, and had twice traversed the Atlantic 
Ocean.98 As stated earlier, the training a navy receives while operating at sea cannot be 
substituted with time spent inactive in port. By not spending a sufficient amount of time 
at sea, the crews of Villenueve’s ships never received the similar training and vigorous 
training they needed (Table 2, factor 1, 2). Lastly, without adequate common training, a 
unit of any kind cannot hope to profit from the by-products of common training such as 
developing similar skills, similar perception and reaction, alignment amongst 
commanders, or implicit connections and bonds (Table 2, factors 5, 6, 7, 9).  
Third, in addition to the lack of similar training and education, the Franco-
Spanish Fleet suffered from a lack of alignment amongst the captains of the ships. First, 
poor stationing and maneuvering of the fleet (i.e., efficiently standing out to sea and 
getting into formations) can be at least partially attributed to resentful French and Spanish 
captains failing to obey orders.99 Villenueve was despised by half of the French Fleet and 
most of the Spanish Fleet. His subordinates were known to regularly disregard his orders. 
In fact, on the day of departure from Cádiz harbor, the French and Spanish ships were 
mixed together in an effort to discourage disloyal units (ships) from not following 
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orders.100 Second, as earlier that year in January and March of 1805, at the time of the 
Battle of the Trafalgar, the Franco-Spanish Fleet suffered from inexperienced captains 
and crews.101 For example, the Combined Fleet’s sortie from Cádiz on October 19, 1805, 
was the first time that for thousands of its sailors had gone to sea.102  
In the end, the French and Spanish failed to give their fleets the kind of 
common training required to engage an adversary like Nelson. The most obvious reason 
the Franco-Spanish Fleet was so poorly trained was their lack of sea experience, 
especially with respect to their opponent. If one looks at the number of guns, ships, and 
personnel taken into battle against the British, a clear advantage was enjoyed by the 
Franco-Spanish Fleet in all three categories (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Gun power, Ships, and Manpower at the Battle of Trafalgar for the Royal 
Navy and Franco-Spanish Fleet 
 
 Franco-Spanish Fleet Royal Navy Advantage % Advantage 
Guns 2,568 2,148 French 16% 
Ships 33 27 French 18% 
Personnel 33,000 17,000 French 48% 
 
However, Schom noted that although the French and Spanish Fleets 
enjoyed a 48% advantage in manpower, that manpower was less trained than were the 
sailors of the British Fleet.103 One can infer from this evidence that the Combined Fleet 
suffered from a serious lack of common training. Referring to Table 2, two of the primary 
characteristics of common training are similar and vigorous training and rehearsal 
(factors 1, 2). The products of these factors are similar skills, alignment amongst 
commanders, and harmony, or focus and direction in operations (factors 5, 7, 8).   
  In conclusion, referring again to Table 6, the French and Spanish Fleets 
should have had the clear advantage; however, it is the third element of Table 6 that 
drives home why they did not. The Franco-Spanish Fleet had more manpower, but they 
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were less trained and they lacked sufficient (if any) sea experience. Villenueve sensed 
this lack of common training and had been telling his superiors for some time that the 
French Navy could never defeat the British in a one-on-one battle (or even a British Navy 
one third weaker).104 Nevertheless, based on pressure by Napoleon to defeat the Royal 
Navy and based on Villenueve’s desire to avoid being relieved by Admiral Rosily (sent 
by Villenueve’s superiors in Paris), Villenueve took his fleet to sea. What is more, 
although his first intention was to flee to the Strait of Gibraltar in an effort to escape 
Nelson, Villenueve would eventually, for selfish and prideful reasons, turn his fleet 
around and face the British despite the obvious common training deficiencies of the 
Combined Fleet. 
3. What Did Collaborative Planning Mean to the Royal Navy and the 
Franco-Spanish Navy? 
a. Collaborative Planning and the Royal Navy 
Collaborative planning was essential for the efficient operation and 
success of the Royal Navy leading up to, and during, the Battle of Trafalgar. Nelson, as 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy, provides the reader with rich examples of a 
leader who understood the importance of sharing ideas, synchronizing all assets, face-to-
face meetings, and in general, using the techniques of collaborative planning (Table 3, 
factors 1, 2, 3, 6). Furthermore, Nelson understood that from successful collaboration 
with his superiors and his subordinates he could expect to gain a shared situational 
awareness, better information flow, a fuller understanding of important issues, and a 
sharing of information across geographic boundaries (Table 3, factors 7, 9, 10, 11). 
Beginning in the month of June, 1805, Nelson, sailing with a contingent of 
British ships on a trip from England to several islands of the Caribbean, stopped at nearly 
every island along the way to meet and collaborate with local friendly leaders in order to 
get situational updates, communications from England, and the most recent intelligence 
available on the location, disposition, and strength of the enemy fleets.105 Referring to 
Table 3, Nelson’s interactions with the island officials, while not for the sole purpose of 
planning a battle per se, facilitated the sharing of ideas, synchronizing of all assets at their 
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disposal, and face-to-face meetings (factors 1, 2, 6). The by-products of these activities 
were improved situational awareness shared by Nelson and all parties involved (e.g., 
island officials), and a fuller understanding of the issues (e.g., orders and news from 
England, intelligence) (factors 7, 10). 
After that island campaign in 1805, Nelson returned home to England for 
twenty-five days of vacation after over two years at sea.106 However, he spent very little 
time actually resting; rather, he passed nearly every day in London talking with his 
superiors about future engagements, strategies, policy, and innovations in the British 
Fleet.107 
As discussed in Chapter I, there are many ways to conduct collaborative 
planning,  and although the Age of Sail did not present us with information technology 
(IT) based methods for collaborative planning, it did offer several physical collaborative 
tools such as signal flags, flares, lights, and sounds. Face-to-face meetings were also a 
valid means of conducting meaningful planning in the 1800s. In truth, these methods 
were used by both the Royal Navy and the French and Spanish Navies.108 
The revolutionary system of signal flags employed by the British Navy is 
just one example of the new and improved forms of collaborative planning used by the 
British Fleet during this time.109 Still, the British acknowledged this new way of 
signaling was not necessarily the only way to communicate; in fact, signal flags could be 
constrained by elements of the weather such as fog, rain, and heavy seas. Furthermore, 
factors such as black smoke from cannons or burning wood, or the absence of a ship’s 
mast during or after battle could limit the usefulness of flags. In 19th century naval 
warfare, a ship’s masts were oftentimes a primary target for the enemy.110 By the end of 
an engagement, a ship’s masts may have been blown away. In this case, hoisting flags  
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and sails became impossible. It was at times like these that the alternative methods such 
as rockets, gun volleys, and color lamps could be used to keep the lines of collaboration 
open.111 
Face-to-face collaboration was probably the most frequently utilized form 
of collaborative planning used by Nelson. Nelson would often, especially when out to 
sea, and most notably while waiting for the Franco-Spanish Fleet outside of Cádiz in 
October 1805, bring the fleet’s captains aboard to discuss how they would attack the 
Combined Fleet when the time came. In fact, it was at one of these dinners where 
Nelson’s famous memorandum, which outlined a new plan for attacking the Franco-
Spanish Fleet, was first introduced. Referring to Table 3, factor 6, face-to-face meetings, 
one can see how the commanders were able to maintain an easier flow of information, 
provide an opportunity to raise issues, and also conduct a certain amount of 
brainstorming to help arrive at a decision (Table 3, factor 9). Elements of Table 3, such as 
factor 10, reaching a fuller understanding of the issues, and elements of factor 12, 
maintaining a clearer picture and access to all relevant information, are also observed.  
Nelson also relied on written lists and correspondence to convey his 
thoughts and orders to the captains of the British Fleet.112 With these orders he was able 
to relay instructions about anything from the procurement of supplies for the fleet to 
orders on actions to carry out in the case of bad weather. What’s more, the captains 
receiving this correspondence used the same method to write back to Nelson as a means 
of resolving issues during those times when geographical or other factors prohibited face-
to-face meetings.113 Despite its usefulness, written correspondence was limited by the 
distances between ships and by weather. 
In conclusion, decision makers of the Royal navy valued collaborative 
planning and used it as a means to alleviate the deleterious effects of environments of 
extreme information ambiguity. Through the use of face-to-face meetings and the  
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concomitant sharing of ideas the leaders of the Royal navy were able to maximize their 
ability to mitigate ambiguity so that continued operation and mission execution was 
possible. 
b. Collaborative Planning and the Franco-Spanish Navy 
Where the British navy serves as an example of a military organization (of 
decision makers) that was able to use collaborative planning to their advantage, 
Villenueve, and the decision makers of the Franco-Spanish Fleet provide a contrasting 
view.114 The Combined Fleet did attempt to share ideas, synchronize assets, and conduct 
face-to-face meetings (Table 3, factors 1, 2, 6). However, examination of the way in 
which the Combined Fleet conducted collaborative planning, raises the question of how 
much success they had in improving their situational awareness, increasing information 
flow, understanding the issues, and sharing information across geographic boundaries 
(Table 3, factors 7, 9, 10, 11). First, the effectiveness of the Combined Fleet’s 
collaborative planning was seriously degraded by the dissention and distrust among 
Villenueve’s superiors and subordinates.115 Second, the Combined Fleet’s collaboration 
was often based on lies and false information (See below). Third, both subordinates and 
superiors of Villenueve hid information from him and communicated about him behind 
his back. Lastly, much of Villenueve’s collaborative planning suffered from the effects of 
distance and the delays that distance posed on the orders he would receive from Napoleon 
and Decrès.  
As discussed above earlier, Villenueve, although capable, was not well 
respected by the captains and crews of the French Navy and was even less well respected 
by the men of the Spanish Fleet.116 As an example, on October 19, 1805, when 
Villenueve had just ordered the Franco-Spanish Fleet to get underway from Cadiz, 
Schom describes it in the following way, “…with so much dissention among his fleet 
eve was of course taking the considerable risk of finding commanders, Admiral Villenu                                                 
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part of his fleet separating from and abandoning him…”117 Additionally, neither 
Napoleon nor Admiral Decrès, Villenueve’s superiors, respected or had confidence in 
him.118 However, Villenueve received the job because there was no more qualified than 
he at the time. The bad relations Villenueve had with his superiors and with his 
subordinates served to derail most of the effective collaborative planning that would have 
otherwise benefited by the Combined Fleet.  
Clearly one of the things that hurt the collaborative planning efforts of the 
French and Spanish navies the most was the lying or false information they gave each 
other. Effective collaborative planning is founded on accurate information. Sharing of 
ideas, synchronizing, and various forms of correspondence are severely hampered, if not 
rendered useless, if the information flowing between to entities is not based on truthful 
data. For instance, after a battle between Admiral Calder of the Royal Navy and 
Villenueve on July 22nd, 1805, “Villenueve’s report on the battle was very sketchy, 
indeed, more typical of a diplomatic assessment than of a naval summary of events…”119 
In his report, Villenueve lied so continuously it would have been impossible for his 
superiors or anyone else to benefit from any number of the positive products of 
collaborative planning such as accurate situational awareness, information flow/issues 
being raised, and certainly not a fuller understanding of what had happened during the 
battle (Table 3, factors 7, 9, 10).  
On August 8th, 1805, upon receiving the report on the battle between the 
Franco-Spanish Fleet and the Royal Navy, Napoleon, in his report to the French Arch-
Chancellor, further perpetuated the lies begun previously by Villenueve. For instance, he 
reported that any failings in the battle could surely be attributed to the Spanish when in 
fact it was the Spanish who had fought the most bravely. Research reveals that 
Villenueve never indicated the full truth in his reports to Decrès and Napoleon and that 
Napoleon was the only one who reportedly lied more than Villenueve.120 
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In the absence of truthful information, Villenueve’s efforts suffered from 
hidden information as well. Both Napoleon and Decrès secretly corresponded with 
General Lauriston, commander of troops onboard Villenueve’s fleet. For instance, in one 
case (though these private communications occurred often), Napoleon is reported to have 
written privately to General Lauriston; “I really believe your Admiral does not know how 
to command.”121 
In addition to the ill effects of hidden/false information, Villenueve 
suffered delays in receiving information from both Decrès and Napoleon. In one 
particular instance, Napoleon sent a long list of orders and missions (dated 13th and 14th 
April, 1805) including some amendments (dated 23rd April), all of which would take 
weeks to carry out. Unfortunately, Villenueve did not receive the orders until the end of 
May of the same year. What is more, Napoleon insisted these new orders be carried out 
and completed in enough time that Villenueve leave for a new destination no later than 
the 22nd of June (same year).122 The distance from Napoleon and Decrès location in Paris 
to Villenueve’s operating area in the vicinity in the Caribbean severely slowed down the 
speed of sharing ideas and the synchronizing of assets (Table 3, factors 1, 2), and 
obviously precluded the use of collaborative planning via face-to-face meeting (Table 2, 
factor 6).  
In the end, Villenueve and the Combined Fleet collaboratively planned, 
though it appears not very well.  Dissention amongst his commanders and crew, false 
information, hidden information, and delayed receipt of orders made it difficult for 
Villenueve and the Combined Fleet to achieve some of the essential products of 
collaborative planning. Factors such as shared situational awareness, increased 
information flow, developing a fuller understanding of the issues, and gaining access to 
all relevant information, no doubt, could have contributed to Villenueve’s successful 
alleviation of his environment of extreme information ambiguity. 
4. What Was Expected to Happen in the Battle? 
Initially the Combined Fleet expected to get to sea and avoid a fight. Villenueve’s 
motives were not like those of Nelson’s. He was putting to sea because he knew he was 
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about to be relieved by the Council of War in France. Days earlier on the 12th of October, 
just four days after the Council of War, Admiral Rosily of the French Navy arrived in 
Madrid, but was detained there because the route to Cádiz was unsafe for travel. 
Nevertheless, word reached Villenueve that he would be superseded. On the 18th  of 
October, Villenueve ordered Rear Admiral Charles Rene Magon (in the French Ship 
Algesiras with Commanding Officer Captain Gabriel-Auguste Brouard) with seven of the 
line and one frigate to proceed to sea to capture Captain Blackwood’s squadron of 
frigates (they were just outside the harbor) in order to find out more about the make-up 
and intentions of the British Fleet.123 However, before this command could be executed, 
Villenueve received word from Louis’s detachment at Gibraltar that a convoy waiting 
there for escort (by some of Nelson’s ships) had sailed eastward with a total of four ships 
of the line and that two other ships were in port. Villenueve inferred that Nelson must 
now be six of the line short and decided that this was the best time, if ever, to put out to 
sea in order to escape or attack.  Most importantly however, the idea of being relieved by 
Admiral Rosily was no doubt in the forefront of his mind. So, despite the fact there was 
little wind, he gave the order for his fleet to get underway.  
What did Nelson expect to happen in the battle considering his environment of 
extreme information ambiguity? He expected the enemy eventually to proceed to sea. 
Next, he expected both fleets to form up and engage each other. Lastly, he expected to 
bring about a decisive victory and take at least twenty prizes (ships, etc.).  
5. What Did Actually Happen in the Battle?  
By taking the Combined Fleet to sea on the 20th of October, 1805, Villenueve 
avoided being relieved by Admiral Rosily. Although Villenueve would eventually stand 
and face the enemy, his first intention was to escape to the Strait of Gibraltar. As it turns 
out, he probably could have managed this considering the heavy rain and fog present in 
the area that day. On the 21st of October, 1805, between 0700 and 0800, Villenueve was 
heading south and dealing with his own ambiguous thoughts. Should he run from Nelson, 
avoid battle, and report to the Mediterranean as ordered by Napoleon? If Villenueve did 
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that, he knew he would eventually have to face Napoleon and Decrès to explain all of his 
previous actions. Villenueve had made a career out of coming up with good excuses for 
all of his failures. At 0800, Villenueve made his decision and gave the order to reverse 
the course of the Combined Fleet and head north directly into the waiting guns of Nelson 
and the Royal Navy.124 Villenueve knew it was probably a suicide mission, but decided it 
best to go down at the hands of a worthy opponent like Nelson, than to be stripped of 
rank and power upon his return to France. The battle was on, and there was no turning 
back.125 
Historians are divided as to whether or not Nelson followed the original plan of 
attack laid out in his memorandum. Suffice it to say, whether the plan was followed or 
not, his actions in battle were wholly justified. Nelson had predicted the vanguard of the 
Combined Fleet, once cut off, would not be able to figure out what to do or execute 
properly in order to reinsert itself back into the battle. As mentioned earlier, Nelson’s 
tactic to cut the vanguard off and put it out of commission worked exactly as planned. 
The commander of the vanguard was no doubt overcome by his own environment of 
information uncertainty, and never got the vanguard turned around until the very end of 
the battle, and by that time it was too late. 
With respect to the ineffectiveness of the vanguard, one must also question what 
effect Villenueve’s transposition of the battle line had on the tactics his officers were able 
to deploy, considering (while they were sailing south towards the Straits of Gibraltar) he 
ordered the fleet to ‘wear together,’ or turn back, which literally reversed the sailing order 
of the whole fleet. An alternative order would have been to ‘turn in succession’ which 
would have changed the direction of the fleet to the north, but would have also 
maintained the original battle order as well. Now, the Spanish Admiral Gravina’s 
Observation Squadron was to function as the rear-guard instead of as the commander of 
the vanguard as originally planned. One last thing Villenueve’s order served to do was 
demonstrate again how much his inexperienced captains struggled to get their ships 
quickly into any semblance of a new battle line.    
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Proceeding on with further details of the battle and as told by the Spanish in a 
summary written once all the details were known, “The attack,” they say, “was upon the 
centre and rear of our line, and by concentrating their force upon it, they involved the 
rearguard in a regular action, line to line, doubling our extreme rear and leaving the van 
out of action.”126 Corbett believed these words to be true and said they also gave a 
correct summary of the main idea of the Memorandum. Furthermore, the reports of both 
the Spanish and the French are full of surprised reactions that Nelson would have tried 
such a reckless attack and one absent of common established principle. Furthermore, both 
the French and the Spanish could not believe they themselves were not able to thwart it 
right away because of its reckless nature. This serves as yet another reminder of the poor 
training and lack of sea experience of the Franco-Spanish Fleet. Their “sprawling display 
of naval ineptitude”127 was not surprising considering upon departure from Cádiz, on the 
20th of October, it was the first time several thousand of the Combined Fleet’s sailors had 
ever ventured out of the harbor!128 How could the men be expected to sail a ship into 
battle without having received the training to do so? They could not.  
So it was no surprise they were unable to repel Nelson’s attack once the battle 
begun. Contemporary evidence agrees that these were the facts of the battle, so then, was 
the battle fought according to Nelson’s Memorandum? “In major tactics it was; in its 
minor tactics it was not.”129 It is possible that Nelson may have discussed some of the 
“minor tactics” verbally with his subordinate commanders, though nothing about the 
exact way he and Collingwood initiated the attack on the Allied Fleet is found in the 
Memorandum itself. 
When the last shots had been fired the British had emerged victorious over the 
Combined Fleet. Villenueve and two of his admirals had been taken prisoner by the 
British Fleet. Only nine of the thirty-three ships which had left Cádiz the day before  
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would return that night; four were headed for the safety of the straits which left no fewer 
than twenty French or Spanish ships still on the battlefield (17 totally dismantled, thirteen 
in possession of prize crews, and one in flames).130 
The significance of all this, especially with respect to the three variables, is that 
Nelson, in the very hour of battle, relied on his unmatched experience and the experience 
of his officers and sailors, and simply charged at the enemy, neglecting the security of a 
more scientific employment of force. What is more, he used his presumed moral and 
material advantage of speed and momentum against an adversary who at that point of 
battle was still having trouble forming up.131 Still some would argue that he accepted too 
much risk; however, the success of his attack and the known defects of his enemy are 
justification in and among themselves. Still, regardless of all that can and has been said, 
Nelson possessed an unquenchable thirst to bring the enemy to battle and destroy it. 
There is nothing that could have kept him from doing so.  
In the end he was right; there was a great lack of training and sea experience on 
the part of the Combined Fleet and that helped to make his tactics successful. Some 
reliable officers of the time argued that had Nelson waited another hour for everything to 
take shape, the mission could still have been completed with more decisive results. 
Nevertheless, his attack was a stroke of genius and what’s more, “It was a glorious 
victory.”132 
C.  THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY 
The Battle of Midway, like the Battle of Trafalgar, is a case study rich with 
examples of decision makers immersed in the heat of battle, caught up in environments of 
potentially paralyzing extreme information ambiguity. The Battle of Midway, which took 
place over the course of three days, from June 4th to 6th, 1942, offers many more 
opportunities to observe the actions of the decision makers. Furthermore, unlike the 
Trafalgar case study that focused on two decision makers, Nelson and Villenueve, this 
study of Midway explores the decisions of four admirals: Fleet Admiral Chester W. 
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Nimitz, Admiral Raymond Spruance, both of the United States Navy and of Commander-
in-Chief Yamamoto and Vice Admiral Nagumo, both of the Japanese Imperial Navy.  
The Battle of Midway matched two navies whose strategies were rooted in the 
writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan.133 His works were required reading readings in 
American schools and Japanese schools alike. Both navies studied Mahan’s teachings on 
staff planning and table-top maneuvers at their respective war colleges.134 
The Japanese naval strategy was actually a blend of Mahan’s doctrines and 
traditional Chinese and Japanese military doctrine -- their thinking emphasized the 
subjugation of the enemy through maneuver, strategy, and attrition rather than by strict 
quantitative superiority.135 While both navies were battleship-centric forces, the 
Americans realized much sooner than the Japanese that a shift to a focus on aircraft 
carriers using the battleship in a supporting role was necessary.136 
The American admirals were willing to evolve their policy towards a more 
carrier-centric strategy. In the process, they changed the use of the battleship: Not by 
scrapping it altogether, rather by using some of its greatest strengths to perform vital 
mission functions. The battleship’s capability as an air warfare asset were well leveraged 
once these mighty ships began seeing use as screens for the carrier task forces; this 
combined use of carriers and battleships represents the origins of the first carrier 
battlegroups. Additionally, later in the war, the battleship’s larger guns were used for 
shore bombardment in order to prepare the Japanese islands for invasion by American 
ground forces.  
In contrast, the Japanese never could, despite the urging from many inside their 
own navy, evolve their thinking from the battleship-centric to the aircraft carrier-centric 
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force until it was too late.137 The Japanese reluctance to adapt is important because it 
became a primary contributor to many of the ambiguous information environments they 
faced in the war, and especially in the Battle of Midway. 
1. What Did the Environment of Extreme Information Ambiguity Mean 
to the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy? 
a. Environments of Extreme Information Ambiguity and the United 
States Navy 
For the Japanese, Admirals Yamamoto and Nagumo stand out as the two 
decision makers on the Japanese side that suffered the most from factors such as friction, 
ambiguity, time pressure, delayed action-feedback loops, and high stakes (Table 1, 
factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). On the American side, Admirals Nimitz, Spruance, and Fletcher 
suffered from many of the same debilitating factors, though not to as great an extent. The 
discussion resumes here with what these environments meant to the United States Navy 
during the battle. 
In analyzing the ambiguous information environments that Spruance faced 
during the Battle of Midway, it is important to look not only at Spruance, but also at his 
battle staff which also experienced significant ambiguity. Nevertheless, Nimitz and 
Spruance actually handled ambiguity better than did their staffs. As soon as Spruance 
took command of Admiral Halsey’s Task Force Sixteen, he became immediately aware 
of the seriousness of his situation. High stakes (Table 1, factor 5) is one of the first things 
Spruance was forced to deal with.138 Fletcher’s and Spruance’s orders were clear: Hold 
Midway Island and inflict maximum damage on the Japanese Fleet.139 However, 
Spruance and Fletcher were ordered by Admiral Nimitz to preserve the valuable 
American carriers, even at the cost of giving up Midway. Admiral Spruance understood 
the high stakes involved -- if he saved the carriers and lost the island, he would be 
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shamed for not saving the island. Furthermore, if he saved the island and lost his carriers, 
he would be failing to fulfill Admiral Nimitz’s primary order which was to cause the 
highest damage on the enemy while not unnecessarily risking heavy American losses 
(i.e., the carrier strike force). Finally, he might lose both the carriers and the island.140  
  After Spruance received his orders from Nimitz, neither Thomas Buell nor 
Ronald Spector, both historians of the Pacific War, give any indication that the news of 
receiving this new command affected Admiral Spruance in any particular way. He 
appeared calm most of the time.141 Also, after receiving his new orders, Spruance 
received from Nimitz a detailed operation order (document) describing the composition 
of the huge Japanese Fleet and how Nimitz expected the Japanese to employ their forces. 
Additionally, Spruance was provided with intelligence reports which gave him even more 
detailed information than that covered in the general order. Buell comments that this 
provided Spruance with a huge advantage. Spruance understood the he had fewer ships 
and aircraft to fight this battle than the Japanese. However, he felt the accuracy of his 
intelligence evened the playing field considerably.142 Spruance would soon learn that at 
least some of this advantage due to intelligence would soon be overshadowed by the 
inefficiency of his staff. 
On the morning of the first day of battle, June 4, 1942, the first signs that 
Admiral Spruance’s newly inherited staff would not hold up under the strains of an 
environment of extreme ambiguity developed. “The inconclusive reports had an 
unintended and malignant effect upon the staff officers, wrenching their nerves and 
intensifying their anxiety,” Buell writes.143 At about 0545 (June 4th), they had been 
waiting for reports from the American search planes out of Midway, and they had been 
receiving incomplete reports about the exact status of the Japanese carriers and attack 
planes. The staff seemed to be dealing with the following characteristics: friction, 
ambiguity, time pressure (Table 1, factors 1, 2, 3). 
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The staff would continue to suffer from friction (Table 1, factor 1), so 
much so that by later in the afternoon on June 4th, Buell wrote and Spector concurred, 
that Spruance’s staff had collapsed and become dysfunctional.144 The staff became 
gradually more confused and unsettled as the battle wore on. They were unable to deal 
with the requirement for regimented planning and well orchestrated task force 
operations.145 They became increasingly more paralyzed because they could not deal 
with sensors (scout planes) that delivered less than 100% accurate data, or with the time 
pressure of their current situation. Regarding, time pressure, the entire staff, including the 
Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, could not execute some of their most 
fundamental duties. For instance, after the first air attack was launched by Spruance, it 
was the staff’s job to calculate the “Point Option.” Since carriers are not stationary 
airfields, the Point Option gives the pilots a set of coordinates to return to upon 
completing their missions.146 The calculation and the updating of this point is the job of 
the staff. However, because of their ambiguous environment, they failed to do this. As a 
consequence, many pilots, failed to find their carriers, ran out of fuel, and crashed into 
the sea.147 
In contrast, Spruance, who was also waiting for the Midway scout plane 
reports, did not seem the least bit affected by having to wait. In fact, upon hearing the 
same report as his staff on June 4th announcing the discovery of two Japanese carriers and 
battleships steaming towards Midway, without apparent emotion, he rose from his chair, 
asked for some information, did some plotting, and quietly directed, “Launch the attack.” 
The important question is: Why did Spruance not appear to be affected by factors such as 
ambiguity, time pressure, and fear of making bad decisions (Table 1, factors 2, 3, 13)? 
Even though Spruance knew that there were still two or three additional Japanese carriers 
whose location he did not know, he still launched all of his planes at the only two he had 
located. Although he knew it was a gamble, his immediate decision to launch illustrates 
that he did not intend to wait to find the other Japanese carriers. Returning to the initial 
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question about the ambiguity, Spruance made assumptions based on wind direction and 
from that deduced what the probable Japanese actions would be. Spruance concluded that 
the Japanese would continue towards Midway, recover and rearm the planes from the 
first strike, and re-launch either at Midway or the carriers of Task Forces 16 and 17. 
Lastly, he had to assume that his forces might be discovered at anytime. Ultimately, he 
knew that his time to decide the best course of action was limited. Launching 
immediately was the surest way for him to maximize his chance of Nagumo’s planes not 
being able to attack the Task Force before he could get his planes launched and away. 
Still, Spruance refused to get overexcited -- he took it all in stride.148 
Throughout the day on June 4th, 1942, Spruance remained calm while his 
staff became increasingly exhausted. After the Yorktown was attacked by planes 
launched from the Japanese carrier Hiryu, Spruance ordered his Chief of Staff to launch 
the second attack of the day.149 Despite the completely inefficient and uncoordinated way 
in which the attack was finally launched, the attack did hit and sank the fourth Japanese 
carrier.150 
At this point, evening was approaching, and Spruance needed to decide 
whether to pursue the Japanese at night or retire to the east and then change course and 
head back west towards the enemy fleet in the morning. In this case he did not know 
whether the Japanese Fleet would retire after losing four carriers, or if they would press 
on with their battleships and cruisers in order to achieve decisive battle against the 
American Fleet and capture Midway. He also knew that his force would be no match for 
the Japanese’s superior surface ship fire power and night fighting skills. He opted to 
retire to the east and fight, if necessary, on the 5th of June. Once again, Spruance seemed 
to keep a clear head and was not affected by high stakes or fear of making bad decisions 
(Table 1, factors 5, 13). However, in spite of his normal calm demeanor, on June 5th, one 
could observe Spruance experiencing some of the factors that characterize environments 
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of extreme information ambiguity, such as ambiguity, time pressure, and delayed action-
feedback loops (Table 1, factors 2, 3, 4). For instance, research indicates he became 
agitated because the planes scouting the location of the Japanese forces continued to send 
back inconsistent reports.151 
On the morning of June 5th, at about 0400, the American submarine 
Tambor spotted several unidentified ships ninety miles west of Midway. Spruance began 
to wonder if the Japanese were going to press on with their invasion of Midway. Several 
hours later Tambor sighted two Japanese cruisers retiring from Midway. At about the 
same time, an American patrol plane sighted the same two cruisers streaming oil. 
Spruance decided that these reports indicated the Japanese had given up their plans for 
Midway.152 
After breakfast, Spruance’s Chief-of-Staff, Captain Miles Browning, 
certain that the Japanese were retiring, recommended that he speed up and attack 
immediately. Spruance waited -- though he knew that he had crippled or sunk four 
Japanese carriers, he still believed that perhaps a fifth Japanese carrier remained that 
might delay its attack until Spruance committed his last few planes against  other 
Japanese surface combatants. Furthermore, the weather was bad for flying. Based on this 
information, he chose to wait until he knew more. Buell refers to Spruance’s inability to 
know this information as the fog of war. Specifically, Spruance experienced ambiguity, 
delayed action-feedback loops, and high stakes (Table 1, factors 2, 4, 5), even if ever so 
slightly.153 
Because Spruance was concerned about the possibility of a fifth Japanese 
carrier, he conserved his remaining planes just in case. The high stakes associated with 
potentially losing his carrier force or Midway still existed, and the ambiguity of not 
having all the information he needed to make a decision, for the first time, seemed to 
have affected Spruance. Poor scouting reports from Midway continued to compound 
Spruance’s uncertainty about the composition, location, and movement of the Japanese 
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he became increasingly more annoyed that the Midway planes failed to maintain constant 
contact with the enemy. The Midway planes would locate the Japanese Fleet and then 
break off, lose the enemy (again), and return to base.154 
By the afternoon of June 5th, the weather and situation were clearing. 
Spruance finally decided to attack the Japanese even though by the afternoon, he had 
received no further reports and had no idea where the Japanese were. He could only guess 
at the location of the enemy. Nevertheless, at 1500, he launched the attack which proved 
unsuccessful because he had lost the Japanese Fleet again.155 So, by the end of the day, 
on June 5th, Spruance was still dealing with the same ambiguity that had plagued him the 
day before. That evening, he decided to launch his own cruiser float planes the following 
morning. What he did not know was that the ambiguity of the situation would not change.   
Early on the morning of June 6th, the Enterprise’s patrol aircraft finally 
reported two distinct groups of Japanese ships and their composition.156 Spruance 
ordered the planes to stay in contact with the enemy until relieved by his cruiser float 
planes.157 Then, after receiving an order from Nimitz, Spruance ordered an attack on the 
Japanese forces using Hornet’s bombers.158 The Hornet bombers reported attacking just 
one Japanese force.159 They reported hitting a cruiser, but not sinking it. Enterprise 
bombers reported many hits on both cruisers, but reported the cruisers would not sink. 
Hornet launched a third attack.160 
At this point, Spruance experienced the effects of an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity. Spruance was puzzled and irritated. After three intense 
attacks, the cruisers still would not sink. What’s more, Spruance was still unable to 
identify what he was attacking. Some aviators reported attacking one battleship and one 
cruiser, and others reported attacking two cruisers. In reality, his planes had been 
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attacking two cruisers and two destroyers. All of this confusion was produced by the 
faulty and inaccurate contact reports made by the pilots. At this time, Spruance still 
thought the enemy ships were in two distinct groups. Clearly, Spruance was experiencing 
ambiguity, delayed action-feedback loops, and fear of not understanding the situation 
(Table 1, factors 2, 4, 13). Buell again refers to this as the fog of war.161  
In one final attempt to alleviate this environment of extreme information 
ambiguity, Spruance launched two planes with cameras. Unfortunately, when they 
returned, the pilots said they were unable to identify the ships because they had forgotten 
their ship identification cards. Nevertheless, the photos they had taken finally revealed 
that Spruance’s Task Force 16 had been attacking Mogami class cruisers and not 
battleships. With this final report, early in the evening on June 6th, the ambiguity of the 
situation gone, his destroyers low on fuel, his aviators exhausted from three days of 
combat flights, and with his ships getting ever closer to the Japanese land-based bombers 
on Wake Island, Spruance decided to end the battle. He turned his ships around and 
headed for home.162 
Despite whatever fog of war, or extreme information ambiguity he may 
have felt, Spruance detached himself from the bedlam that surrounded him so that he 
could continue his planning and coordination of the battle. During the Battle of Midway, 
Admiral Spruance found himself in many ambiguous information environments. In fact, 
he clearly experienced friction, ambiguity, time pressure, delayed action-feedback loops, 
high stakes, and fear of not understanding the situation (Table 1, factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13). 
In spite of being exposed to the potentially debilitating effects of all these factors, he 
consistently demonstrated the ability to acknowledge that such environments existed, and 
with that, moved on and focused on his orders and mission objectives which were to 
defend Midway and preserve his fighting force, namely, the American carriers.163 
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b. Environments of Extreme Information Ambiguity and the 
Imperial Japanese Navy 
After the Battle of Coral Sea, Admiral Yamamoto and his planners were 
not terribly upset by the turning back of the Port Moresby invasion. However, the 
decisions made from that point forward would be affected by the effects of extreme 
information ambiguity. First, the Japanese believed two American carriers had been sunk 
during the battle, when in fact only the Lexington had been sunk. The Yorktown returned 
to Pearl Harbor for quick repairs and returned to sea in time for action at Midway.164  
Second, the Japanese failed to capitalize on two vital intelligence 
opportunities. One of the failed intelligence gathering attempts would have given the 
Japanese knowledge of whether or not the American carriers were at Pearl Harbor before 
beginning their Midway invasion plans. The second failure occurred because Yamamoto 
was unable to get important information to Nagumo about the American’s ongoing 
preparations on Midway. Because Yamamoto was out to sea on his flagship, Yamato, he 
refused to break radio silence and collaborate with Nagumo and his other commanders. 
These intelligence failures were two more strikes against the Japanese, and eliminated 
any chance they had to alleviate the environment of extreme information ambiguity they 
faced. 
Third, Yamamoto effectively took his main force and much of the rest of 
the Japanese Fleet out of the fight through the excessive disposition of his fleet.165 The 
Japanese failed to concentrate their force even though concentration is one of the longest 
lasting principles of war.166 In contrast, the Americans concentrated their fleet northeast 
of Midway. In the end, Yamamoto was not present where the Japanese Imperial Navy 
needed him the most, concentrated up north with Nagumo, screening for the carrier strike 
force. Furthermore, had Yamamoto been with Nagumo, he could have taken command of 
the battle as well. Yamamoto and his main force, together with Vice Admiral Kondo and 
his Midway Invasion Force, and Vice Admiral Hosogaya and his Northern (Aleutians) 
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Force, were all too far away from Nagumo to make a difference in the battle.167 These 
second and third issues of radio silence and force disposition were important because 
they kept the Japanese Fleet from being able to collaborate before and during the battle. 
For some reason, the Japanese never saw the need to fix these communication issues until 
it was too late. Improving collaboration would have helped to clear up their intelligence 
failures as well. 
The Japanese never recovered from the ambiguity caused by these three 
elements: incorrect information about the survival of Yorktown, intelligence failures, and 
failure to concentrate their forces. Overcoming either of these would have helped to 
alleviate the ambiguity the Japanese experienced. For instance, if the Imperial Japanese 
Navy had not imposed a radio silence, they could have overcome their collaborative 
planning challenges. If Yamamoto had been in Tokyo, as Nimitz was in Hawaii, he 
would have been able to benefit from collaborative planning. These benefits include 
sharing ideas and synchronization of assets and their products of shared situational 
awareness, better information flow, issues raised, and overall, Yamamoto would have 
reached a fuller understanding of the issues (Table 3, factors 1, 2, 8, 9, 10).168 Yamamoto 
could have freely collaborated with all of his commanders at sea. The use of any number 
of these factors would have more than likely increased his situational awareness to 
ahigher level than he was able to achieve onboard his flagship at sea under the restriction 
of radio silence. At sea, under the restriction of radio silence, Yamamoto effectively cut 
himself and his battleship force out of the battle. He was never in a position to help 
Nagumo at all.  
The wide disposition of Japanese forces at the Battle of Midway was one 
of the leading contributors to the environment of extreme information ambiguity with 
which Nagumo was forced to cope. Yamamoto had placed Nagumo and his strike force 
of four carriers to the northwest of Midway. From there, Nagumo launched the Japanese 
air attacks on Midway Island while he laid in wait for the American Fleet. So, where was 
the rest of the Japanese Fleet? Yamamoto was three hundred miles to west, Kondo was 
                                                 
167 Spector, 166-167. 
168 Fuchida, Mitsuo and Okumiya, Masatake, Midway: the battle that doomed Japan, (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1955), 239. 
70 
hundreds of miles to the southeast, and finally, Hosogaya was entirely out the action up 
north in the Aleutians. Nagumo was all alone. 
As the preceding paragraphs have shown, the Japanese had a lot working 
against them before the Battle of Midway even began. What follows is a detailed 
discussion of Admiral Nagumo’s experience at the Battle of Midway. The scenario he 
faced, and the conditions under which he fought, tell the story of how an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity affected the Imperial Japanese Navy.  
It is important to note that the primary mission of the Japanese navy at 
Midway was to destroy the U.S. Fleet and extend their defensive perimeter to Midway 
and the Aleutians. After the first wave of Japanese attacks on Midway Island, more and 
more of Nagumo’s assets became tied up attacking Midway and fending off American air 
attacks from Midway. Nagumo knew he needed to keep a certain number of planes 
prepared to conduct an immediate strike on the American carriers once they were found. 
Events however, derailed Nagumo’s plan.  
Adding to his problems was the way in which he decided to employ his 
carriers. Instead of launching planes from just two carriers and keeping two carriers in 
reserve so they could launch a full attack on the American carriers once they were located 
by Japanese scout planes, he chose to launch several planes from each of his four carriers; 
thus effectively tying up all of his carriers. Through the use of this tactic, Nagumo gained 
more speed with respect to launching attacks on Midway, but it left him incapable of 
immediate launch on the enemy carriers.169 Nagumo’s choice to use all four carriers to 
attack Midway would be a cause of great stress for him later.  
By about 0740-0800 on the 4th of June, as Nagumo was fully involved in 
the Battle of Midway, he had a great deal of information ambiguity to deal with.170 At 
this time, in the unfolding scenario, Nagumo needed to decide on his next move, and five 
major challenges weighed heavily on his thoughts.171 First, the Japanese incurred a loss 
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of over sixty percent of their planes during the first attack on Midway.172 Second, the 
Japanese strike commander, returning from the first Midway strike, radioed that a second 
strike against Midway would be necessary. Third, at the time of that communication, 
Nagumo’s carriers were fending off continued attacks by American planes from Midway, 
which told him that Midway was still dangerous. Fourth, Nagumo faced the question: 
“What should he do?” He expected the first attack on Midway Island to be sufficient, so 
he had armed all his planes for an attack on the American carrier strike force. Fifth, 
should he now rearm his planes again, a process that would cause over an hour delay, for 
another attack on Midway? After all, he was still waiting for information from his 
scouting planes, out for over two hours, which were to inform him of the location of the 
American carriers.173 Preparing his strike force for another land attack would be a grave 
mistake if there were enemy carriers near by. 
He decided that an hour’s delay to rearm the planes would be safe enough 
considering that he had not heard any reports of American carriers being in the area. At 
0715 on June 4th, Nagumo gave the order to rearm the planes for a second attack on 
Midway.174 At 0728 one of Nagumo’s scout planes from the cruiser Tone, which earlier 
that morning had been ten minutes late in launching, reported back news of ten enemy 
ships, but not what kind of ships. At that time, Nagumo ordered a halt to the rearming of 
the planes.  
A little while later, Tone’s scout plane reported five cruisers and five 
destroyers, but said nothing of the American carriers. Ten minutes later, a third and final 
dispatch reported sighting one American carrier. Upon the arrival of this report, Rear 
Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon, commander of the Japanese carriers Soryu and the Hiryu of 
Carrier Division Two, signaled to Nagumo’s flagship: “Consider it advisable to launch 
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attack force immediately.”175 Yamaguchi had three dozen dive-bombers ready and 
Nagumo’s carriers, Kaga and Akagi, had several torpedo planes ready. Amongst all of 
this information, Nagumo’s senses must have been overloaded. Nagumo made the 
decision to wait, reorganize a coordinated attack, and prepare his planes for a strike 
against the American carriers.176 
By this point in the battle, shortly after 0800, June 4th, Nagumo has 
reversed a decision, halted a decision, and finally, reversed the same decision again. 
Nagumo suffered from friction, ambiguity, time pressure, and high stakes (Table 1, 
factors 1, 2, 3, 5). These characteristics very often affect a decision maker’s ability to 
think, and the decision maker may experience a fear of not understanding a situation and 
a fear of making bad decisions (Table 1, factors 10, 13). Table 7 outlines these factors 
and the situations which caused them. 
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Table 7. Factors that Contributed to Nagumo’s Environment of Extreme Information 
Ambiguity 
# Factor Situation causing environment of extreme information ambiguity factors for Nagumo 
Enemy attacks.  
Lack of coordination with Yamamoto’s Main Body and Kondo’s Invasion Convoy to the south and Hosogaya’s 
Northern Area Force (Aleutian) and Takasu’s Screening Force (Aleutian) to the north because of disposition 
and fleet radio silence.  
1 Friction 
Unclear or complicated plan based on the number of variables he was trying to consider at that time. 
Ambiguous Data: His scout planes were not feeding him data on the location and disposition of the American 
forces.  
The scout plane Tone had taken off late.  
Yamamoto was not able to feed him at least one critical intelligence report and guidance because of radio 
silence. 
Correlation of data: The plane strike commander was recommending a second strike on Midway Island.  
Correlation of data: Rear Admiral Yamaguchi was recommending immediate attack on the American Fleet.  
Correlation of data: Only the scout plane Tone4 was sending back data, and it was in small sporadic pieces.  
2 Ambiguity 
He has so much information overloading his thoughts; it is difficult to discern the situation from inaccurate or 
possible missing data.  
3 Time Pressure Nagumo must make a decision and act quickly. He does not know how many carriers the Americans have nor when the American planes will be able to attack. 
5 High Stakes If he decides correctly, he saves the carrier strike force, if he decides incorrectly, he dooms them. 
Fear of making bad decisions: If he decides poorly, many men and ships will be lost, and he may lose the 
battle. 
13 Fear 
Fear of not understanding the situation: It is difficult to completely understand everything that is happening. 






After all that had happened, and was still occurring shortly before 0800, 
friction was clearly one of the factors most affecting Nagumo. Although the attacks had 
not yet started from the American carriers, he was being hit by nearly constant attacks 
from the Midway-based American planes.177 A large part of the friction he felt stemmed 
from his inability to coordinate and correlate data with other Japanese forces.178 Lastly, 
based on everything discussed so far, it seems obvious that the number of variables and 
the complexity involved in the situation facing him became difficult to manage: (1) 
Midway plane attacks, (2) lack of scouting reports, and (3) multiple suggestions from his 
subordinates. 
Nagumo was also affected by ambiguity. Nagumo had a lot of 
information, but it was not helping him. First, his information was not helping him 
because he was under constant attack by the enemy. Second, Nagumo struggled because 
it was difficult to differentiate between the inaccurate or incomplete data he was 
receiving from his reconnaissance planes. Nagumo either had no data at all (the two plus 
hours Nagumo’s planes were away and did not see anything) or the data that Nagumo 
was receiving was incomplete (when Tone’s scout plane finally did find the American 
forces, it took the pilot a long time (almost one hour) to fully discern what he had 
spotted.). 
During a battle, ambiguity (correlation of data) may lead a decision maker 
to several different possible threat assessments. During the Battle of Midway, Nagumo 
was correlating battle damage data and suggested courses of action from his subordinates. 
For instance, the Midway plane strike commander recommended a second strike on 
Midway. Rear Admiral Yamaguchi was recommending that Nagumo launch an 
immediate attack. Finally, not only was it difficult to correlate the inputs and suggestions 
from his subordinates, but at times, there just was not enough useful data coming in (from 
scout planes and the complete lack of orders from Yamamoto).179 
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Time pressure forced Nagumo to make decisions and take action when he 
did not feel he had all the information he needed. This was especially evident while he 
was waiting for the rearming of the planes that would fly the second attack against 
Midway and while waiting for reports back from his scout planes.180 
Nagumo, more than any other Japanese commander involved in the battle, 
had to make high stakes life and death decisions that would impact his men, equipment, 
and even the future of Japan. In the case of arming his planes to attack Midway vice the 
American carriers, if he decided correctly, he would save his carrier strike force and 
possibly go on to win an important battle. If he did not, he may lose his carriers, kill a lot 
of his men, and lose the battle.  
It seems obvious Nagumo also experienced at least two reactions to his 
environment of extreme information ambiguity: a fear of making bad decisions and the 
fear of not understanding the situation. He had many variables to consider and may have 
felt incapable of completely understanding the whole situation.181 
In conclusion, Nagumo found himself in an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity from the onset of the battle all the way through to the end. 
Tragically for the Japanese, he never found a way to reduce it enough to be able to 
function and make the decisions necessary to save his force from destruction. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note, Nagumo is not completely to blame for how poorly 
the Japanese performed during the Battle of Midway. The information ambiguity he 
faced was due in large part to the Japanese navy’s inability to develop effective 
collaborative planning and common training. From these deficiencies came intelligence 
failures and a lack of a training program to replace aviators lost in battle. Lastly, the 
disposition and dispersion of their forces, and Yamamoto’s location at sea also made it 
difficult for them to plan collaboratively.  
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2. What Did Common Training Mean to the United States Navy and the 
Imperial Japanese Navy? 
a. Common Training and the United States Navy 
Decision makers like Spruance trained their whole navy careers for fleet 
engagements like the Battle of Midway. This research will show that men like Nimitz, 
and Spruance do not just emerge by good luck.  Rather, they are trained and promoted 
through the ranks in common ways throughout their careers. Referring to Table 2, which 
presents the characteristics and products of receiving common training, decision makers 
like these share similar skills, similar training and education, and the result of all that 
common training is a certain harmony, or focus and direction, during operations (Table 2, 
factors 1, 8).  
Common training meant a great deal to the United States Navy around the 
turn of the twentieth century. Although the Japanese, entering into the war, probably had 
a better track record for common training, the Americans by no means neglected it 
altogether. (The Japanese had their problems as well.) On many occasions, the Americans 
relied on common training as a means of reducing the friction that inevitably arises in 
environments of extreme information ambiguity. Nevertheless, the training and 
proficiency of the United States Navy was not without problems. What follows are 
several examples of what they did right and, equally important, what they did wrong.  
With respect to officer education, officers that aspired to “important” 
commands attended the Naval Academy, at Annapolis. In fact, almost all of the top Naval 
commanders of World War II attended the Naval Academy between 1901 and 1905. 
Spector writes that the leaders of the Academy attempted to stimulate the intellect as 
much as mold character.182 At first glance, one might conclude that this meant the 
American naval leaders of that era were not receiving the kind of similar skills, training, 
and education that promoted quality common training.  They learned their general 
education topics, but they also left Annapolis with a lot of character, guts, presence, 
personality, and qualities of mind. Midshipmen were expected to learn the “qualities of 
reliability, leadership, integrity, good judgment, loyalty to service and to others.” 183 The 
                                                 
182 Spector, 18. 
77 
183 Reminiscences of Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Naval Historical Foundation, Oral History 
Collection, 65, 25-46. Rosenburg, Arleigh Burke, pg. 507.   
Naval officers left with ideas about warfare and “sea power” developed by Alfred Thayer 
Mahan and his collaborators at the Naval War College before the turn of the century.184 
Looking to the leadership of some of the decision makers who served 
during the time of the Battle of Midway, one sees the Navy’s equivalent of mission-
oriented command (Table 2, factor 3). Buell writes that Spruance received his written 
orders for the Midway operation on the evening of May 27, 1942, and adds that all 
operation orders during that time were short and to the point, which reflected the 
leadership styles of Fleet Admiral King and Admiral Nimitz. Like mission-oriented 
command, the idea was to tell the subordinate commanders what was to be done, give 
them the necessary resources, and make sure they knew that it was their responsibility to 
get the job done. Fleet Admiral King was especially adamant that his commanders use 
this leadership style. Spruance believed that, if he was responsible for accomplishing a 
mission, then it should be he who developed the necessary plans. Furthermore, the role of 
his superior should be to establish the objective and perhaps suggest, not direct, how it 
should be carried out.185 Spruance, after all, had prepared his whole Navy career for a 
genuine fleet action. He needed only to be given the objective and he knew what to do.186 
For instance, upon receiving his orders from Nimitz to take over Task 
Force 16, Spruance no doubt appreciated the danger in the forthcoming battle, but “by his 
nature he would not allow his imagination to magnify the threat and paralyze his 
thinking.”187 Before receiving this independent command of the task force, Spruance had 
had command six times previously. He had prepared for fleet action and decisive battle at 
sea for many years. Being a professional officer, commanding ships in battle was his 
life’s profession. The common training he received throughout his career, starting with 
the Naval Academy, had prepared him for decision making in environments of extreme 
information ambiguity.188 
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One area where Spruance’s training was still in development was in his 
understanding of carrier aviation. Normally, command of a carrier task force required a 
flag officer who was a naval aviation expert. The man he was replacing, Admiral Bill 
Halsey, had served eight consecutive years in carrier aviation. Spruance, on the other 
hand, had cut his teeth in the cruiser navy. Command of a carrier task force would be all 
new to him in many respects. Still, even though Spruance did not have all of the same 
aviation training and education that Halsey had, he had been educated at the Naval 
Academy like Halsey, and he had access to the same doctrine. By this point in his career 
he had already commanded six different ships and in September 1941 (just nine months 
before the Battle of Midway), he commanded Cruiser Division Five. In addition to his 
command experience, Spruance used his skills as a planner to offset any lack of carrier 
aviation experience he may have had.189 In the end, Nimitz supported Halsey’s strong 
endorsement of Spruance although, despite Halsey’s endorsement, career aviators were 
less confident about the decision -- they knew only that Spruance was not an aviator. 
“The aviators were uneasy going into the battle of their lives being led by a stranger, a 
shawdowy figure who had been riding about in the cruisers.” Later on, during the Battle 
of Midway, the aviators would find themselves in a situation of collaboration with 
Spruance on June 5th, 1942, and he did not disappoint them. Spruance overruled an order 
given to the aviator by Spruance’s Chief of Staff.190  
Buell’s biography of Admiral Spruance provides invaluable examples of 
how common training prior to encountering an environment of extreme information 
ambiguity proves its worth many times over. One such example shows how Spruance 
utilized inactive time at sea to build the staff’s operational skills by administering 
theoretical operational problems for them solve, problems similar to those used at the 
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United States Naval War College.191 Here the commander was reinforcing the factor of 
similar skills by letting his staff mentally rehearse possible scenarios on what their 
responses might be.  
Common training was always important to the United States Navy. During 
the war in the Pacific, both the Japanese and the Americans lost many aviators. The loss 
of so many pilots proved to be devastating for the Japanese because they lacked a training 
program that adequately replaced the lost pilots – the Japanese desired pilots that were 
perfectly trained. The Americans maintained an ample supply of pilots by emphasizing 
competence rather than excellence.192 Like the Japanese, the Americans also sustained 
heavy pilot casualties, but “because of a far more flexible training system, the U.S. Navy 
could absorb these losses and still continue to function effectively.”193 As a result, the 
Japanese found themselves running out of pilots whereas the Americans always found 
themselves in fresh supply – all because of their training program.194 
However, on several occasions Spruance’s staff, aviators, and operators 
demonstrated behavior and performance characteristic of poor common training. For 
instance, the first American attack on June 4th, 1942, against Nagumo’s carrier strike 
force was considered to be “piecemeal and uncoordinated.”195 In the first wave of attacks 
launched by the Hornet-Enterprise196 carrier group, the faster and more maneuverable 
fighters had failed to protect the slow moving torpedo planes from the devastating fire of 
the Japanese combat air patrol197; consequently, all of the torpedo planes were shot 
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down. Another group of planes, the dive-bombers, never managed to find the target and 
had to return to the ship because they were low on fuel.198  
 Although there exists convincing evidence that American aviators were 
not as well trained as their Japanese counterparts (especially in first two years of the war), 
there was one aspect of American carrier aviation that was clearly superior to that of the 
Japanese. Dive-bombing was the one aspect of aviation where the United States, during 
World War II, held a decisive advantage over Japanese aviation. The Americans 
developed the concept for dive-bombing, and not surprisingly, had arguably better dive-
bombing planes, pilots, and tactics. In the years after 1930, military aircraft began to be 
drastically improved which helped to further evolve the concept of dive-bombing. For 
some reason, the Army Air Corp did not put emphasis on dive-bombing, but the United 
States “Navy had taken it up as a distinct policy.”199 
During World War II, from 1941-1943, the Americans used the Douglas 
SDB Dauntless. “The Dauntless was older and slower” than its Japanese counterpart, but 
the SBD was far more impervious to battle damage, and its flying qualities suited it to its 
role perfectly. “In particular - as Dauntless pilots testified - it was very steady in a 
dive.”200 Lastly, in what is probably one of the most famous examples of dive-bombing 
during the war in the Pacific, Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky led the perfectly 
executed attack that destroyed three Japanese carriers during the battle.201 Luck that day 
was on the side of the Yorktown planes – together with some of the remaining Enterprise 
bombers, they were able to make one last attack before returning to the American carriers 
which left three of the four Japanese carriers burning. Only one Japanese carrier 
remained.202 
There were other instances of staff failures in addition to the “Point 
Option” debacle. Yet again, on the first day of the Battle of Midway, Spruance was 
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waiting for a scout plane report before he launched a second and final air attack for the 
day. When the reports came in, and when Spruance was satisfied with his information, he 
ordered an air attack at 1445 on June 4th. It was at this point, late in day, that Spruance’s 
staff began to fall apart:  they sent the wrong signal to the other ships in the task force, 
they sent the signals late, and ultimately, at the time they finally started launching aircraft 
for the attack (1530), the carrier Hornet still had not received an order to attack. At 1539, 
Hornet received an order to attack, and was finally able to launch by 1605.  Her planes 
were thirty-five minutes behind those of Enterprise. This was to be the second time in one 
day that the two carriers had failed to launch a coordinated attack against the enemy.203 
The staff had all but ceased to function. Buell indicated that this was the 
staff’s first real test during sustained combat against powerful enemy forces. 
Furthermore, the staff’s earlier engagements (island raids) had been against weak island 
defenses. Those operations had not prepared them for the difficulty of sustained fleet 
action. They had succeeded in the past in spite of their deficiencies. However, as the 
Midway battle wore on, they discovered that they were unable to deal with the “need for 
disciplined planning and the coordination of complex task force operations.”204  The 
cause of Spruance’s staff’s poor ability to cope under the strain of actual combat was 
insufficient vigorous training and rehearsal before battle. Moreover, a staff or a force 
must train on the “right” areas. The staff of Task Force 16 had real world training doing 
island raids. However, when the time came for intense battle against a relentless enemy, 
their previous training was not sufficient.  
The outcome of the Battle of Midway was a victory for the United States. 
Despite the obvious adverse effects of an environment of extreme information ambiguity 
had on the United States Navy, there is no denying that common training played a huge 
role in helping the Navy succeed. Spruance, even though he spent his career on cruisers 
and non-carrier type platforms, showed that similar training, education, and doctrine 
appear to sufficient. Furthermore, the superior training, tactics, and equipment of the 
American dive bombers carried the day on the 4th of June, 1942, by destroying three 
Japanese carriers in a very short amount of time. Of note, the element of time played a 
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role on both sides during the Battle of Midway. McClusky spotted the wake of the 
Japanese destroyer (which led him to the Japanese carriers) at almost the exact time he 
was going to turn around because of low fuel -- he was literally out of time. That little 
piece of time benefited McClusky and the American effort, but it was detrimental to 
Nagumo and the Japanese. There was an element of luck on the side of the Americans 
that deserves mentioning. One may also argue that leadership, and intelligence played a 
significant role as well. In contrast to the Battle of Trafalgar, the Battle of Midway has 
shown that there is more to overcoming environments of information ambiguity than just 
common training and collaborative planning .   
b. Common Training and the Imperial Japanese Navy 
The training and preparation strategy for the Japan Combined Fleet for 
World War II was “quality rather than quantity.” They had prepared for a long time to 
defeat a numerically superior fleet. However, at Midway the opposite happened -- a 
stronger Japanese fleet was defeated by a significantly weaker American fleet. 205 
The Japanese naval strategists focused on three factors to ensure the 
success of its naval forces against the United States in World War II: (1) the superior 
toughness, morale, and fighting spirit of their servicemen, (2) constant drill and training, 
and (3) advances in new and superior weapons.206 One can clearly see from factors (1) 
and (2) that common training played a big role in ensuring the Japanese Navy was 
prepared to deal with whatever situation they might face in battle.  
The high-ranking Japanese naval officers of the World War II era, like 
their American counterparts, had similar training, education, and doctrine. For instance, 
Fuchida, who entered the Naval Academy in 1921, reported that the officers at that time 
were already being taught that the United States was the next potential enemy (The 
Orange Plan also dates from the early 1920s). Second, most of the up and coming officers 
in the navy shared in the experience of serving as Naval Attachés in Washington. 
Because of this, almost all high ranking officers during the time before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor were well versed in the capabilities of the United States Navy.207  
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 Buell states that Spruance’s staff became increasingly more “confused and 
disoriented” as the battle progressed because the staff lacked the capacity for the 
disciplined planning and coordination of complex task force operations.208 This does not 
seem to have been the case with Nagumo’s staff.  Whereas Spruance inherited his staff 
from Admiral Halsey, and that staff lacked sustained combat experience, Nagumo’s staff 
had been with him for a long time, had spent months at sea (sea experience), and they had 
even conducted the attack on Pearl Harbor with Nagumo. Research shows that his staff 
was not afraid to make suggestions to Nagumo or to the Combined staff of Yamamoto, 
even if their suggestions were sometimes ignored.209 
 Nagumo’s Chief-of-Staff was Rear Admiral Kusaka Ryunosuke who was 
also a graduate of the Naval Academy. Kusaka was a seasoned Naval officer and was not 
only Nagumo’s Chief-of-Staff for the attack on Hawaii, December 7, 1941, but also 
played a major role in planning that operation and the air operation on Midway.210 A 
diligent and forward thinking officer, during the planning for Midway, Kusaka urged 
Yamato to relay all information to Akagi for the duration of the Midway operation. As 
mentioned earlier, the Japanese carriers did not have antennas sufficient to reliably 
receive all message traffic that would be coming from Tokyo. However, the relay from 
Yamato to Akagi (or to any other ship) never happened because Yamamoto refused to 
break radio silence. In fact, it was Yamamoto’s senior staff officer, Kameto Kuroshima 
that convinced Yamamoto that radio silence should not be broken and that Nagumo was 
probably receiving the same messages they were.211  
 The previous example demonstrates how well thought ideas from a well-
trained staff can sometimes be ignored or overridden, and often with dire consequences. 
It will be shown later in the section on collaborative planning and the Imperial Japanese 
Navy, how Nagumo, his staff, and his ability to alleviate his environment of extreme 
                                                 
208 Buell, 153. 
209 Evans and Peattie, 479. 
210 Evans and Peattie, 528. 
211 Dallas Woodbury Isom, The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost, (Naval War College  
Review, Summer 2000, 21. 
84 
information ambiguity was drastically reduced due to the information void created by 
Yamamoto’s unwillingness to get Nagumo the information he desperately needed.  
 With respect to air operations, Commander Genda Minoru was Nagumo’s 
air officer of the First Air Fleet. Commander Genda Minoru was also a graduate of the 
Naval Academy. Once, when requested by Yamamoto to submit ideas for the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, Genda returned two weeks later with a paper which asserted 
recommendations and identified potential problems – essentially it was a call for 
maximum air power. Not by coincidence, Genda was soon after handpicked by 
Yamamoto to serve as the chief air officer of Nagumo's staff -- he played a major role in 
the development of the tactical plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor.212 
This description of Genda serves to highlight yet another capably trained 
element of Nagumo’s staff. One example of Genda’s capability and of his ability to lead 
and train his officers and operators is seen in how well the Japanese conducted air 
operations during the Midway operation. In contrast to the Spruance’s staff’s inability to 
launch coordinated air strikes involving just two carriers on June 4th, 1942, Nagumo’s 
staff and the operators demonstrated flawlessly launched aircraft from four carriers at the 
same time.213 Furthermore, when the Japanese recovered planes: “With the veteran fliers 
we had at this time, speedy recovery operations on board the carriers even under stringent 
battle conditions were little more than child’s play.”214 
Any military unit, navy or otherwise, requires vigorous training before 
actual battle. The result is a force that is more prepared to execute its mission. The 
Japanese were no exception. The Japanese utilized many techniques to offset their 
quantitative disadvantages. For example, tactical concepts were ingrained throughout the 
fleet through a means of “hard and unremitting training.” Relentless training led to a 
confident and well-trained Japanese force.215  
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The Japanese Navy, like the U.S. Navy, also saw value in war gaming. For 
the operation against Midway, the staff officers and commanders involved in the 
planning and execution of the mission, on several occasions, got together for the purpose 
of conducting war games as a means of battle preparation. This training was generally 
held onboard the flagship Yamato and was directed by Yamamoto’s Chief of Staff, Rear 
Admiral Ugaki.216 In spite of the apparent benefits of this type of training, there were 
problems with how the Japanese carried it out.  
While conducting the war games, the Japanese (referees and Yamamoto’s 
Chief of Staff) cheated themselves when it came to reporting the results of the mock 
battles. For example, in one scenario nine enemy hits on Japanese ships were scored and 
two Japanese carriers sunk. At first, the results were changed to three hits scored and one 
carrier sunk. The final results reported no Japanese carriers sunk. This “cheating” was 
done to ensure the whole Japanese Navy would be under the impression they were well 
trained and prepared for battle. It is not clear from the research conducted just how much 
the Japanese tampered with the results of the war games.217 Fuchida described this as 
“thoughtless and stupid arrogance.”218  
Another area worth serious scrutiny is the common training of the 
Japanese aviators and lack of a program or process to replace them once lost in 
combat.219 The Japanese pilots, like the planes they flew, were some of the best trained 
and most experienced in the world. Many of the pilots had several years of experience 
flying missions over China. By 1941, some of these pilots had as many as 300 hours of 
experience flying their planes, while those who flew the Pearl Harbor mission averaged 
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with this one batch of pilots.  However, there was a problem. The main deficiency in the 
Japanese aviation program was the lack of a system for producing replacements for the 
experienced pilots once they were lost in battle. This would prove to be a serious 
weakness later in the war.221 
For instance, in the case of Carrier Division Five flagship Zuikaku, this 
carrier escaped physical damage during the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942. However, 
because of the severe loss of pilots in the battle and because of the subsequent lack of 
replacement pilots, she would not be available for the Midway operation in June.222 
Upon their entrance into the Battle of Midway, Japanese commanders 
such as Yamamoto and Nagumo believed their force was more than sufficiently trained 
and prepared for battle against the navy. In this case, they believed they had the quality 
and quantity advantage. In short, they believed superior tactics and their superbly trained 
(commonly trained) pilots and sailors would carry the day no matter what. Unfortunately, 
although their training techniques served to produce an extremely capable force, it was 
the few critical deficiencies that undermine many of their efforts.  
3. What Did Collaborative Planning Mean to the United States Navy 
and the Imperial Japanese Navy? 
a. Collaborative Planning and the United States Navy 
Collaborative planning was essential for the efficient operation and 
success of the United States Navy during the Battle of Midway. Some methods used to 
facilitate collaborative planning leading up to and during the Battle of Midway include: 
face-to-face exchanges, flashing lights, Morse code, radio, paper correspondence, and 
horn blasts. 
Evidence of collaborative planning by the US Navy begins with Admiral 
Nimitz’s preparation for the attack on Midway. Despite a very busy schedule, the 
Admiral flew out to the Midway Atoll in early May 1942 in order to ensure his two 
commanders there were fully informed and prepared for the ensuing engagement with the 
Japanese. The purpose of his visit was twofold: Nimitz inspected all physical aspects of 
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the defenses of this American outpost, and most importantly, he collaborated with 
Midway’s two commanders, Commander Cyril Simard and Lieutenant Colonel Harold 
Shannon, USMC, commander of the ground forces. Nimitz asked his subordinate 
commanders if they had what they needed and if they needed anything else. Nimitz 
ensured he had a good two-way dialogue between himself and his commanders. Nimitz’s 
visits to Midway demonstrated the following characteristics of collaborative planning: 
Sharing ideas, synchronization of assets, and face-to-face meetings. Those characteristics 
yielded the following products: shared situational awareness, improved information 
flow/issues being raised, and participants reaching a fuller understanding of the issues. 
On May 26th, Halsey returned to Pearl Harbor with his twenty-one ship 
task force after six long months at sea. While at sea, possibly due to stress, he developed 
dermatitis and would not be able to return to sea for the upcoming Battle of Midway.223 
Halsey was relieved by Spruance, and one might think this would be cause for Spruance 
to be concerned. He was not. Spruance and Halsey had so often collaborated about what 
they both would do, should Spruance need to take command, that when Halsey fell ill 
with this torturing skin rash, the two did not have to say anything. They were already 
prepared for what was to come next.224 
On May 27th, 1942, after a full morning attending meetings and visiting 
Enterprise in order to decorate some of her pilots, Nimitz received word that Admiral 
Fletcher’s Task Force 17 had arrived with a badly damaged Yorktown. Nimitz was again 
down in the trenches (in the dry dock) with his subordinate commanders, ship engineers, 
and workers alike, inspecting the damaged carrier, making assessments, and letting all 
involved know that the damaged ship was to be back in service in three days, not ninety 
as was previously estimated. The importance of face-to-face meetings as a form of 
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and Nimitz used the following characteristics of collaboration: Sharing of ideas and face-
to-face meetings which again yield the following by-products: flow of information, issues 
raised, brainstorming, and, in the end, a fuller understanding of the challenges that were 
ahead of them.225  
Later in the day, on May 27th, Admiral Nimitz met two more times with 
his admirals to discuss upcoming plans.226 During the evening meeting on the same day, 
he met with the staffs of Task Forces 16 and 17 to hammer out the details for the defense 
of Midway. This group was called the Council of War and it was one way the admirals 
and staffs involved in the preparations for the Midway operations collaborated.227 This 
meeting involved the commanders of Task Force 16 and 17 and their staffs’ operations’ 
officers. All key parties were involved.   
Face-to-face meetings were not the only way to convey orders during 
World War II. Other methods such as written correspondence and written orders were a 
common way in which these leaders could dispatch direction and receive feedback. Often 
times, these messages were then transmitted via flashing light (Morse code) or encrypted 
radio communications. For example, before the battle, Nimitz used letters to convey 
orders to Spruance and Fletcher.228 Later on, Spruance drafted orders on paper and 
dispatched them to his ships via Morse code and flashing lights.229  
In spite of the successful ways in which the leaders of the Navy 
collaboratively planned leading up to and during the battle, a closer look at the carrier 
staff that Spruance inherited from Halsey also provides an example of a group with some 
collaborative planning dificiencies.  
By the end of the first day of the Battle of Midway, as mentioned earlier, 
Spruance learned just how poorly his staff functioned under the full pressure of sustained 
fleet action.230 To him it was just a normal day of combat on the high seas, but to his staff 
                                                 
225 Potter, 85. 
226 Potter, 86. 
227 Buell, 143. 
228 Buell, 137 
229 Buell, 141 
230 Reference the section on what common training meant to the United States Navy. 
89 
it was much different. Spruance’s staff, especially his Chief of Staff, had collapsed. They 
became confused and disoriented and simply could not deal with “the need for 
disciplined planning and the coordination of complex task force operations.”231  
Months of work, and many new faces, were required to resolve the 
deficiencies that had paralyzed the staff on June 4th, 1942.232 Spruance’s staff was 
overcome by their environment of extreme information ambiguity. They failed to share 
ideas with each other and with the other ships in Task Forces 16 and 17. Furthermore, the 
amount of time it took to launch a coordinated air strike (it did not end up being 
coordinated at all) demonstrates how they failed to synchronize fleet assets. 
Consequently, Spruance’s staff was not able to benefit from the usual products of 
collaborative planning. 
With the exception of the deficiencies in the collaborative planning skills 
demonstrated by Spruance’s battle staff, it is clear the Americans demonstrated the ability 
to effectively conduct collaborative planning, in preparation for, and during the Battle of 
Midway.  
b. Collaborative Planning and the Imperial Japanese Navy 
Similar to the preparations conducted for Pearl Harbor, there were 
extensive preparations and planning by the Japanese for their Midway operation. All 
planning operations were conducted on the flagship Yamato and the Commander-in-
Chief Yamamoto which was anchored with a battleship group at the wartime stand-by 
anchorage at the Island of Hashirajima. Through the use of underwater cables, running 
from the flagship to the shore, Yamamoto maintained constant communication with 
Tokyo. However, this connection was lost once Yamamoto and the rest of the fleet 
eventually departed for sea enroute to Midway in May of 1942.233 The Japanese navy 
attempted collaborative planning, but ultimately chose courses of action that almost 
completely prohibited any type of efficient and productive collaborative planning 
between Yamamoto and the rest of his subordinate commanders, namely, Vice Admiral 
Nagumo. Tragically for the Japanese, during the planning phases of the Midway 
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operation, on many occasions various admirals and their staff officers made 
recommendations for ways to fix nearly all (future) failures that eventually doomed the 
Japanese to defeat at the Battle of Midway For example, specific recommendations were 
made on how to reorganize the fleet to allow for better communications between 
Yamamoto and the carrier strike force. It was decided that current disposition plan for the 
ships acceptable. 234 
As previously noted, all preparations for the Midway operation were made 
onboard the Combined Fleet flagship, Yamato, by Admiral Yamamoto and his staff. 
Telephone cable linking the flagship with the shore was incessantly busy with a constant 
stream of messages as Yamamoto’s Fleet Headquarters maintained close contact and 
coordination with the Naval General Staff in Tokyo. In addition, through the same 
method, they also collaborated with the Kure Naval Base for ship repairs, maintenance, 
and supply.235  
Another similarity drawn from the planning of the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, and the attack on Midway, concerned the secrecy that surrounded the 
planning of the battle. What is significant is that many key admirals who would be 
involved in the fight, like Vice Admiral Nagumo and Vice Admiral Kondo, were left out 
of the planning altogether. Furthermore, once let in, their suggestions for improvement 
were disregarded. The plan was already set. Nagumo and Kondo were never consulted 
regarding the Midway operation until the end of April 1942.236 This would be the first of 
many examples of where the collaborative planning of the Japanese fell short.  
Another example of ineffective collaborative planning occurred at the 
conclusion of the wargames onboard Yamato on May 4th. A few days were set aside for 
study and briefing discussions about the upcoming operation. A variety of changes or 
alterations were proposed, but these suggestions basically went no where. For instance, 
there were several recommendations from Vice Admiral Kondo on down the chain of  
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command that the operation should be postponed in order to allow more time for 
preparation. These suggestions were briefly considered and then discarded. In this case, 
collaborative planning occurred; however, the recommendations, although sound, fell on 
deaf ears.237  
In another separate attempt to share ideas with the Yamamoto staff (during 
the conferences held onboard Yamato before the war games May 1-4), Commander 
Genda and other officers from Nagumo’s staff made recommendations to reorganize the 
fleets to place more emphasis on being carrier centric rather than surface fire power 
centric (i.e., battleship centric). Specifically, Rear Admiral Yamaguchi suggested 
organizing all of the Japanese naval forces into three separate “task fleets” which would 
have three to four carriers as their center with a proportionate number of battleships, 
cruisers, and destroyers acting as screening forces. In yet another example of ineffective 
collaborative planning, the Combined Fleet agreed to the proposal, but never took any 
action to put the new plan in place.238  
As discussed earlier, the Japanese carriers did not typically have good 
radio communications with the rest of the fleet because of the small antennas on these 
ships. The antennas were designed to be small so they would not interfere with flight 
operations. Consequently, the carriers could not send or receive vital information as 
effectively as other ships. Thus, their ability to plan was seriously degraded. For example, 
in the time leading up to the morning of June 4th, Vice Admiral Nagumo, onboard 
flagship Akagi, was not aware of the enemy fleet movements because of his limited 
radio-receiving capacity and due to the radio silence being employed by the Japanese 
forces. He was not privy to much of the same information Yamamoto had at that time. 
Access to this information would have told Nagumo that the American forces were, in 
fact, aware of his presence and that the element of surprise had been lost.239 
In conclusion, the command arrangements that were in place for the 
Midway operation did not allow the Japanese Commander-in-Chief Yamamoto to 
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believed the place for the Commander-in-Chief was at the front. In accordance with this 
belief, Admiral Yamamoto put to sea with the fleet to serve as inspiration to the fleet. 
However, this was no place for the commander of such an operation to be. Yamamoto 
left himself with no way to stay informed or to inform and maintain control over his 
forces. In contrast, the Americans had realized the implications this particular Japanese 
practice could have on their ability to collaborate with all necessary parties. 
Consequently, American Fleet Admiral Nimitz was stationed in Hawaii where he had the 
ability to communicate with all of his subordinates before and during the battle. Lastly, in 
addition to Yamamoto’s position onboard Yamato at sea, radio silence killed any last 
chance he would have had to keep Nagumo and others informed of the latest information 
from Tokyo.240  
4. What Was Expected to Happen in the Battle? 
The Americans expected that several factors, such as their disposition of forces at 
sea (i.e., concentration), their reinforcement of Midway Island, and the element of 
surprise would give them an advantage. This expectation was based on the fact they 
could read the Japanese communications which yielded to the Americans an 
overwhelming amount of intelligence. Nimitz felt the advantage of surprise and superior 
intelligence would be sufficient to repel the Japanese attack and defend Midway Island.  
The Japanese had no idea the Americans had broken their encryption code, and 
that subsequently, the element of surprise had been lost. They had fully expected to be 
able to launch at least one or two attacks on Midway before the American Fleet would be 
able to respond. They wanted to lure the Americans into a trap at Midway, and in a 
Mahanian way, use one decisive battle to destroy the United States Pacific Fleet early in 
the war in 1942. They acknowledged that keeping Midway as a part of their perimeter 
would be nice, but that it was probably too far away from home to realistically do so. 
Attacking Midway was just a way to get the American Fleet to come out and fight.241  
After the Battle of the Coral Sea, Yamamoto believed the Americans had lost at 
least two carriers, Lexington and Yorktown; however, in reality, the Americans had only 
lost one, the Lexington. The Japanese believed the Americans had lost a lot in recent 
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defeats and believed the Americans lacked the will to fight. Yamamoto had sixteen 
groups of ships deployed for the attack on Midway, including four aircraft carriers 
(Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu,). He felt these forces would be more than enough to finish 
the job.242 
One thing the Japanese knew might hurt them, though they seemed to do very 
little to fix it, was their failure to change their message crypto key on April 1st, 1942, as 
planned. Instead the change was delayed because so much of the fleet was out to sea and 
too far extended to make the change. It was delayed until May 1st, and it was delayed 
again until June 1st for the same reason. In the meantime the Americans were copying and 
breaking essentially all of the Japanese’s communications. It is unclear whether changing 
the keys on schedule would have actually stopped the Americans from breaking the code, 
but it is certain it would have slowed them down. In the end, the American’s knew 
exactly what the Japanese intended to do.243 
5. What Did Actually Happen in the Battle?  
The Japanese, despite having a stronger force, were defeated by a weaker 
enemy.244 The preceding paragraphs on the Battle of Midway have highlighted many 
instances where aspects of Japanese common training and especially collaborative 
planning, proved inferior compared to that of the United States. From the beginning, and 
certainly in the end, the Japanese were unable to overcome these shotcomings in training 
and planning. These weaknesses prohibited them from sufficiently alleviating the 
environment of extreme information ambiguity which stayed with them almost from the 
very moment they left Japan on their way to fight at Midway. 
Additionally, the Japanese did a number of other things wrong. First, the 
disposition of the Japanese Fleet for the Battle of Midway effectively spread their forces 
too thin. In the end, during Nagumo’s hour of need, there was not a sufficient number of 
ships in concentration to thwart the American attacks from Midway and the American 
carriers. Second, the Japanese were over confident and made inaccurate assumptions 
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about the Americans’ will to fight and the composition of the United States Navy; 
namely, the number of carriers the Americans had available for the battle. Third, 
intelligence failures inhibited them from getting current reports back on the status of 
ships in Pearl Harbor. Lastly, Yamamoto, on the morning of the battle, had received an 
intelligence report detailing all of the activity occurring on Midway. However, Nagumo 
never received this vital information because Yamamoto refused to break radio silence.    
Despite the failures of the Japanese, the Americans were not without their own 
deficiencies. During the Battle of Midway on June 4th, the Americans twice failed to 
launch coordinated air attacks against the Japanese carriers. In spite of how they 
struggled, they were nevertheless able to get to and destroy all four Japanese carriers. 
Not being able to launch coordinated air strikes amongst the carriers in the 
American Fleet is attributable to the inefficiency and lack of common training practices 
of Spruance’s staff. This inherited staff lacked sound leadership from their Chief-of-Staff, 
Miles Browning. Their poor ability to hold up under the stress of continued fleet 
engagements should be attributed to these leadership and training failures. Recall the 
productive training Spruance gave to his aid LT Oliver and the battle staff. On the other 
hand, throughout this research, never once was there an account of the training 
techniques used by Browning.  
If both sides had their own share of failures before and during the Battle of 
Midway, why then did the Americans prevail so decisively? In a conversation after 
breakfast one morning during the battle, Spruance summed it all up: He said that the 
Battle of Midway had been a typical major battle. You enter the battle with a sound plan, 
and you trust it will work. Next he said, the fog of war sets in and, at that point, you are 
never quite sure what is happening. Lastly, you must have faith, Spruance comments, and 
a lot depends on luck.245  
D. CONCLUSION  
In the end, all the training, planning, tactics, and confidence in the world did not 
help the Japanese overcome the five things the Americans either executed better or had 
more of: (1) common training in the form of dive bombing planes, pilots, and techniques; 
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(2) the American’s intra-fleet collaboration, which was made possible due to Nimitz’s 
location in Hawaii vice being at sea; (3) Spruance’s leadership and the way he would not 
allow himself to be overcome by his environment of extreme information ambiguity. This 
strong leadership allowed Spruance to stay focused so that, upon finding the Japanese 
carriers, he immediately ordered the launch of all of his planes; (4)  the gold mine of 
intelligence they had on the disposition, location, and make-up of the Japanese Fleet; and 






IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
1. Model and Hypothesis 
Case study analysis on two historical military battles was used to gain insight into 
how military decision makers maintain the ability to make successful decisions by 
mitigating the debilitating effects of environments of extreme information ambiguity 
through the combined use of common training and collaborative planning. Chapter III 
described the fine points of each case study conducted. This chapter presents the 
evaluation of the findings of those case studies. Specifically, based on the model, did 
common training and collaborative planning alleviate the effects of environments of 
information ambiguity so that decision makers could continue to make good decisions? 
The first and second parts of this chapter discuss the results of an evaluation of 
whether or not the thesis model holds for the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of 
Midway. Each battle was broken up into two different time periods (see Table 8.) For 
each battle, each country’s respective navy’s (i.e., British, Franco-Spanish, American, or 
Japanese) ability to mitigate the effects of an environment of extreme information 
ambiguity through the combined use of common training and collaborative planning will 
be evaluated by means of four simple questions (see below). The third part acknowledges 
other possible independent variables such as time, leadership, strategy, good intelligence 
and the principles of war, in addition to common training and collaborative planning, 
which may also contribute to ameliorating the effects of an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity. Two of the possible independent variables, in particular, occurred 
through serendipitous discovery while performing the case study analysis on the two 
battles studied in this thesis. They are leadership and time, and will be discussed in detail. 
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Table 8. Case Study Results  of Common Training and Collaborative Planning 





Battle of Trafalgar:  
BEFORE Villenueve Leaves
for the West Indies 
Battle of Trafalgar:  
AFTER Villenueve Returns  
from West Indies 
 British French British French 
Common Training + -- + -- 
Collaborative Planning + -- + -- 
Successfully alleviate own 
EEIA Yes No Yes No 





BEFORE Japanese Sortie for 
Midway May 27, 1942 
Midway:  
AFTER Japanese Sortie for 
Midway May 27, 1942 
 American Japanese American Japanese 
Common Training -- + + -- 
Collaborative Planning + + + -- 
Successfully alleviate own 
EEIA Yes Yes Yes No 
+ : Advantage      -- : Disadvantage 
For the analysis of the Battles of Trafalgar and Midway, the following logic is 
used in accordance with the thesis model:  
1. Did the decision makers experience an environment of extreme information 
ambiguity (Yes/No)? 
2. Did they have effective common training (Yes/No)? Were there any deficiencies or 
highlights in their common training (Yes/No)?  
3. Did they utilize effective collaborative planning (Yes/No)? Were there any 
deficiencies or highlights in their collaborative planning (Yes/No)? 
4. Did they successfully alleviate their environment of extreme information ambiguity 
(Yes/No)? 
If the answers to questions 1-3 are “Yes” and the decision maker successfully 
alleviated their environment of extreme information ambiguity, then the decision maker 
did so predominantly via the use of common training and collaborative planning (See 
Section D, Other Considerations, for postulation that other factors besides common 
training and collaborative planning may be taken into account.) 
This method of analysis serves to emphasize that alleviating an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity and subsequently winning a battle is not always about 
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who has the best common training and who most effectively engages in collaborative 
planning, but who has it at all, and if so, whether or not it is effective. For instance, the 
case study analysis on the Battle of Trafalgar showed that the British had effective 
common training for both periods discussed. However, we see quite the opposite situation 
with the Franco-Spanish Fleet, who often got underway with sailors that had little to no 
training at all. In another example, in the Battle of Midway, the Japanese had effective 
common training and collaborative planning leading up to May 27th, 1942. However, it 
seems clear there were various common training and collaborative planning issues that 
led to the Japanese demise after their sortie from Japan. For instance, regarding their 
collaborative planning, once they left Japan for Midway, the actions they took, based on 
the way they had planned the operation, were absolutely contrary to establishing and 
maintaining effective collaborative planning.  
Lastly, in a situation where both sides alleviate their respective environments of 
information ambiguity, the outcome of a battle may be determined by who has the most 
effective common training and collaborative planning. By the logic discussed earlier, if a 
decision maker or organization successfully alleviates their environment of extreme 
information ambiguity, then it appears that decision maker did so primarily through the 
combined use of common training and collaborative planning. Continuing with that same 
logic, in a battle between two adversaries, assuming both have alleviated their respective 
environments of extreme information ambiguity, it seems likely, based on the this limited 
model, that the side which demonstrates the most effective common training and 
collaborative planning will win the battle.  
B. BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR 
The results of the case study analysis for the Battle of Trafalgar did not 
demonstrate any differences in the common training and collaborative planning used by 
the Royal Navy and the Franco-Spanish Navy from the time Villenueve left for the West 
Indies to the time when he returned and was finally blockaded in the Cadiz Harbor by the 
Royal Navy. 
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1. Royal Navy 
Did the Royal Navy decision makers experience an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity? Yes. The Royal Navy and more specifically, Admiral Nelson, 
experienced characteristics of an environment of extreme information ambiguity such as 
friction in the form of poor weather and the unpredictability of the formations employed 
by the Franco-Spanish Fleet. Moreover, the British experienced ambiguity in the form of 
correlation of data during the time right before the battle when Nelson was trying to 
determine the center (Villenueve’s flagship) of the Franco-Spanish battle line.  
Did the Royal Navy have effective common training? Yes. Were there any 
deficiencies or highlights in their common training? Yes. The Royal Navy 
demonstrated the following characteristics of common training: similar training/doctrine 
and vigorous training. The products of their common training were similar skills; similar 
perceptions and reactions; alignment amongst commanders; harmony and focus in 
operations; and lastly, the commanders under Nelson shared implicit connections and 
bonds.  
Clearly, the Royal Navy demonstrated effective common training. Prior to the 
Battle of Trafalgar, the Royal Navy had spent nearly 100 years refining their navy’s 
seamanship and combat skill. Next, their sailors, especially those under Nelson, had vast 
amounts of time practicing their skills at sea. Lastly, the Royal Navy, during the battle, 
fought in accordance to doctrine (which had been written by Nelson) for which they had 
trained under Nelson. 
Did the Royal Navy utilize effective collaborative planning? Yes. Were there 
any deficiencies or highlights in their collaborative planning? No. Nelson was a 
leader who understood the importance of sharing ideas, synchronizing all assets, holding 
face-to-face meetings. Furthermore, Nelson understood that from successful collaboration 
with his superiors and his subordinates he could expect to gain a shared situational 
awareness, better information flow, a fuller understanding of important issues, and a 
sharing of information across geographic boundaries. For instance, there were many 
occasions during Nelson’s operations in the Caribbean where he would stop and 
collaborate with local island leaders. Additionally, while at sea in the days preceding the 
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Battle of Trafalgar, Nelson, on numerous occasions, enabled effective collaboration by 
means of face-to-face meetings with his captains, held aboard the British flagship, 
Victory.  
Did the Royal Navy successfully alleviate their environment of extreme 
information ambiguity? Yes 
2. Franco-Spanish Navy 
Did the Franco-Spanish Navy decision makers experience an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity? Yes. The Franco-Spanish Fleet also suffered from the 
effects of an environment of extreme information ambiguity. Specifically, they suffered 
from friction in the form of poor weather caused by light winds; ambiguity caused by not 
being able to accurately determine the disposition, location, and exact force size of the 
British Navy; time pressure; and high stakes. Regarding time pressure, Villenueve knew 
his French superiors (Decrès and Napoleon) had sent an admiral to relieve him. For that 
reason, despite his apprehension to face Nelson, Villenueve headed for sea in order to 
avoid his impending termination of command. 
Did the Franco-Spanish Navy have effective common training? No. Were 
there any deficiencies or highlights in their common training? Yes. The common 
training of the Franco-Spanish fleet was highly ineffective and in some cases the 
crewman received only crash courses in seamanship before going to sea or into battle. 
Villenueve was a “trained and dedicated officer,”246 but he was a young admiral which 
was a sign of how the French had a limited supply of seasoned sea officers.247 By not 
spending a sufficient amount of time at sea, the crews of Villenueve’s ships never 
received the similar and vigorous training they needed. Looking at the numbers of guns, 
ships, and manpower taken into battle against the British, a clear advantage was enjoyed 
by the Franco-Spanish Fleet in all three categories (see Table 6, Chapter III). However, 
Schom points out a critical factor. Although, the French and Spanish Fleets enjoyed a 
48% advantage in manpower, that manpower was less well trained than that of the British 
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Fleet.248 Clearly, captains and sailors cannot learn to maneuver their ships independently, 
let alone as a fleet, if they have never left the harbor (and gone to sea) to rehearse. 
Did the Franco-Spanish Navy utilize effective collaborative planning? No. 
Were there any deficiencies or highlights in their collaborative planning? Yes. 
Similar to their lack of common training, the collaborative planning of the Franco-
Spanish Fleet was also ineffective for several reasons. The Combined Fleet attempted to 
share ideas, synchronize assets, and conduct face-to-face meetings. However, when they 
tried to collaboratively plan, the French and Spanish Fleets did not have a lot of success 
in improving their situational awareness, information flow, understanding of the issues, 
and shared information across geographic boundaries. The effectiveness of the Combined 
Fleet’s collaborative planning was seriously degraded by the dissention and distrust 
Villenueve’s superiors and subordinates had against him.249 Second, the Combined 
Fleet’s collaboration was often based on lies and false information. Third, the 
subordinates and superiors of Villenueve hid information from him and communicated 
about him behind his back. Lastly, much of Villenueve’s collaborative planning suffered 
from the effects of distance.  
Did the Franco-Spanish Navy successfully alleviate their environment of 
extreme information ambiguity? No. Clearly, the Franco-Spanish Fleet did not reduce 
their environment of extreme information ambiguity sufficiently to emerge victorious 
over the Royal Navy. Although they had some measure of common training and 
attempted to plan collaboratively, what little the French and Spanish did was not enough 
to contribute to their overall ability to overcome the ambiguous environment that 
consumed Villenueve and the other French and Spanish decision makers involved in the 
Battle of Trafalgar. 
 
                                                 
248 Schom, 315. 
249 As with the common training of the Franco-Spanish fleet, it is demonstrated again here how 
dissention in the ranks, up and down the chain of command, was a seriously debilitating factor in the 
effectiveness of collaborative planning. 
102 
C. BATTLE OF MIDWAY 
1. Americans before May 27, 1942 
Did the American Navy decision makers experience an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity? Partially. For the Americans, the time leading up to 
the Battle of Midway was more about a race against time in order to get prepared for the 
battle than it was about dealing with an environment of extreme information ambiguity. 
That the Americans had broken the Japanese code (communication) was the primary 
reason the American commanders had an almost perfect picture of what would be the 
force composition, disposition, and location of the Imperial Japanese Navy for the battle. 
In one example, as soon as Spruance took command of Admiral Halsey’s Task Force 16, 
on May 26th, 1942, he became immediately aware of the seriousness of his situation. 
High stakes is one of the first things Spruance was forced to deal with.250  
Did the American Navy have effective common training? Yes. Were there 
any deficiencies or highlights in their common training? Yes.  The common training 
of the high level US naval commanders was more than satisfactory. Decision makers like 
Spruance had been training during their entire navy careers for fleet engagements like the 
Battle of Midway. The case study on the Midway battle demonstrated that men like 
Nimitz and Spruance did not just emerge by good luck.  Rather, they trained and rose 
through the ranks in similar ways throughout their careers. Decision makers like these 
two shared the following characteristics of common training: similar 
training/education/doctrine and mission-oriented command. As a result they also 
benefited from the following by-products: similar skills; similar perceptions and 
reactions; alignment amongst commanders; and harmony, or focus in direction, in 
operations.    
In contrast, regarding the common training of the American battle staffs and 
operators, their training was lacking in comparison to the training received by the 
American officers. Furthermore, research indicates that, unlike their Japanese adversary, 
the American operators had not been training and preparing for war anywhere near as 
much. The Japanese Navy’s operators and staffs had been training for years in 
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anticipation of facing off with the American Fleet. As a consequence, the common 
training of the operators of the United States Navy was not spectacular.  
Spruance’s staff’s inability to cope under the strain of actual combat was the 
result of not being sufficiently trained. Vigorous training and rehearsing is necessary 
before actual battle. Furthermore, a staff or a force must train on the “right” areas. The 
staff of Task Force Sixteen had real world training doing island raids against Japanese 
outposts. However, when the time came for intense battle against a relentless enemy, 
their previous training was not sufficient. 
One aspect of the United States Navy’s training that does stand out is their pilot 
training program, especially in comparison to that of the Japanese. In addition to the 
United Sates Navy’s ability to replace pilots, they also maintained an advantage in dive-
bombing planes, tactics, and the pilots who flew them.   
An additional highlight of staff and operator common training worthy of note 
shows how Spruance utilized inactive time at sea to build the staff’s operational skills by 
posing theoretical operational problems for them solve, problems similar to those used at 
the United States Naval War College.251 This was an example of similar training, 
education, and doctrine. Here the commander was reinforcing similar skills; similar 
perceptions and reactions; and harmony, or focus and direction, in operations by letting 
his staff mentally rehearse possible scenarios on what their responses might be.  
Did the American Navy utilize effective collaborative planning? Yes. Were 
there any deficiencies or highlights in their collaborative planning? No. Collaborative 
planning was essential for the efficient operation and success of the United States Navy 
during the Battle of Midway. Some means used by the United States to facilitate 
collaborative planning leading up to the Battle of Midway include: sharing ideas; 
synchronization of assets; use of physical collaboration tools such as intelligence reports 
and operational orders; and face-to-face meetings. 
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In particular, the visits by Nimitz to Midway demonstrated the following 
characteristics of collaborative planning: sharing ideas, synchronization of assets, and 
face-to-face meetings. Those characteristics yielded collaboration products such as shared 
situational awareness, improved information flow, issues being raised, and participants 
reaching a fuller understanding of the issues. 
Did the American Navy successfully alleviate their environment of extreme 
information ambiguity? Yes. 
2. Japanese before May 27, 1942 
Did the Japanese Navy decision makers experience an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity? Partially. For the Japanese, Admirals Yamamoto and 
Nagumo stand out as the two decision makers on the Japanese side that suffered the most 
from factors such as friction, ambiguity, time pressure, delayed action-feedback loops, 
and high stakes. 
Did the Japanese Navy have effective common training? Yes. Were there any 
deficiencies or highlights in their common training? Yes. The high-ranking Japanese 
naval officers of the World War II era, like their American counterparts, had similar 
training, education, and doctrine. For instance, Fuchida, who entered the Naval Academy 
in 1921, reported that the officers at that time were already being taught that the United 
States was the next potential enemy. Second, most of the up-and-coming officers in the 
navy shared in the experience of serving as Naval Attachés in Washington. Because of 
this, almost all high ranking officers during the time before the attack on Pearl Harbor 
were well versed in the capabilities of the United States Navy.252 
The operators/sailors of the Japanese Navy, because of their vigorous training and 
battle drill, worked like well-oiled machines, far out pacing their American counterparts 
in common training. Some of the highlights of the Japanese Navy’s common training 
included similar training/education/doctrine and constant drill. However, one serious 
deficiency in the common training of the Japanese Fleet was the lack of a flexible pilot 
training program capable of re-supplying the fleet with replacement pilots. This 
deficiency in the Japanese common training illustrates how they had already begun to 
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derail their ability to successfully alleviate the environment of extreme information 
ambiguity they would face the moment of their departure on May 27th. Lastly, due to the 
shortage in pilots, the Japanese Navy departed Japan with one less carrier (Zuikaku). 
Did the Japanese Navy utilize effective collaborative planning? Yes. Were 
there any deficiencies or highlights in their collaborative planning? Yes. The biggest 
highlight regarding Japanese collaborative planning was the fact that their idea sharing, 
synchronization of assets, and face-to-face meetings all worked well for them before they 
left Japan May 27th. In contrast, as soon as they left Japan, because of radio silence, the 
disposition of their forces, the location of Yamamoto, and the weather itself, their ability 
to conduct effective collaborative planning began to decline at an exponential rate. What 
is more, they never recovered from these problems, and as a result, the severity of their 
environment of extreme information ambiguity increased at an exponential rate from 
May 27th through the end of the battle on June 6th, 1942. 
Did the Japanese Navy successfully alleviate their environment of extreme 
information ambiguity? Yes. Prior to their departure on May 27th, the Japanese did not 
have an environment of extreme information ambiguity to speak of. They believed they 
had a good plan, superior forces, and they believed they had a good idea where the 
American carriers were, although they did not know for sure. 
3. Americans after May 27, 1942 
Did the American Navy decision makers experience an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity? Yes. Closer to the beginning of the battle on June 4th, 
Admirals Nimitz, Spruance, and Fletcher and their staffs experienced factors such as 
friction, ambiguity, time pressure, delayed action-feedback loops, and high stakes, though 
not to as great an extent as the their Japanese counterparts. They already had the force 
size, disposition, and approximate size. The Americans needed only to confirm the 
location of the Japanese Strike Force. 
During the Battle of Midway, Admiral Spruance found himself in many 




debilitating effects of all these factors, Spruance consistently demonstrated the ability to 
acknowledge that such environments existed, and with that, moved on and focused on his 
orders.253 
Did the American Navy have effective common training? Yes. Were there 
any deficiencies or highlights in their common training? Yes. Spruance may have 
lacked the same extensive carrier aviation experience as the man he relieved, Admiral 
Halsey, but because he had spent his career on cruisers and non-carrier type platforms 
(command at sea six times plus command of a cruiser destroyer group), he demonstrated 
factors such as similar training/education/doctrine and mission-oriented command. For 
example, recall Spruance, prior to receiving his commission in the navy, had received a 
similar education and the Naval Academy and similar training and doctrine later on upon 
reporting to the fleet. 
There are two other positive aspects of American common training (at the time of 
the battle) that stand out. First, the Americans had an adaptive training system, namely, 
their pilot training program which emphasized a theme of producing sufficient quantities 
of capable pilots versus a finite number of perfect pilots. Second, the superior training, 
tactics, and equipment of the American dive bombers carried the day on the 4th of June, 
1942, by destroying three Japanese carriers in a very short amount of time. 
Did the American Navy utilize effective collaborative planning? Yes. Were 
there any deficiencies or highlights in their collaborative planning? Yes. The most 
significant highlight of American collaborative planning during the war in the Pacific is 
the fact that Admiral Nimitz, the operational commander, oversaw the battle from Hawaii 
(unlike Yamamoto). From there, he was able to maintain contact with his forces at sea, 
and on Midway Island, throughout the battle. 
Did the American Navy successfully alleviate their environment of extreme 
information ambiguity? Yes. The Americans accomplished this feat because they 
continued to practice good collaborative planning via a sharing of ideas and 
synchronization of assets. Furthermore, utilizing superior training and equipment, 
McClusky and his fellow dive-bombers eventually found and sunk three Japanese carriers 
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in a matter of minutes. Lastly, due in large part to certain aspects of the American Navy’s 
effective common training and their ability to plan collaboratively, Spruance was able to 
remain focused, was able to make a decision, and subsequently, launched his strike force. 
The Americans won a decisive battle. 
4. Japanese after May 27, 1942 
Did the Japanese Navy decision makers experience an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity? Yes. Nagumo found himself in an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity well in advance of the onset of the battle, all the way 
through to the end. He never found a way to reduce it enough to be able to function and 
make the decisions necessary to save his force from destruction. Nagumo experienced 
friction, ambiguity, time pressure, delayed action-feedback loops, and high stakes. From 
the time Nagumo left Japan with the carrier strike force, he experienced friction due to 
weather in the form of dense fog, rain, and heavy seas. Regarding ambiguity, because of 
radio silence and inadequate communications antennas on his carriers (and the lack of a 
back-up communications plan), Nagumo did not receive all reports and intelligence from 
Yamamoto and the headquarters in Tokyo. These characteristics most likely affected 
Nagumo’s ability to think, causing a subsequent fear of not being able to understand the 
situation and a fear of making bad decisions. 
Did the Japanese Navy have effective common training? No. Were there any 
deficiencies or highlights in their common training? Yes. The flaws mentioned in the 
previous section (pre-May 27th) haunted the Japanese once they arrived at Midway as 
well. Like the Americans, up to this point in the war, the Japanese had also sustained 
heavy pilot casualties. However, unlike the American Navy, the Japanese Imperial Navy 
lacked a pilot training program to replenish those pilots lost in battle. 
Did the Japanese Navy utilize effective collaborative planning? No. Were 
there any deficiencies or highlights in their collaborative planning? Yes. As 
mentioned earlier, the Japanese fleet got underway with Yamamoto onboard the 
battleship Yamato, serving as the commander and as an inspiration to his men. 
Additionally, they were forced to contend with severely limited visibility due to foggy, 
cloudy, and rainy weather during the entire transit to Midway. Furthermore, the whole 
fleet was under radio silence. Regarding the issue of radio silence, Yamamoto failed to 
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pass vital information and reports to Nagumo and his strike force in the days, hours, and 
minutes leading up to the battle. This lack of collaborative planning exacerbated the 
effects of an environment of extreme information ambiguity that Nagumo and Yamamoto 
were experiencing.  
If Yamamoto had been in Tokyo, as Nimitz was in Hawaii, or if he had been with 
Nagumo’s strike force, he likely would have been able to benefit from collaborative 
planning such as sharing ideas and synchronization of assets and their products of 
developing shared situational awareness, better information flow, issues being raised, and 
having a fuller understanding of the issues.254 At sea, under the restriction of radio 
silence, Yamamoto effectively cut himself and his battleship force out of the battle. He 
was never in a position to help Nagumo at all. 
Did the Japanese Navy successfully alleviate their environment of extreme 
information ambiguity? No. From the time the Japanese Fleet departed from their 
homeland of Japan, their environment of extreme information ambiguity got 
progressively worse and worse. By the time they figured out the location of the American 
strike force, the Americans had already found them and launched a strike. Nagumo, due 
mostly to deficiencies in collaborative planning, was never able to rise above his 
environment of extreme information ambiguity. The Japanese carriers were sunk and they 
lost the battle.  
D. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
The case study analysis of the Battle of Trafalgar and the Battle of Midway has 
shown that, to sufficiently contend with the effects of an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity, the decision maker does so predominantly through the combined 
used of common training and collaborative planning. These two concepts appear to have 
significantly contributed to the success of the victors, the British and American Navies, 
when applied to these two maritime battles. However, it is prudent to acknowledge that, 
over the course of this research, two other concepts presented themselves at various times 
throughout the case study process. They are time and leadership. 
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1. Time 
Time is the essence in war, and while a defeat may be balanced by a battle 
won, days and hours – even minutes – frittered away, can never be 
regained.255 
With respect to alleviating environments of extreme information ambiguity, 
consideration of the factor of time is most likely necessary. A characteristic of time 
worthy of note is that time lost cannot be recovered, and while space is important, if lost, 
it can conceivably be retaken. Not so is the case with time. Time is required for planning, 
preparing, conducting, and sustaining military operations. Time is often referred to as the 
fourth dimension, the other three being: length, width, and height. However, time is by no 
means the least important dimension, rather, it is arguably the most important, and 
commanders have had to consider it since the beginning of history. Time is an integral 
and unavoidable part of all decision making in war and must be considered and managed 
carefully.256  
Leonard and Vego, two authors who have written on the concept of time and 
warfare, concur that that decision makers may try to buy allotments of time through 
maintaining a forward presence in threatened theaters; developing and sustaining 
alliances; intelligence operations; deliberate planning; creating newer and lighter 
materials; and lastly and most important, more and faster strategic lift.257 Additionally, an 
operational commander (decision maker) and his/her staff have the greatest ability to 
effect the time needed for planning, preparing, and conducting a major operation. In 
general, the more time a decision maker has, the greater the probability of success. 
Adequate preparation time is important for “alerting, mobilization, pre-deployment, 
deployment, and combat employment of one’s forces.”258  
Increasing ones warning time of an impending attack can be achieved through the 
use of a capable long-range early warning system. Similar and closely related to warning 
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time is reaction time to an adversary’s attack or unplanned action. Once a battle begins, 
reaction time, like so many other things, “is a function of the decision-making cycle, 
command and control process, and theater-wide communications.”259 By reacting faster, 
one side may significantly increase the possibility of achieving its military goals.  
In conjunction with the movement of one’s military forces and the speed of 
carrying out actions, time is capable of significantly increasing the freedom of action for 
the operational commander. For example, an unanticipated incident in the course of a 
battle (think Midway, Nagumo, and the destroyer’s wake), can derail the entire 
sequencing or synchronization schedule. The consequences may even quickly change the 
entire outcome of the battle or campaign.260 
During the time of the Battle of Trafalgar, the speed of warfare changed slowly. 
Consequently, there was no extreme compression of the factor time. Nearly 140 years 
later, at the Battle of Midway, new technologies had enlarged the area of combat over 
what had been the norm in 1805. Consequently, this new technology had also compressed 
the amount of time afforded to leaders for making decisions.261 In the end, when one 
considers ways in which to ameliorate the debilitating effects of an environment of 
extreme ambiguity, it seems sensible to consider the factor of time. 
2. Leadership 
Leadership also requires consideration regarding other factors which may 
contribute to a decision maker’s ability to mitigate the negative effects an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity. The fundamental purpose of leadership is to obtain and 
use information to mitigate uncertainty. One specific role of a leader is to ensure that 
there exists a process in place to reduce uncertainty.  Furthermore, the concept of 
leadership and its role must be taken beyond the traditional narrow idea that leadership is 
just a study of the interpersonal relationships of leader/leader and leader/subordinate. 
Rather, leadership should be applied across all organizational levels. If an attribute of  
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leadership is reduced uncertainty, then “effective leadership (at all levels of command) 
depends on an adequate cognitive map, which enables understanding and interpretation of 
complexity at subordinate levels.”262 
So, if leadership can help to reduce the uncertainty of a situation, then perhaps it’s 
valid to postulate its credibility as an additional factor which, when used effectively, 
could contribute to the reduction of the effects of an environment of extreme information 
ambiguity. The next step then, is to attempt to predict which style of leadership may be 
most suited for the situation considered here. According to the United States Army’s field 
manual for operations, some of the criteria which are inherent and essential to the kind of 
leadership required to fight and win battles are listed below and briefly described 
thereafter.263 
1. “Subordinate leaders are to be given freedom and responsibility…”  
2. “Initiative…” 
3. “Independence of action…” 
4. “Mission-type orders will be required at every echelon of command…” 
5. “Risk taking and an atmosphere that supports it…” 
6. “Quick-minded and flexible…” 
7. “Imagination, audacity, and willingness to take risk…” 
8. “Resolute and independent…” 
9. “As battles become more complex and unpredictable, decision making must become 
more and more decentralized…” 
Each item in the list above relates directly to the mission-oriented command 
leadership style or Auftragstaktik. Recall, this style of leadership, currently utilized by 
the United States Army and developed by the German Army more than 200 years ago, is 
a decentralized leadership and command philosophy that pushes decisions and actions 
down to the lowest level.   
Mission-oriented command is based on the principle that initiative and creativity 
in execution and completion of the mission is done without fear of retribution by higher 
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command. Simply stated, the subordinate is trained and expected to act. The list above 
details several characteristics of mission-oriented command such as independence of 
action, mission-type orders, risk taking, flexibility in the absence of higher authority, 
willingness to take risk, and decentralization of command. Exercise of these attributes 
should increase the leader’s ability to make decisions as ambiguity and friction increase 
the harmful effects of an environment of extreme information ambiguity. The success of 
battle with Auftragstaktik depends on the initiative of junior decision makers/leaders and 
their willingness to act in support of their commander’s intent.  
In conclusion, it appears that, after conducting detailed case study analysis on the 
Battles of Trafalgar and Midway, and after applying the findings to the thesis model, 
there may be other variables that should be considered, namely, time and leadership. 
Others which may merit future consideration are strategy, good intelligence and the 
principles of war (e.g., cohesiveness, unity of force, unity of effort, and unity of 
command). 
E. CONCLUSION 
Results of the analysis conducted on the battles of Trafalgar and Midway indicate 
that for these two case studies the thesis model appears to be a useful tool for 
interpretation and description of the events and their outcomes.  
Trafalgar was a case that did not change from the first time period observed to the 
next (see table 8). In the end, the Royal Navy effectively employed common training and 
collaborative planning, which, through their combined use, enabled the British decision 
makers, like Nelson, to successfully alleviate their environments of extreme information 
ambiguity and emerge victorious. In contrast, although the Franco-Spanish Navy 
attempted to employ common training and engage in collaborative planning, they did so 
ineffectively. As a consequence, Villenueve, for example, was unable to reduce the 
effects of the ambiguity and friction he faced, and in the end, was defeated in battle by a 
British force that was able to ameliorate those similar effects. 
Midway was a case where the Japanese and the Americans were both able to 
conduct effective common training and collaborative planning prior to and after May 
27th. However, as shown in the analysis of the Japanese Imperial Navy during the period 
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before May 27th, particular deficiencies in common training and collaborative planning, 
in the end, created an environment of extreme information ambiguity that Yamamoto, 
and especially Nagumo, could not overcome. First, the Japanese lacked a sufficient and 
flexible pilot training program for the purpose of replacing aviators lost in combat. 
Lastly, and arguably most damaging to their effort, was the ineffective way in which they 
collaborated once they left Japan on May 27th. With the Japanese fleet too far dispersed 
and with Yamamoto at sea instead of on land in Tokyo (or much further forward with 
Nagumo and the carrier strike force), the Japanese exacerbated an already ambiguous 
situation beyond a recoverable point. Consequently, the Japanese Fleet found itself 
experiencing the harmful effects of extreme information ambiguity. Moreover, the 
Japanese decision makers were unable to alleviate these effects sufficiently in order to 
continue making effective decisions.  
In contrast, the American Navy accomplished almost the exact opposite. 
Regarding common training, before and after May 27th, the United States maintained an 
adaptable and sufficient pilot training program capable of supplying the fleet with an 
apparently insatiable supply of pilots. Additionally, the American dive bomber pilots, due 
to their superior equipment and flying skills were the ones that found and sunk the four 
Japanese carriers at Midway. Lastly, the Americans, unlike their Japanese counterparts, 
put themselves in a position to be able to successfully collaboratively plan (i.e., by 
keeping Nimitz in Hawaii and concentrating their forces). Because of this, they 
maintained the ability for a continued sharing of ideas and actions amongst the American 
decision makers and fighting forces. Furthermore, the American Navy, when it counted, 
enjoyed shared situational awareness and a flow of information that inevitably enabled 
them to mitigate the normally overwhelming effects of the ambiguous information 
environment present during the battle.  
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In conclusion, one may postulate the generalizability of the thesis model to land 
and air battles. The obvious difference in both scenarios is the environment and speed of 
battle. Regarding land battle, the speed of battle is much slower than that of maritime 
battle. For example, at the Battle of Trafalgar, the British and Franco-Spanish Fleets may 
have reached a top speed of about four knots, but that was still faster than the speed of 
advance in most World War II battles (e.g., the Battle of the Bulge). In contrast, air battle 
presents an environment where the speed of battle is many times faster than either the 
land or maritime environments. Nevertheless, an environment of extreme information 
ambiguity is what it is -- ambiguous. Regardless of the element of time, a decision maker, 
in battle, will always have to deal with the disruptive effects of an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity. However, with increased speed, and subsequent 
condensed event timelines, the decision maker will be forced to adjust and evolve their 
common training and collaborative planning methods (i.e., in a way that acknowledges 
the challenges of increased speed and decreased time) in order to succeed.   
So, for the maritime battles at Trafalgar and Midway, common training and 
collaborative planning were necessary and appear to be sufficient for alleviating the 
destructive effects of the environment of extreme information ambiguity the decision 
maker’s faced. In consideration of land and air battles, common training and 
collaborative planning will continue to be necessary. However, whether or not they will 
be sufficient will depend on the leader/decision maker’s or organization’s ability to adapt 
their common training and collaborative planning methods as necessary. In addition there 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis model264, with a focus on behavior not technology, has presented a 
detailed case study analysis of two historic maritime military battles, the Battle of 
Trafalgar and the Battle of Midway. Both battles, although separated by 140 years have 
some similarities, namely, both battles provide a good example of an environment of 
extreme information ambiguity and both ended in decisive victory for one side. The 
thesis model seems to be valid on the basis of the limited number of case studies 
conducted. Additionally, in Chapter IV, it was proposed that perhaps time and leadership 
should be considered as factors that may also serve to alleviate the detrimental effects of 
an environment of extreme information ambiguity.  
Any conclusion based on the two cases is bound to be limited. However, one can 
see connections and relevance with what the thesis model describes and how the United 
States Joint Forces doctrine seems to be evolving. This chapter focuses on the evolution 
of future joint operations for the United States military as described in the United States 
Department of Defense Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) Version 2.0 
August 2005. Specifically, does this thesis model have implications for the success of 
future joint military operations? The answer is yes, and what follows is a brief discussion 
that postulates how the joint force decision makers of tomorrow will depend on a 
combined use of common training and collaborative planning in order to alleviate the 
information ambiguity and complexity they will inevitably face in future operations. 
First, a brief description is presented of the CCJO. Next, the CCJO proposes 
broad “solutions” for how the joint force will operate in order to accomplish its mission. 
It is here that one really begins to recognize the implications the thesis model has for the 
CCJO. The third, and arguably the most important part of this chapter, delineates the 
characteristics of the joint force and offers some suggestions on how to achieve the goals 
of the CCJO. The inference will be that the joint force’s goals will be attainable through 
                                                 
264 Are common training and collaborative planning necessary and sufficient for lessoning the harmful 
effects of an environment of extreme information ambiguity so that a decision may continue to make 
effective decisions. 
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the use of common training and collaborative planning. Additionally, the third part of this 
chapter asserts that an environment of extreme information ambiguity cannot be 
eliminated, rather, it can only be reduced. Fourth, some suggestions are offered for future 
joint operations and its inevitable environments of extreme information ambiguity. 
Finally, the conclusion offers some recommendations for future use of the model. 
B. BRIEF OVERVIEW: CAPSTONE CONCEPT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS  
The CCJO is the summary document for all future joint military operations and is 
the main document in a family of joint operations concepts (JOpsC)265 that detail how 
joint forces are expected to function across the range of military operations from 2012-
2025. One noteworthy implication of the CCJO is that the future joint force must seek 
full spectrum dominance and continue to improve its ability to operate in a unified 
way.266 
In all situations, the joint force will seek Full Spectrum Dominance 
through unified action as a supporting or supported element of a larger 
national or multinational effort designed to achieve strategic and 
operational objectives, and outcomes.267 
C. SOLUTIONS TO FUTURE MILITARY PROBLEMS 
The future joint force will operate in order to complete strategic objectives and 
prevail over the military problems described in the CCJO. The CCJO details the solutions 
to future military problems in the following way: 
 
1. Central Ideas 
2. A Systems View of the Environment where all situations (adversary and crisis 
response) are view as involving complex adaptive systems 
3. The Fundamental Joint Actions that are key  to designing joint force operations 
                                                 
265 The CCJO guides the joint operating concepts, joint functional concepts and the joint integrating 
concepts. 
266 United States Department of Defense Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 2.0, August 
2005, 2. Unified action: Strategic objectives are determined in the context of the global situation and 
interaction with a variety of allies and other multinational partners. Achieving these objectives requires 
integrating joint force actions with those of interagency and perhaps multinational partners.  
267 An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century, 28 
January 2003, 10. Full Spectrum Dominance is the decisive defeat of any adversary or control of any 
situation across the full range of military operations. 
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4. The Supporting Ideas which describe how the future joint force is expected to 
operate 
5. The Key Characteristics the joint force must possess to operate as envisioned 
 
Taking a systems view of the environment, the information that will exist 
regarding future military problems will be complex. Because of this complexity, the 
framework used in the CCJO treats adversaries and situations as complex, adaptive 
systems. Regarding complex adaptive systems, it is important to understand the structure 
and dynamics of adversaries to the extent possible and to continue to learn about them 
over time. The thesis model addresses common training and collaborative planning 
which, in this case, appears to be the way the CCJO envisions the future battle space. For 
example, regarding common training, one infers from “learn about them over time” that 
common training should be applied. Moreover, the joint force could use similar 
training/education/doctrine and vigorous training to ensure learning over time. In another 
example, this time regarding collaborative planning, the CCJO states “the inability to 
predict the outcome of actions taken on a system requires an adaptive and flexible 
approach to joint force operations.” This last idea indicates the joint force will need to be 
able to deal with novel situations where collaborative planning techniques such as sharing 
ideas among distributed decision makers, planers, and leaders, synchronizing the use of 
assets, engaging in global real-time collaboration, and making use of multiple 
information sharing techniques such as a virtual workspace, video conferencing, and chat 
tools could be used to help with planning for novel scenarios prior in advance of military 
operations.268 
The solution of developing and sustaining fundamental joint actions suggests the 
joint force must acquire, refine, and share knowledge. Knowledge must be timely, 
applicable, and correct to be useful, and it must be obtained, prioritized, refined, and 
shared vertically and horizontally. In order to accomplish this level of knowledge 
management, the joint force will need to utilize multiple collaboration tools to develop 
and maintain shared situational awareness, facilitate information flow, examine other 
viewpoints, and share information across geographic boundaries. With sufficient 
                                                 
268 CCJO, 11-12. 
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bandwidth, a clearer picture of the situation can be developed because everyone involved 
in planning will have access to all relevant information, all the time, and will be able to 
communicate ideas to all participants in near-real time (with the goal of this process 
becoming instant). 
D. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JOINT FORCE 
In reviewing the anticipated future military problems that the CCJO will likely 
face, it is clear that tomorrow’s joint force decision makers will likely encounter far 
greater environments of extreme information ambiguity than what past decision makers 
had to contend with. For the most part, the leaders of the Department of Defense 
recognize the necessity of reducing environments of extreme information ambiguity. It 
also seems clear that in order to accomplish the solutions to the future military problems 
prescribed in the CCJO, a joint force capable of effective common training and 
collaborative planning will be necessary.  
The CCJO details several characteristics the future joint force will most likely 
need to possess in order to be capable of dealing with the future military threats. The 
future joint force’s key characteristics include being knowledge empowered, networked, 
and interoperable. A closer look at these characteristics should reinforce the reader’s 
understanding of the correlation between common training, collaborative planning, 
environments of extreme information ambiguity, and how the thesis model applies to 
what the CCJO hopes to accomplish. 
Regarding knowledge empowerment, the CCJO explicitly states that the focus of 
a joint military force includes being able to function in, vice removing, the environment 
of extreme information ambiguity (The CCJO refers to an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity as the fog of war.). Chapter I of this thesis also stated that it was 
absolutely essential to emphasize that the effects of an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity can only be mitigated and not eliminated completely. 
Furthermore, a joint force that tries to get rid of the effects of this type of environment 
will expend a disproportionate amount of time, energy, and resources for little to no gain. 
For clarification, one cannot eliminate an environment itself; rather, one can only lessen 
or tone down its harmful effects.  
120 
The CCJO states, “Although we will never eliminate the fog of war, an increased 
level of understanding should empower leaders throughout the joint force.”269 One can 
infer from the CCJO’s call for “an increased level of understanding should empower 
leader,” that what is occurring is the alleviation of the harmful effects of the decision 
maker’s uncertain information environment. It is the intention of the CCJO that all joint 
leaders realize that the effects of environments of extreme information ambiguity cannot 
be removed or eliminated, only lessened.  
Once this concept of “mitigation” is accepted, the decision maker/leader may go 
on to “anticipate and act as opportunities are presented, apply innovative solutions, 
mitigate risk, and increase the pace, coherence, and effectiveness of operations even in 
complex environments.”270 In the end,  an ability to continue making effective decisions, 
is what is accomplished through the amelioration of the unfavorable outcomes of an 
extremely ambiguous information environment. 
Networked refers to the idea that a networked joint force is achieved through the 
use of collaborative planning. “All joint forces will be connected and synchronized in 
time and purpose…”271 A networked joint force is able to capitalize on the benefits of 
decentralization, adaptability, and increased tempo -- without sacrificing coordination or 
unity of effort. The joint force, through the use of networking, will be able to efficiently 
share ideas, synchronize assets, utilize information technology, conduct global real-time 
collaborative mission planning, and use multiple information sharing techniques. As a 
result of having a networked joint force facilitated by collaborative planning, the force 
will benefit from shared situational awareness, freer flowing information, fuller 
understanding of all issues, information shared across geographic and temporal 
boundaries, and near real-time ability to maintain a clearer picture/access to all relevant 
information. In the end, in order to improve unified action, networks must extend to 
interagency and multinational partners. 
A force that is interoperable refers to a force that is capable of sharing and 
apabilities between elements and commands at various exchanging knowledge and c                                                 
269 CCJO, 21. 
270 CCJO, 21. 
271 CCJO, 21. 
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levels, and helps to eliminate the “guess work” about how countries, militaries, units, and 
individuals will interact in the battlespace.  Common training and common understanding 
of concepts and terms are a huge part of interoperability. The CCJO is about common 
understanding of the principles of warfare and how groups are organized to fight 
together. This is facilitated through collaborative planning. 
E. FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE CAPSTONE CONCEPT FOR JOINT 
OPERATIONS 
The joint force decision makers of tomorrow will find themselves immersed in an 
environment of extreme information ambiguity. The thesis model has shown that 
common training and collaborative planning, at least on the basis of limited case study 
exploration, appear to help mitigate the debilitating effects of such an environment. 
Moreover, it will be imperative that the US military leaders of the future utilize common 
training and collaborative planning to build a joint force capable of successfully facing 
the future military scenarios anticipated in the CCJO. Environments of extreme 
information ambiguity have always existed in warfare, and this level of information 
ambiguity is anticipated to increase in future scenarios. One of the assumptions of the 
thesis model is that the debilitating effects of such environments cannot be eliminated; 
rather, the effects of the harmful environment may only be reduced (hopefully to a level 
where the joint commander may continue to make effective decisions).  
Solutions detailed in the CCJO that propose to deal with future military scenarios 
will only be possible provided future joint force decision makers do not become 
overwhelmed by their inevitable environment of extreme information ambiguity.  
Creation of a joint force capable of this feat will be accomplished through the use of 
common training and collaborative planning. Validation of this claim is found in Chapter 
III and IV of this thesis. Specifically, these chapters underscore how the Royal Navy 
prepared for the battle they faced at Trafalgar in 1805 and the how the United States 
Navy prepared for the Battle at Midway in 1942. It is worth noting that the findings of 
this thesis have brought historical relevance to much of what is portrayed in the CCJO 
within the operational and organizational limits of time. 
In conclusion, the CCJO proposed several possible characteristics for the future 
joint force. It was postulated that any joint force capable of implementing the solutions 
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previously described would require such characteristics. Close examination of these 
characteristics showed obvious implications for common training and collaborative 
planning as they pertain to assuaging the hazardous effects of an environment of extreme 
information ambiguity. However, when all is said and done, and as the future joint force 
moves towards the eventual goal of full spectrum dominance through unified action, the 
United States military must learn to succeed even when the environments remain 
ambiguous. 
F. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS 
We should endeavor to explore this model through a variety of methods in 
addition to the two maritime case studies already done. Perhaps more research could be 
conducted using a more quantitative dynamical model (vice the qualitative model used 
for this thesis) which takes into account change in all the variables over the time of a 
battle. Such a statistical model could be applied against a far more quantified database of 
battles. This would enable detail horizontally (quantitative) and may improve the validity 
of the model.272 
This thesis has been an initial exploration that essentially asked the question, how 
does the researcher think this particular aspect of the world works (i.e.,  decision making 
in an environment of extreme information ambiguity and its relation to common training 
and collaborative planning)? So how does one go about answering that question? In this 
thesis, the question was answered via an exploratory case study method which, being 
qualitative, took the researcher deep, not wide, into a small cross-section of the topic of 
decision making in environments of extreme information ambiguity. Now that the initial 
exploration is complete, it appears reasonable that this model should be looked into 
further, and since it appears to have implications for the CCJO, the model appears to be 
important. 
                                                 
272 D.T. Campbell and D.W. Fiske, Convergent and discriminant validation by multi-trait-multi-










































APPENDIX A:  ACADEMIC SOURCE SURVEY 
 









I AM LT ANDY REEVES.  I AM DOING THESIS RESEARCH ON MILITARY  
ENVIRONMENTS OF EXTREME INFORMATION AMBIGUITY.   
 
Q1.  DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT I MEAN BY A “MILITARY 
ENVIRONMENT OF EXTREME INFORMATION AMBIGUITY? 
 
Y OR N 
 
IF ( Y,) CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOU MEAN BY A “MILITARY 




(IF THE DESCRIPTION FITS YOURS), ASK: 
 
Q2.   CAN YOU PROVIDE AT LEAST THREE HISTORICAL OR CURRENT 
EXAMPLES OF AN ENVIRONMENT OF EXTREME INFORMATION 
AMBIGUITY? 
 1.  
 2. CAN YOU PROVIDE ANOTHER? 
 3. CAN YOU PROVIDE ANOTHER? 
 4. 
 
(IF THE DESCRIPTION DOES NOT FIT YOURS), ASK: 
 
Q3.   COULD WE THINK OF A MILITARY ENVIRONMENT OF EXTREME 
INFORMATION AMBIGUITY IN THE FOLLOWING WAY?: 
• AN ORGANIZATION IS COMPOSED OF PEOPLE, EACH OF WHICH, 
UNDER THE RIGHT CONDITIONS, CAN BECOME A DECISION 
MAKER. A MILITARY DECISION MAKER IS OFTEN TIMES FACED 
WITH ENVIRONMENTS-OF-EXTREME-INFORMATION-AMBIGUITY.  
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• AT THE MOST CONFUSING POINT OF SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT, 
THE DECISION MAKER REACHES A POINT AT WHICH SURVIVING 
SEEMS INCONCEIVABLE. HIS SENSES AND CAPACITY TO 
CONTINUE FUNCTIONING ARE SO OVERWHELMED, IT IS AS IF HE 
IS PARALYZED, AND CEASES TO FUNCTION.  
• DESPITE THIS CONFUSION, A DECISION MAKER WHO HAS 
PREPARED HIMSELF TO DEAL WITH SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT 
WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AND ORCHESTRATE AN 
OPERATION OR CAMPAIGN.  
• AN ORGANIZATION THAT FUNDAMENTALLY UNDERSTANDS 
THAT ENVIRONMENTS-OF-EXTREME-INFORMATION-AMBIGUITY 
CANNOT BE AVOIDED OR ELIMINATED, WILL NOT TRY; RATHER, 
IT WILL WORK TO UNDERSTAND THEM, FUNCTION WITHIN 
THEM, AND IF POSSIBLE, REDUCE THE CONFUSING AND 
DEBILITATING EFFECTS OF THEM.  
• THE TASK OF DEFINING AN ENVIRONMENT-OF-EXTREME-
INFORMATION-AMBIGUITY IS MET BY UNDERSTANDING HOW A 
HUMAN’S 5 SENSES, COGNITION, AND AFFECT (EMOTIONS) 
FACTOR INTO AN ORGANIZATION’S ABILITY OR INABILITY TO 
MAKE EFFECTIVE DECISIONS IN THIS OVERWHELMING 
ENVIRONMENT. IN SHORT, WHAT DOES THE DECISION MAKER 
OF AN ORGANIZATION FEEL, AND HOW DO THESE FEELINGS 
AFFECT HIM. 
 
(NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: GET INTERVIEWEE TO AGREE) 
 
(N TO Q1) COULD WE THINK OF A MILITARY ENVIRONMENT OF 
EXTREME INFORMATION AMBIGUITY IN THE FOLLOWING WAY?: 
• AN ORGANIZATION IS COMPOSED OF PEOPLE, EACH OF WHICH, 
UNDER THE RIGHT CONDITIONS, CAN BECOME A DECISION 
MAKER. A MILITARY DECISION MAKER IS OFTEN TIMES FACED 
WITH ENVIRONMENTS-OF-EXTREME-INFORMATION-AMBIGUITY.  
• AT THE MOST CONFUSING POINT OF SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT, 
THE DECISION MAKER REACHES A POINT AT WHICH SURVIVING 
SEEMS INCONCEIVABLE. HIS SENSES AND CAPACITY TO 
CONTINUE FUNCTIONING ARE SO OVERWHELMED, IT IS AS IF HE 
IS PARALYZED, AND CEASES TO FUNCTION.  
• DESPITE THIS CONFUSION, A DECISION MAKER WHO HAS 
PREPARED HIMSELF TO DEAL WITH SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT 
WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AND ORCHESTRATE AN 
OPERATION OR CAMPAIGN.  
• AN ORGANIZATION THAT FUNDAMENTALLY UNDERSTANDS 
THAT ENVIRONMENTS-OF-EXTREME-INFORMATION-AMBIGUITY 
CANNOT BE AVOIDED OR ELIMINATED, WILL NOT TRY; RATHER, 
IT WILL WORK TO UNDERSTAND THEM, FUNCTION WITHIN 
126 
THEM, AND IF POSSIBLE, REDUCE THE CONFUSING AND 
DEBILITATING EFFECTS OF THEM.  
• THE TASK OF DEFINING AN ENVIRONMENT-OF-EXTREME-
INFORMATION-AMBIGUITY IS MET BY UNDERSTANDING HOW A 
HUMAN’S 5 SENSES, COGNITION, AND AFFECT (EMOTIONS) 
FACTOR INTO AN ORGANIZATION’S ABILITY OR INABILITY TO 
MAKE EFFECTIVE DECISIONS IN THIS OVERWHELMING 
ENVIRONMENT. IN SHORT, WHAT DOES THE DECISION MAKER 
OF AN ORGANIZATION FEEL, AND HOW DO THESE FEELINGS 
AFFECT HIM. 
 
(THEN CONTINUE WITH Q.2 ABOVE)  
 
PROBING QUESTIONS:  
 
1. WHY DID YOU CHOOSE THAT CAMPAIGN/PERSON?  
i) IS THERE ANY ASPECT ABOUT THE TRAINING THAT STANDS 
OUT? 
ii) IS THERE ANY ASPECT OF THE PLANNING THAT STANDS OUT? 
iii) CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT HOW THIS SITUATION/CASE THAT 
TALKS ABOUT THE TRAINING THEY USED?  
 
2. IF HE SAYS A NAME LIKE ROMMEL: 
i) WHICH CAMPAIGN WOULD YOU BE TALKING ABOUT ROMMEL 
IN? 
(1) ANS: NORTH AFRICA 
ii) WHAT PART OF NORTH AFRICA? LIBIYAN CAMPAIGN OF 1941? 
(1) ANS: ANY OF HIS CAMPAIGNS. 
iii) STOP HERE.  
 
3. IF THE ANSWER IS TOO BROAD: 
i) WHAT CAMPAIGN? 
ii) ANYTHING ABOUT THE PLANNING OF EACH SIDE THAT 
STRIKES YOU ABOUT THIS CAMPAIGN? 
iii) ANYTHING ABOUT THE TRAINING OF EACH SIDE THAT 
STRIKES YOU ABOUT THIS CAMPAIGN? 
 
4. CAN YOU THINK OF ANY OTHER CAMPAIGNS? 
i) ANS: NO 
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